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February 16, 1979 Conference 
Appeal from E. D. Wash. / h-judge ·-~ 
List 3, Sheet 1 ' -
- 0- t-rv~ 
No. 78-60 - v • 
_(East(dj) & Turrintine'(dj); / / 
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF Kilkenny (cj), concur & di·ssent-) __ .-
THE COLVILLE INDIAN RESERVATION 
UL-
J ~ t Gt' v 
\' ::V Federal/Civil 
v. 
WASHINGTON Timely 
""\ Appeal from E. D. Wash. C (3-j udge ~) 
/ 
No. 78-630 
. WASHINGTON KTikennv(cj), concur & dissent) 
v. -n-e s-~ ~~~ ( 
(East(dj) & Turrintine(dj); 
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF 'l'HE--i.~l ~~ ~ -r:. .... ~t...c-r...: 
COLVILLE INDIAN RESERVATION Federal/Civil Timely 
_./ 
1. SUMMARY: In these two cross-appeals, both sides attack 
different portions of the three-judge d.ct's decision 
regulating the relationship between the State of Washington and 
four Indian tribes located within the State. The Tribes 
challenge the State's assertion of jurisdiction over them and 
"I WC)v\d a\~(~ c_,I.M'\IMM\~ :tt T8-la0. _r- wtru\c\_ ~VA\JL -~II)!:-" ho--o.. oF , . 
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State challenges the Tribes' refusal to comply with some of 
taxing provisions. 
2. FACTS: Appts in 78-60 are the Colville, Lummi and Makah 
Indian Tribes. All three are sovereign tribes recognized by 
the United States that are governed ·-by a tribal council under a 
constitution and by-laws approved by the Secy of the Interior. 
All three tribes live on reservations located within the 
geographic area of the State of Washington. 
The source of the controversy in 78-60 is the State's 
assertion of varying degrees of jurisdiction over the three 
Tribes. Based on the authority provided by Congress in Public 
Law 83-280, the Wash. legislature in 1957 enacted Chapter 240, 
which authorized the governor to issue a proclamation assuming 
total jurisdiction over any Indian reservation if the Tribe on 
that reservation requested it. In 1963, the legislature 
enacted Chapter 36 which obligated the State to assume partial 
civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian reservations with 
regard to eight subject-matter categories, ~' compulsory 
school attendance. 
In 1965 the Colville Business Council enacted a resolution 
requesting the State to assume total jurisdiction over the 
Indian reservation. The governor of the State issued a 
proclamation to that effect on January 29, 1965. Neither the 
Makah nor the Lummi Tribe has made a similar request and thus 
they are subject only to the State's partial jurisdiction. 
All three Tribes filed suit for a declaratory judgment that 
the State's assumption of jurisdiction was illegal. All three 
Tribes argued that the State could not assume any jurisdiction 
' c 
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over them without first amending its constitution. They argued 
that this requirement arose either from Public Law 83-280 or 
Washington's Enabling Act. Alternatively, the Tribes argued 
that, even if the State could exercise jurisdiction by passing 
a mere statute, the Act passed by the Wash. legis. violated 
equal protection. 
The d.ct. held that there was no need to have a 
constitutional amendment in order for the State to assume 
jurisdiction over the Indians. It felt bound by this Ct's 
dismissal of an appeal, 397 u.s. 316, from a Wash. s.ct 
judgment that a statute sufficed to comply with Pub. Law 
83-280. Makah Indian Tribe v. Washington, 76 Wash.2d 485, 457 
P.2d 590. 
The d.ct did accept a previous CA9 decision that the 
State's assumption of partial jurisdiction violated the Makah 
and Lummi tribes' rights to equal· protection. See Confederated 
Barids & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington, 552 
F.2d 1332 (CA9 1977), revd, No. 77-388 (Jan. 16, 1979). The 
d.ct, however, rejected the Colville Tribe's claim that the 
State's assumption of total jurisdiction ·over it also violated 
equal protection. 
The State of Washington is the appt Ct~ At issue 1n 
---~ that appeal are several general taxing statUtes that are 
applied to enterprises conducted on the Tribes' reservations. 
First, the State has a cigarette excise tax of approximately 
$1.60 per carton that is imposed upon the sale, use, 
consumption, handling, possession or distribution of 




retailer is required to purchase. Sales of cigarettes to 
reservation Indians are not subject to the tax. The tax is 
applied, however, to the resale of cigarettes by the 
reservation Indians to non-members ~f the Tribe. The incidents 
of the tax thus fall on the purchaser of the cigarettes. To 
assist in enforcing these taxes the State requires all sellers 
to provide it with complete information on all cigarette 
sales. As applied to the Tribes, this requirement is imposed 
both for sales to members of the Tribes and to non-members. 
The State also imposes a sales tax on resale of 
cigarettes. The tax amounts to 5 per cent of the sale price of 
the item. 
The Colville, Lummi and Makah Tribes all have a scheme for 
taxing the sale of cigarettes on their reservations. The 
Tribes themselves are engaged in the retailing of cigarettes. 
They purchase them wholes~le from out of state and distribute 
them to their tribally licensed dealers on the reservation. 
The cigarettes remain the property of the Tribe until sold. 
All three tribes levy a tax upon the distribution of cigarettes 
to the distributor. These taxes range from 40 to 50 cents per 
carton. Approximately 90% of the Tribes' sales of cigarettes 
are to non-members of the Tribes. 
The Yakima Indian Tribe is an appellee i 
~ 
78-630 \and it too 
has an ordinance for regulating and taxing the sale of 
cigarettes. The Tribe purchases cigarettes wholesale from out 
of state and then sells them to members who have been licensed 
to run •smoke shops" on the reservation. The Tribe derives a 




imposes a 22.5 cent per carton tax. 
The S~te's second tax at issue in No. 78-630 is a motor 
 
vehicle, camper and travel trailer excise tax that is imposed 
on the privlege of using these various motor vehicles in the 
state. The tax is measured by 2 per- cent of the fair market 
value of the vehicle. The State only taxes those vehicles that 
are used in whole or in part outside of the reservation. 
The Tribes refused to comply with the State's taxing 
requirements. To enforce its cigarette tax, the State seized 
unstamped cigarettes shipped in interstate commerce that it 
believed were going to be used for resale outside of the 
reservation. 
The Tribes then filed suit in federal d.ct to enjoin the 
State's enforcement efforts. They claimed that the taxes as 
applied to them were unlawful. A three-judge d.ct was convened 
because the Tribes were seeking to have the state's statute 
declared unconstitutional and its enforcement against them 
enjoined. 
The d.ct held that the cigarette taxes had been preempted 
by Tribal ordinances regulating and taxing the sale of 
cigarettes. In addition, it held that the tax, by increasing 
I 
the price of cigarettes and reducing the Tribes' revenues from 
their sales, interfered with the Tribes' right of self-govt as 
provided in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217. The ct reasoned 
that if the Tribes did not have the tax revenues from sales to 
non-tribe members, they could not afford to provide basic 
govtal services. For the same reasons, the ct struck down the 






non-members of the Tribes. With regarq to the vehicle tax, the 
ct held that the tax had the same practical effect as the 
personal property tax struck down in Moe v. Confederated Salish 
& Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 u.s. 463, and 
thus was equally unconstitutional. 
Judge Kilkenny dissented from the holding that the 
cigarette tax was impermissible. He felt that the mere fact 
that both sovereigns chose to tax the same product did not 
create a preemption problem. He also declined to join the 
majority's holding with regard to the vehicle excise tax. He 
felt that the record was inadequate to determine whether the 
tax was unconstitutional under McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Commn, 411 u.s. 164, as being a tax on activity on the 
reservation or constitutional under Mescalero Apache Tribe v. 
Jones, 411 U.S. 145, as a tax on activity outside of the 
reservation. 
3. CONTENTIONS & DISCUSSION FOR 78-60: The Tribes in 78-60 
basically raise the same issues decided by the Ct in Yakima II, 
on Jan. 16. In fact, they request consolidation of ~argument 
with that appeal. They argue that the State cannot assume 
jurisdiction over their reservations without amending its 
constitution. The Colville Tribe also claims that even if the 
state's law complies with the federal statutes, its application 
to it still violates equal protection. 
The Ct in Yakima decided that the State's assumption of 
jurisdiction not only complies with the federal statutes relied 
upon by the Tribes, but also that the state law permitting 




The Ct held that the propex standard of review of the State's 
statute was whether it bore a rational relationship to a 
legitimate state interest. Yakima thus decided most of the 
issues in 78-60. 
The only issue left is whether tne assumption of total 
jurisdiction against the Colville Tribe violates equal 
protection. Given that the Tribe, itself, requested the State 
to assume total jurisdiction, it is difficult to perceive how 
the State's action can be said to be unreasonable. 
For the appeal in No. 78-60, I would affirm summarily on 
the authority of Yakima. 
~ 4. CONTENTIONS IN 78-630: The State first argues that the 
d.ct erred in holding that it could not tax cigarettes sold to 
non-members of the Tribes. The State first notes that this Ct 
decided in Moe, supra that taxing such sales by individual 
Indians was permissible. 425 u.s .. at 481. The State next cites 
Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 
442 F.2d 1184 (CA9 1971), cert denied, 405 u.s. 933 (1972) 
(state possessory interest tax on lessees'of Indian-owned land 
held constitutional) and Fort Mojave v. San Bernardino County, 
543 F.2d 933 (CA9 1976), cert denied, 430 u.s. 1253 (1977) 
(same), to support its view that there is no Williams v. Lee 
problem created by the fact that the Tribes are the actual 
retailers in this case. 
The Tribes argue that the d.ct's decision is a proper 
application of this Ct's previous holdings. They contend that 
the d.ct correctly found that the Tribes' ability to govern was 




contrary to the principles supporting tribal self-government 
announced in Williams v. Lee, 358 u.s. 217. The Tribes also 
rely upon this fact to distinguish the Ct's holding in Moe, 
supra. 
The State next argues that its tax reporting statute is a 
reasonable accounting requirement that is very similar to the 
state law requiring the Indians to collect the taxes for the 
State that was approved in Moe, supra, 425 u.s. at 482-83. It 
asserts that its ability to guarantee collection of the proper 
amount of tax is dependent on being permitted to require 
record-keeping on all sales and not merely those sales to 
non-members of the Tribes. 
The Tribes do not specifically address this issue. The 
d.ct held that the State could require collection of only that 
information reasonably necessary to guarantee collection of the 
tax and that the State had failed to demonstrate why it needed 
records on all sales to satisfy its enforcement interest. 
Third, the State contests the d.ct's independent holding 
that its cigarette and sales taxes could not be applied to 
reservation Indians who are not members of the Tribe. It 
argues that the issue was not decided in Moe, supra, 425 u.s. 
at 480 n.l6, and that it is substantial. The State asserts 
that there is no federal basis for restricting the State's 
right to regulate non-tribal members merely because they live 
on a reservation. 
The Tribes first question whether this is an appealable 
issue since nothing in the . d.ct's injunctive order deals with 






dealing with the issue have agreed with the d.ct. Finally, 
they contend that the definition of "Indian" in 25 u.s.c. §479, 
includes non-tribe members on a reservation, and thus federal 
law precludes the distinction among Indians that the State 
seeks to draw. 
Fourth, the St~te argues that its vehicle excise tax is 
constitutional under Mescalero Apache Tribe, supra. It argues 
that it merely taxes uses .of vehicles off the reservation and 
thus there is no basis for applying McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Commn, supra. It asserts that at a minimum the issue is 
substantial since it falls between two decisions of this Ct. 
The Tribes respond by adopting the analysis of the d.ct. 
They note that the statute here has the same practical effect 
as the statute invalidated in Moe. Citing the d.ct's opn, they 
assert that the statute in Moe also applied to vehicle use 
partly on and partly off the Flathead reservation. They thus 
argue that the issue has been resolved by this Ct. 
Finally, the State seeks reversal of the d.ct's decision 
agreeing with the CA9's Yakima holding that the State's 
assumption of partial jurisdiction violates equal protection. 
The Tribes do not directly respond to this argument. 
5. DISCUSSION FOR 78-630: There is an initial question of 
.. '-~ 
the three-judge ct's jurisdiction to decide th~ case. The ct 
~~ 
acknowledged that this Ct in Moe made clear that a three-judge 
d.ct could not obtain jurisdiction if the only basis for 
attacking enforcement of the state's statute was under the 
Supremacy Clause. The d.ct avoided that problem by noting that 





statutes--seizure of goods in interstate commerce--raised a 
substantial question under the Commerce Clause and thus the Ct 
did have jurisdiction over the Tribes' claims. 
There are several problems with ~he d.ct's resolution 0f 
this question. First, the constitutionality of the enforcement 
procedure really is independent of the underlying statutes 
being challenged by the Tribes. Thus, there is a serious 
bootstraping problem in its analysis. Second, the enforcement 
efforts only applied to the cigarette tax issue and yet the ct 
considered and decided several additional issues that did not 
implicate the enforcement procedure. I am not sure whether 
these issues were properly decided by the d.ct. The ct did 
invoke the doctrine of "judicial economy, convenience and 
fairness to the litigants" to justify retaining jurisdiction 
over the whole case. I would tentatively note probable 
jurisdiction on the subst~ntial questions discussed below and 
postpone consideration of the jurisdictional issues until 
argument. 
On the merits, I think the cigarette tax issue is a 
substantial one. The d.ct took a very expansive view of 
~
Williams v. Lee. There the effect of the state's law was to 
undermine directly the authority of the tribal ct. Here, the 
effect on the Tribes' ability to govern is much less direct. 
Moreover, the two CA9 cases cited by the State do seem to 
reject a broad application of Williams to state taxing cases. 
I would note probable jurisdiction on this issue. 
The question of whether the State may require records of 
Indian sales to Indians on the reservation by itself is 
( ~ 
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probably not substantial, but if the Ct noted probable 
jurisdiction on the first issue it would be reasonable to note 
it on this one too. It does seem reasonable to permit the 
• 
State to require records on all sales to guarantee against tax 
fraud. The requirement would not b~ onerous if the tax is 
declared constitutional since the Tribes could be required 
under Moe, supra, co provide records on the sales to 
non-members, which comprise 90 per cent of the sales. 
The question of whether the State for taxation purposes can 
distinguish between tribal Indians and non-tribal Indians 
living on the reservation is also not independently noteworthy, 
but probably should be noted if the first issue is. 
The constitutionality of a state's "use" tax on vehicles 
driven both on and off the reservation has never been decided 
by this Ct. The Ct in Moe, however, did strike down a persona~ 
property tax applied to a vehicle on a reservation. Both that 
tax and the one involved here were bas~d on a percentage of the 
fair market value of the vehicle. Since the State's tax does 
not purport to make allowance for the amount of use off the 
reservation, it seems to me indistinguishable from Moe. I thus 
would affirm this part of the d.ct's decision. 
Finally, our decision in Yakima requires reversal of the 
d.ct's holding that the State's assumption of partial 
jurisdiction over the Lummi and Makah Tribes violates equal 
protection. 
There is a motion from the State of Wash. to affirm in 
78-60. There are motions to affirm or dismiss from both the 
J( 
Yakima Tribe and the Colville, Lummi and Makah Tribes in 78-630. 
1/23/79 Phillips D.Ct opn in JS app. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 13 September 1979 
From: Gregory May 
No. 78-630: Washington v. Confederated Tribes "1.. ~~. 
cr~~~·-~·1~t~ 
Questions Presented 
s.AvuU. L,..-.& .. ,;-r ~vi" j/cfi "-~~0 ~ 
Jurisdictional Questions ~~ J.4A- v€~-R~ H ~ ~ Y.. 
~ ~
1. Was a three-judge district court properly convened 
in these cases? The United States has raised this issue by 
moving to dismiss the Yakima appeal. The same issue is present 
in the Colville appeal, although no party has moved for 
dismissal. 
2. Was the appeal of the motor vehicle excise tax 
issues in Colville timely? 
Substantive Questions 
1. State Cigarette Tax: ..________-
(a) May the state tax cigarettes sold on the 
reservation to non-Indians by tribal retailers even though the 
tribes also tax cigarettes? 
(b) Are Indians living on a reservation set aside 
for a tribe other than their own subject to the state cigarette 
tax? 
(c) May the state require tribal retailers to 
putb igarette tax stamps on cigarette packages sold to non-
Indians? The district court did not expressly reach this issue 
because it invalidated the tax. 
(d) May the state enforce its c iq a ret te tax by 
seizing cigare~tes being shipped through interstate commerce to 
~"""' ~-------------...._____~ 
non-complying retailers? The district court did not reach this 
issue, although it used the question as a basis for its 
jurisdiction. 
(e) May the state enforce its cigarette tax by 
seizing cigarettes held on the reservation by non-complying 
retailers? The district court also did not reach this issue. 
2. State Sales Tax: __..... 
(a) May the state impose a sales tax on the 
cigarette sales made on the reservation to non-Indians by tribal 
retailers even though the tribes tax cigarettes? 
,,, 
"· ., ' 
'l~.· 
·.. I-•' 
(b) Are Indians who do not belong to the tribe 
occupying the reservation on which they reside subject to the 
state sales tax? 
(c) May the state require tribal retailers to 
report all exempt sales to Indians? 
(d) May the state enforce its sales tax by assessing 
retailers who fail to collect it from buyers? The district 
court did not reach this issue. 
3. State Motor Vehicle Tax: 
May the state impose an excise tax on motor 
vehicles owned by reservation Indians and used both on and off 
the reservation? 
4. Is the state's partial assumption of partial 
territorial jurisdiction over Indian reservations invalid under 
the equal protection clause? This issue, appearing only in 
Colville, was resolved last Term in Washington v. Confederated 
Bands & ·Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 99 s. Ct. 740 




~ · \rhis appeal 
Facts 
arises from two cases 
" 
consolidated for 
decision by a three-judge district court. In the first suit, 
the Colville tribes sought declarat~ and 
----- (j\ :z:. 
against Washington's~igarette tax, otor vehicles tax, and 
i nj uncti ve relief 
~~ 
~y 
assumption of jurisdiction over their reservation. The tribes 
also challenged the state's seizure of untaxed cigarettes moving 
in interstate commerce. 
In the second suit, the United States on behalf of the 
Yakima tribes sought declaratory and injunctive relief against 
~
Washington's cigarette tax and the seizure of untaxed cigarettes 
moving in interstate commerce. The confederated tribal 
government intervened, claiming damages for interference with 
its cigarette business. Those claims, however, have been 
remanded to a single district judge. 
Although the parties agreed that the three-judge court 
had jurisdiction, the court felt cbnstrained to note why. Moe 
. t., 
v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 481 n.17 
(1976), said that challenges to state taxes as applied to ~· ·~~C reservation Indians raise only supremacy clause issues not 
~~--~~ within the jurisdiction of a three-judge court. In this case, 
~-_,p-1- ~c.. 
~however, the court based jurisdiction on the commerce clause 
~ challenges to seizures of cigarettes moving interstate. Having 
found jurisdiction, the court concluded that it could address 
lo ~ the validity of the tax statutes which gave the state cause for 
..-(M~ the seizures. The court did not explain how it had 
jurisdiction over the sales and motor vehicle tax questions. 
~ The three-judge court held the state cigarette tax :? invalid as applied to cigarettes sold on the reservation by 




two alternative grounds: ( 1 ) the state tax was preempted by 
cigarette taxes enacted by the tribes and approved by federal 
authori ti~ ; ( 2 ) the state tax interfered with tribal self-
government because it impaired the tribal governments' ability 
~ . to collect needed revenue. 
h U 4::J:1distinguished these cases from Moe. 
The thought both grounds court 
~ The court also held that the tribal cigarette taxes 




applied to Indian sales of other goods to non-Indians, however, 
the court declared the sales tax valid. Next, the court found 
that all Indians residing on the reservation were exempt from 
sales tax even if they were not members of the tribe for whom 
.. 
the reservation had been set aside. Finally, the court thought 
Moe permitted the state to require that the Indian seller 
collect the sales tax. It concluded, however, that requiring 
Indian sellers to record and report information about exempt 
sales to other Indians was beyond the state's power. 
The state excise tax on motor vehicles, the court 
concluded, really operated on i~dian-owned vehicles in the same 
~ way as the personal property tax at issue in Moe. The court 
IV ~~noted that the district col}'rt opinion in Moe showed that 




as they were in this case. The court therefore invalidated the 
tax under Moe. 
Discussion 
Jurisdictional Questions 
I. Three-Judge Court 
Although the United States called for a three-judge 
court in the Yakima case, it now argues that this Court has no 
jurisdiction over the appeal because a three-judge court was 
unnecessary. The Yakima tribe has joined in this contention. 
Although the Colville case presents the same issue, the Colville 
tribe agrees with the state that the three-judge court. was 
properly convened. 
~~d- ~- It is well-settled that a single district judge can 
~~hear supremacy clause challenges to state statutes. E.g., ~wift 
~ ~&Co. v. Wickham, 382 u.s. 111, 129 (1965). In Moe, 425 u.s. at 
~ 481 n.l?, this Court expressly noted that the basis for 
~ challenging state taxes as applied to the Indians was the 
supremacy clause "and not any automatic exemptions 'as a matter 
of constitutional law' either under the Commerce Clause or the 
inter-governmental immunities doctrine . " Mescalero and 
McClanahan, the Court said, had established that proposition. 
The Court allowed the appeal from the commerce clause challenge 
in Moe because the three-judge court had been convened before 
those two opinions were announced. Sine= the three-judge court 
in the present case was convened after those announcements, the 
United States argues, appeal lies in CA9. 
I'· • 
The state makes several rejoinders. First, it notes 
that the three-judge court convened in these cases before the 
decision in Moe. At that time, the state continues, the 
implications of Mescalero and McClanahan were not as clear as 
they became after Moe. Second, the state contends that this 
case did present a substantial commerce clause question even in 
light of Moe. The tribes challenged the state's right to seize 
as contraband untaxed cigarettes moving to the reservations 
through interstate commerce. Those seizures were conducted 
under spec i f i c state statutes , Wash • Rev . Code § § 8 2 . 2 4 . 1 3 0 , 
82.32.210, 82.32.235, 82.24.230. Given jurisdiction over this 
issue, the three-judge court could address the other questions 
raised in the cases. 
The three-judge court recognized the jurisdiction 
problem, even though the parties had not challenged its 
authority. It abjured reliance on the first argument advanced 
by the state, proceeding on the basis of the second argument. 
The court also noted that it had expended substantial judicial 
resources on the cases, so that retention of jurisdiction over 
all claims served the interest of judicial economy. 
The lower court rather clearl boot-strapped itself 
into taking jurisdiction over these cases. Even assuming that 
the commerce clause challenge to seizures gave the court 
jurisdiction over all challenges to the state cigarette tax, the 
court still should have remanded attacks on the other statutes 
to a single judge. By taking a charitable view, one could 
conclude that the attack on the sales tax as applied to tribal 
cigarette sales was within the court's ancillary jurisdiction 
because the tax arguably interfered with the tribal cigarette 
business. The Colville tribe's challenges to the motor vehicle 
tax and the state's assumption of partial jurisdiction over 
their reservation, however, are totally unrelated to the court's 
basis for jurisdiction. 
f~v :;: 
Since the parties have focused their efforts in this 
Court the cigarette tax issues, Court could decline the on 
jurisdiction claims without all other doing much harm. over 
~~~ 
~ · 
Indeed, because the lower court did not deal very fully with the 
remaining claims, this benefit from further Court could 
c~e~n of the issues by the court of appeals. 
'A_rN ~II. Timeliness of Appeal { ff Vv ~) 
~- The Colville tribes have moved to dismiss as untimely 
the state's appeal on the motor vehicle tax and assumption of 
jurisdiction claims. The appeal on these two claims was taken 
by amended notice of appeal within sixty days after the lower 
court denied a motion for partial new trial on the cigarette and 
sales tax issues, but more than sixty days after the court 
entered its original judgment in the case. The Colville tribe 
cites no authority for the proposition that a partial new trial 




The single question is whether a motion for partial 
new trial undermines the finality of those parts of a judgment 
not challenged by the motion. If it does, then the time for 
appeal runs anew from the denial of the motion. The state's 
amended notice of appeal, therefore, would be timely. 
The state argues convincingly that its appeal is .....___-
timely. First, the state notes that a new trial motion 
qenerally defeats the finality of a judgment. Indeed, an appeal 
taken before the trial court disposes of the motion may be 
premature (although appellate courts often forgive this defect). 
See United -states v~ Crescent -Amusement Co., 323 u.s. 173, 177 
(1944): Wright & Miller, Federal · Practice and ·Procedure: 
Jurisdiction§ 3915 at 593, 599-601 (1976). Second, the state 
argues that according finality to the parts of a judgment not 
implicated in a motion for partial new trial conflicts with the 
policy against piecemeal appeals. The usual practice is to 
merge unchallenged portions of the original judgment into the 
trial court's judgment after retrial. See 'i1r i g h t & M i 11 e r , 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2814 at 99 (1976). 
Thus, any motion for new trial suspends the finality of an 
entire judgment until the trial court takes final action. 
Substantive -Questions 
The centerpiece of this appeal is the cigarette tax, 
and the most obvious question is whether this case differs from 
Moe. Moe also bears heavily on the sales tax and motor vehicle 
tax issues. 
I. State Cigarette Tax 
(;,~~~~) 
A. State Tax Statutes 
( 1) Washington imposes a tax of $1. oO per carton on 
"the sale, use, consumption, handling, possession, or 
distribution of all .cigare'ttes." Wash. Rev. Code § 82.24.020; 
-:;;;:::l 
see id. §§ 28A.47:440, 73.32.130. The tax is collected by 
I 
requiring retailers ( 1) to buy cigarette packages bearing the 
state tax stamp or' ( 2) to buy tax · stamps and 'lffix them to each 
package before sale. 
II~ Indian tribes and their licensed retailers may possess 
~ unstamped cigarettes for .sale to enrolled members of the tribe. 
At\~V Id. § 82.24.260. When selling cigarettes to anyone else, 
~ however, the Indian retailer must affix the tax atamp and remit 
l,A>, ~~ the excise tax to the state. The retailer receives nominal 
G~ l.~ompensation for affixing the stamps. If the Indian seller does 
/ "'V not collect the tax, the state may collect it directly from the 
~r buyer. Id. §§ 82.24.020 & -.080. 
Unstamped cigarettes are subject to seizure as 
contraband unless they are in transit to authori~ed retailers. 
' '· 
Id. § 82.24.260. Indian tribes and their traders are not 
authorized retailers if they sell unstamped cigarettes to non-
Indians. Id. § 82.24.040. 
( 2) The cigarette tax is due upon occurrence of the 
first taxable event within the state. Id. § 82.24.080. In most 
case, therefore, the incidence is upon the distributor or the 
retailer. When cigarettes are consigned to an Indian retailer, 
however, the state claims that the first taxable event is the 
subsequent "possession by the non-Indian [buyer]." E.T.B. 
504.08.192 (1976): ~Tonasket v. State (Tonasket II), 525 P.2d 
744, 754 (Wash. 1974). Thus, the state avoids the federal bar 
against taxes on Indian traders. Warren Trading Post Co. · v. 
Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 u.s. 685 (1965). The Indian retailer 
who sells to non-Indians, however, does bear the burden of 
affixing the tax stamps that he must purchase from the state. 
B. Tribal Tax Ordinances 
Cigarette distribution schemes and taxes differ 
tribe to tribe, but all tribal taxes are authorized by the 
-----------~--------
federally-approved tribal constitutions and approved by. the .. -------------~-----._ ______________________________ __ 
Secretary of the Interior. 
( 1) The Colville tribes operate tobacco outlets on 
trust lands within their reservation. All cigarettes are 
purchased from out-of-state, federally-1 icensed Indian traders 
with federally-restricted tribal funds and distributed under 
tribal regulatory ordinances. Tribal retailers, who manage the 
tobacco side of their business as employees of the tribe, obtain 
custody of the tribally-owned cigarettes by paying the wholesale 
price. The purchaser pays a tax of $. 40 or $.50 per carton, 
which has been added to the retail price. The retailer's 
compensation is the amount by which the sale price exceeds the 
wholesale price plus the tribal tax. 
( 2) The Yakima tribe, on the other hand, acts as a 
-....___, ------ --
cigarette wholesaler to the tribal members who own and operate 
tobacco outlets on allotted lands within the reservation. The 
tribe buys cigarettes from out-of-state wholesalers, marks them 
up $. 01 per carton, and sells them to retailers who pay a 
"permit fee" of $.225 per carton for the privilege of retailing 
the goods. Retailers need not add the tax to their selling 
price. 
C. Incidence of the State Tax 
( 1) Since federal courts are not bound by a state's 
characterization of its tax when tax immunities are at issue, 
First Agricultural Bank v. Tax Comm'n, 392 U.S. 339, 347 (1968), 
the first question is whether the Washington tav on cigarettes 
sold by Indians to non-Indians is a tax on the non-Indian. 
~he tax is really on the Indian seller, it is invalid under 
ty{ ~ , Warren Trading · Post Co. ·v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 w~ 
If 
#1.- ;z;_ ( 1965). 
~ 
.1.~ fully that no state tax on them was valid absent explicit 
~ Congressional authorization. 




( 2) The appellees have taken the higher ground on 
which the lower court relied, and they do not strongly pursue 
the claim that the incidence of the state tax is on the Indian 
retailer. In light of the strained distinction drawn between 
Indian and non-Indian retailers in Tonasket a.nd the state tax 
bulletin, however, the claim has merit. Th~ tax here is not 
"precollected" through the price paid by the retailer to the 
wholesaler, as it was in Moe. Here, the Indian retailer pays 
the tax when he buys tax stamps for use on pac~ages sold to non-
Indians. Although he can pass the tax along in the selling 
price, like the retailers in Moe, it is he who must pay the tax 
directly to the state. Thus, the impact on th~ Indian trader is 
more like the burden disapproved in Warren than wash-out 
transaction approved in Moe. 
(3) A decision on this ground may be unsatisfactory, 
however, because it would ignore the most critical differences 
v 
between this appeal and Moe. Moe involved simply a private 
~ . . ~ r~ler whose business had almost 
~~government. Here (particularly in 
no impact on the tribal 
Colville), the tribal 
~~ ~ governments both tax and engage in the business of selling 
~ cigarettes to non-Indians. If Washington were to adopt a tax 
~~scheme like that approved in Moe, the scheme still might be 
.. ~ invalid as applied to a business taxed by the tribes themselves. 
yV~ ~In such a case, even the argument that tribal involvement is a 
~ strategy for immunizing private business from state taxes 
-~~ 
appears unsatisfactory. A state tax on cigarette sales by 
private sellers still destroys the possibility of substantial 7 
revenue from a tribal tax on the same transactions. 
D. Pre~emption of State Tax 
( 1) The two grounds on which the three-judge court 
invalidated the state cigarette tax have a common theme, the 
right of Indian tribes to exercise quasi-sovereignty 
----------~~--------~----------~------------------~--------
within 
their reservations. Since that theme is less important to the ~ 
--------~--~-- ... ~ 
pre-emption ground, pre-emption is a safer and narrower basis'~~ 
for decision. See McClanahan v. ·Arizona · Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. r 
164, 172 & n.8 (1973). Some amici are particularly fearful that~ 
a decision recognizing the tribe's inherent power to tax non-;:::t:;._ 
Indians within the reservations would impede industrial 
development on Indian lands. See Amicus Brief of Salt River 
Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District et al. 
The state argues that pre-emption is the more 
troublesome ground because it allows Indian tribes to divest 
states of their tax powers by a "mere stroke of a pen." This 
argument, however, ignores the constitutional principles that 
give the federal government plenary power to regulate relations 
between Indians and non-Indians. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca 
County, 426 U.S. 373, 376 (1976). Under the pre-emption theory, 
/
not a stroke of the tribal pen, but the federal power behind the 
stroke ousts the state tax. Since the state can exert its power 
within the federal government, it more easily can place limits 
~· ' . • 
on the possibility of pre-emption that on the exercise of 
inherent Indian sovereignty. 
( 2) The first step in the pre-empt ion argument - is 
finding a delegation of federal power to the Indian tribes. 
(a) The three-judge court found delegation in § 16 
of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, as amended, 25 U.S.C. 
§ 4 76. Only one of the tribes involved in this apoE"al (the 
Makah of the Colville confederation) reorganized under ~he Act, 
but all of the tribes have constitutions approved by the 
Secretary of the Interior under regulations applicable to 
reorganized tribes. Section 16 confirmed to the tribP.s "all 
powers vested in any Indian tribe . • by existing law." The 
power to tax non-Indians within the reservation apparently was 
one of those powers, although it was based more on the tribe's 
right to exclude whites rather than on some notion of tribal 
sovereignty. See Morris v. ·Hitchcock, 194 u.s. 384 (1904); 
Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 
203 U.S. 599 (1906); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 
89 (8th Cir. 1956); Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 142 
(1942). The federally-approved constitutions of the tribes 
involved in this appeal permit taxes on non-Indians. See, e.g., 
Constitution and By-Laws of the Confederated Tribes of the 
Colville Reservation, art. V, § 1 (e) ( 1938) [A. 66]. 
~~A~~ 
Ltf"'l"~ approval of 
!~---=7 
(b) A cleaner analysis relies squarely on 1 ederal 
-._______ ""'--"" t 
the tribal cigarette taxes and the constitutions 
authorizing them, rather than referring to traditional sovereign 
powers. It then builds on three of this Court's recent 
decisions. United States v; Mazurie, 419 u.s. 544 (1975), 
recognized that the federal government can delegate to the 
Indians broad authority over non-Indians because the tribes 
already have substantial independent authority over non-Indians 
within their territory. Fisher · v. ·District Court, 424 U.S. 382 
(1976) (per curiam), held that a federally-approved tribal court 
pre-empted state court jurisdiction over matters within its 
power. And Bryan v. · Itasca County, 426 u.s. 373 (1976), 
declared that plenary federal authority over the Indians pre-
empted taxation of property within the reservation even though 
the state had assumed complete civil and criminal jurisdiction 
under ·public Law 280, 67 Stat. 588. (Washington has assumed 
complete jurisdiction over only one of the tribes involved in 
this case: the Colville tribe of the Colville confederation.) 
Thus, the argument goes, even a state with the broadest possible 
power over the Indians cannot levy taxes on non-Indians within 
the reservation if the state exaction undercuts a federally-
approved tribal tax. 
(3) The second step in pre-emption analysis is 
~determining whether the state law undercuts federal policy. The 
~ purpose of the federally-approved tribal taxes is to raise 
enue. The tribes accomplish this objective by keeping the 




make their cigarettes significantly cheaper than those sold off 
the reservation. The resulting savings for non-Indian consumers 
Large 
numbers of non-Indians 1 ive on all the reservation, and large 
numbers come from outside the reservation in order to buy the 
cheaper cigarettes. The state wants to stop this drain on its 
own tax revenues by imposing its tax on cigarettes sold to non-
Indians. If the state tax were added to the selling price, 
however, the tribal business and its tax revenues would 
virtually disappear. No party to the appeal really disputes the 
incompatibility of the tribal and the state tax objectives. 
E. Interference with Tribal Self-Government 
Where both a state and an Indian tribe have an 
in a transaction and Congress has not spoken on the 
matter, the critical question is "whether the state action 
infringe [s] on the right of reservation Indians to make their 
own laws and be ruled by them." Williams v. Lee, 35~ U.S. 217, 
220 (1959); see McClanahan v. · Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 u.s. 164, 
179 (1973). The appellees say that Washington's cigarette tax 
interferes with tribal self-government in two respects. 
(1) The state tax most obviously interferes with 
tribal government by cutting off a substantial source of the tax 
revenue needed to support governmental functions. --- The tribes argue that the power to tax is a necessary and inherent part of 
their sovereignty, which cannot be infringed without 
Congressional approval. 
United ' States v~ Wheeler, 435 u.s. 313, 323 (1978), 
which held that a tribal prosecution did not bar a subsequent 
federal prosecution grounded in the dual sovereignty doctrine, 
recognized that the tribes "still possess those ~spects of 
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by 
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status." 
The tribes argue that the power to tax those within the 
reservation is an aspect of original sovereignty. Ta"(ation is 
critical to the support of governmental functions for which the 
tribe has primary--and sometimes exclusive--responsibility. 
See, e~g~, Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976) (per 
curiam) (jurisdiction over dispute among Indians); KP.nnerly v. 
District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971) (per curiam) (jurisdiction 
over suit for debt incurred on reservation). Non- I'1d ians who 
choose to transact business within the reserv.::ttion are 
legitimate objects of the tribal tax powers. See authorities 
cited at p. 15 sup~; cf. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 
( 1975) (owner of bar comes under Indian regulation bv choosing 
to transact business in Indian country). 
( 2) The state tax also interferes with tr i ba 1 self-
government by extending state authority into lands reserved 
exclusively for the Indians. The Indian tribes say that 
theirterritorial sovereignty over the reservations prevents the 
states from entering unless Congress has consented or the matter 
at issue "does not directly affect the Indians." New York ex 
.. 
.. 
~ . ... 
rel; ·Ray · v; ·Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 501 (1946) (murder of one non-
Indian by another) ; see Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 
U.S. 145, 148-51 (1973) (state can sales tax off-reservation 
tribal enterprise, but it has less power within the 
reservation). The first taxable event under Washington's 
cigarette tax--the possession by a non-Indian--occurs within the 
reservation. More importantly, Indians are directly affected by 
the tax. They must buy tax stamps and affix them to cigarette 
packages held on the reservation. Indeed, the state contends 
that even Indians who live on the reservation must pay the tax 
unless they are members of the governing tribe. Thus, the state 
rather clearly is reaching into territory over which the tribes 
are sovereign in some sense. 
I 
(3) (a) The territorial sovereignty strain of the 
Indians' argument is largely unpersuasive. In Moe itself, the 
state taxed events that occurred on Indian land. Washington's 
intrusion into Indian territory is not unlike that upheld in 
cases 1 ike Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernardino, 543 
F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976), which found that Moe permitted the 
state to levy a possessory interest tax on non-Indian lessees of 
reservation trust lands. The Indian retailer's duty to affix 
the stamp tax is slightly more burdensome than the precollection 
scheme in Moe, but the retailer is compensated for the task. 
~ 
~ 
(b) The argument that state cigarette taxes destroy 
a source of needed revenue for the tribes goes to the real heart 
of this case: a battle between two governments for the same _________...,. 
revenue. The tribes point to the poverty of their own people 
~ ~a~aim that they must rely on trade with non-Indians in order 
V to support tribal government. The state, on the other hand, 
~ ~ says that the tribes cannot live by marketing an Indian tax 
exemption to non-Indians and robbing the state of its own 
revenue. This Court has never squarely confronted this problem, 
but the cases suggest a resolution in favor of the state. 
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 151 
(1973), dealt with an tribal enterprise operating off the 
reservation, but the Court did declare that Indian businesses 
otherwise subject to state taxation are not exempt simply 
because the tribe needs the income for Indian government and 
welfare. Likewise, in Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San 
Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976), the court sustained 
the state tax even though its economic impact on the tribe was 
uncertain. The possible reduction in rentals due to the tribe's 
inability to market a tax exemption, the court held, was an 
indirect economic burden that did not threaten tribal self-
government. Throughout its opinion, CA9 seemed to suggest that 
the economic consequences for the tribe had no real bearing on 
the legal question. 
F. Other Issues 
(1) The state claims that Indians living on the 
reservation who are not members of the tribe for which it has 
been s e t aside are non-Indians for purposes of the state 
,_ - .- .~ .. - T ., ' .. ,... tt - e • ' .-
cigarette tax. The three-judge court did not consider this 
claim as it relates to the cigarette tax, so it may not be 
before this Court. The district court decision in Moe rejected 
a similar argument, Confederated Salish & · Kootenai Tribes · v. 
Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1312 (D. Mont. 1975), but the parties to 
that case did not raise the issue in this Court, 425 U.S. ar 480 
n.16. Although the question remains open, the state's argument 
has no merit. 
(2) If this Court holds that Indian cigarette sales to 
non-Indians are subject to the state tax, the Court then r e aches 
a number of enforcement issues. Since the three-judge court did 
not decide these issues, the case should return to the district 
court for resolution of enforcement problems in light of the 
Court's opinion. 
II. State Sales Tax -- ~ 
A. State Tax ·statute 
(1) Washington has a 4.5% sales tax on retail sales. 
Wash. Rev. Code § 82.08.020. The tax is on the buyer, but the 
seller collects the tax at the time of the sale and remits to 
the state. Id. § 82.08.050. The three-judge court noted that 
the present tax rate is 5.1% [Juris. Statmt. A. 55 n. 7], owing 
perhaps to a local option provision not included in the 
appendices. 
( 2) All retailers who collect the tax must file a 
monthly return with the state. Id. § 82.08.070. In addition, 
E.T.B. 504.08.192 (1976) requires Indian retailers to make 
detailed reports on all tax-exempt sales to Indians. The 
reports must disclose the name of the buyer, his tribal 
affiliation, the reservation on which the transaction occurred, 
the amount of the sale, and the date of the sale. 
If the seller fails to collect the tax, the state may 
recover its revenue from either the defaulting seller or from 
the buyer. Id. § 82.08.050. 
B. Pre-emption by Tribal Cigarette Tax 
(1) The three-judge court found that addition of the 
s~x to the price of cigarettes sold to non-Indians 
·~ would have an effec t n the tribal cigarette business. Although 
the Indians would retain an $.80 per carton price advantage over 
off-reservation retailers, their sales to non-Indians would 
decrease "substantially" due to the high elasticity of the 
demand for cheap cigarettes. The court concluded that the 
decrease in sales would not diminish revenues enough to 
interfere with tribal self-government, but that the impediment 
to maximum sales frustrated the policy behind the tribal 
cigarette ordinances. The court therefore held the sales tax on 
cigarettes pre-empted by the tribal laws. 
(2) The conflict between the state sales tax and the 
tribal cigarette tax is much less apparent than the conflict 
between the state and the tribal cigarette taxes. The last two 
taxes aim to raise revenue from the same object--cigarettes. 
Although the state purports to tax possession of the goods by 
non-Indians while the tribes tax cigarette purchases (Colville 
.. . . . 
tribes) or sales (Yakima tribes), the state and tribal taxes 
both go to the subject matter of the transaction. Cigarettes 
subject to both exactions are double .. taxed • The resulting 
interference with the tribes' ability to collect their tax from 
buyers who can avoid the double exaction is rather clear. 
r-~ Th~x, on the other hand, falls on all 
5~ales whether or not the subject matter of the transaction is 
~ ~ o~le. The tax assesses the buyer not for w~at he 
()4·~ acquires, but for the privilege of making the purchase. Since 
the sales tax does not subject non-Indians who buy cigarettes on 
the reservation to a double exaction, the tribes do not lose the 
• 
revenues attributable to their more favorable tax rate on 
cigarettes. Thus, the state can sales tax non-Indian buyers 
without directly interfering with tribal cigarette taxes. The 
incidental burden on the Indian retailer who must collect the 
tax probably is permissible under Moe, 425 U.S. at 463. 
C. Interference with Tribal Self-Government 
The appellees claim that the sales tax interferes with 
tribal self-government not so much by reducing cigarette sales 
to non-Indians as by unacceptably intruding into Indian 
territory and Indian affairs. The arguments advanced to Rupport 
this claim are the same arguments advanced against the state 
cigarette tax. They are equally unpersuasive here, and they do 
not distinguish the sales tax on cigarettes from the tax on any 
other retail sale to a non-Indian. 
D. State Reporting Requirements 
(1) There are, however, limits on the administrative 
requirements that the state can impose on Indian retailers. The 
lower court held that Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax 
Comm'n, 380 u.s. 685, 691 (1965), a pre-emption case, prevented 
the state from requiring tribal retailers to keep d e tailed 
records on all tax-exempt sales to Indians. 
the court noted, was a direct burden 
This requirement, 
on the trc>ders' 
transactions with Indians; indeed, the trader could not Avoid 
the burden even if he traded exclusively with Indians. Thus, 
although the court found that sales to non-Indians of goods 
other than cigarettes are taxable, it concluded that the state 
must monitor collection through some less burdensome procedure. 
(2) The state responds that requiring retailers to 
record only taxable transactions with non-Indians would he more 
burdensome, since the tribal smoke shops at issue here sell 
primarily to non-Indians. Warren does not necessarily apply, 
the state says, because it directly addressed only the question 
of state tax burdens on trading with the Indians. Common sense 
commends the state's argument, if its factual premise is 
correct. Since the lower court invalidated the reporting 
requirement, it made no findings on the relevant point. The 
state also suggests that a report covering only taxable 
transactions would not assure compliance with the law, although 
that problem alone might not justify an otherwise impermissible 
burden on Indian traders. Thus, whether or not this Court holds 
the sales tax applicable to cigarette sales, the lower court's 
decision on this point bears reconsideration in light of further 
fact-finding. 
E. Other Issues 
( 1) The state claims the right to enforce its sales 
tax by assessing Indian retailers who fail to collect tho tax 
from non-Indian buyers. The three-judge court apparently did 
not pass on this question, so it may not be before the Court. 
Furthermore, the answer probably depends upon the ext r~nd to 
which the state has jurisdiction over a particular reserv~tion. 
Although it may seem unsatisfactory to confirm the state's power 
to tax without considering how the tax can be enforced, the 
question probably ought to be remanded. 
( 2) The state also contends that reservation Indians 
who do not belong to the tribe for which the reservation has 
been set aside are subject to state sales tax as if they were 
not Indians. The three-judge court rejected this claim, relying 
on the district court opinion in Moe. See discussion at pp. 20-___._ 
21 supra. The decision appears correct. 
III. State Motor Vehicle Tax 
A. State · Motor Vehicle · Tax 
Washington imposes an excise tax on "the privilege of 
using in the state any motor vehicle." Wash. Rev. Code § 
82.33.020. The tax rate is 2% of the vehicle's value at the 
annual registration date, and the tax is payable to the 
appropriate county auditor. Id. §§ 82.33.020 & -.060. The 
state also imposes a like tax on the use of trailer~ and 
campers, rated at 1% of their value on January 1 of each year. 
Id. §§ 82.50.400 & -.410. This tax apparently applies to mobile 
homes. 
B. Validity of the Tax 
( 1) The parties have devoted scant attention to the 
motor vehicle tax. The state simply argues that Indian v~hicles 
come within its tax power whenever they drive off the -
reservation. Mescalero ·Apache ·Tribe v. Jones, 411 u.s. 145, 1 51 -----(1973) (state can sales tax Indian business off the reservation 
even if it could not tax the same business on the reservation). 
The tribes simply argue that the motor vehicle tax is 
essentially a property·· ~x and that the property is exemp t since 
it is held on ' the reservation. See McClanahan v. · Arizona Tax 
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). They note that the Indian vehicles 
exempted from property taxes in Moe were used both on and off 
the reservation. See Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. 




concurring and dissenting), aff'd, 425 U.S. 463 (1976). 
( 2) There is 
personal property tax 
excise tax at issue 
no meaningful distinction between the 
on vehicles invalidated in Moe and the 
here. Although Washington taxes the 
vehicle • s use, the tax is computed--1 ike any property tax--on 
the basis of value at a fixed date. The tax is paid--like any 
property tax--to the county tax official. Use is presumed. If 
this Court validated this tax, Montana could change the result 
in Moe simply by redenominating its tax. 
Summary 
Jurisdictional Questions 
1. The three-judge court arguably had jurisdiction 
over all challenges to the state cigarette tax because they were 
ancillary to its jurisdiction over the commerce clause attack on 
state seizures of contraband cigarettes. One might even argue 
that jurisdiction over cigarette tax claims gave the court 
jurisdiction over challenges to the state sales tax as applied 
to cigarette sales. The court, however, had no basis for 
jurisdiction over the claims against other applications of the 
sales tax, the motor vehicles tax, and the state's assumption of 
jurisdiction over the Colville reservations. (The last claim, 
of course, is controlled by the decision last term in Washington 
v. Confederated ·Bands · and · Tribes of the ·Yakima Indian Nation, 99 
S. Ct. 740 ( 1979).) Since the _?iqarette tax is the c:nterpiece(j 
of this appeal in any event, the Court should decline appellate\ 
jurisdiction over all other issues. 
2. The state appeal on the motor vehicle tax claims 
was timely because the state's motion for a new trial on other 
issues stopped the running of the time for appeal on all parts 
of the judgment. 
stantive Questions 
~1. State Cigarette Tax: .4~~~ftt_ 
~~~ ( ) h . . f.c;.,{ ~. 
· a T e state c1garette tax as ap~l1ed to 
cigarettes sold by tribal retailers probably has been pre-empted 
by the tribal taxes. One could also argue that the tax is 
invalid because it falls on the Indian retailer rather than on 
the non-Indian buyer, but that argument ignores the real 
differences between this case and Moe. The tribal self-
government arguments against the tax have dangerous implications 
and limited merit. 
(b) Since the three-judge court invalidated the 
state tax as applied to cigarettes sold by the Indians, it did 
not reach the enforcement issues upon which it had grounded its 
jurisdiction. These questions are not insubstantial. If the 
Court reverses, they should be resolved on remand. 
2. State Sales Tax: 
(a) Tribal 
It . ~~ 
c1garette taxes do 
------------------------------~ 
not pre-empt the 
state sales tax -------------tribal retailers. on cigarettes sold to non-Indian buyers by ~The sales tax also does not interfere with 
--~----~- --- --------
tribal self-government. _______ ....__..........~
(b) Reservation Indians who do not belong to the 
tribe occupying the reservation are exempt from sales tax on 
purchases made within the reservation. 
(c) If other aspects of the sales tax are properly 
before this Court, it should remand the lower court's decision 
' J I 
that Indian retailers need not keep records of their tax-exempt 
sales. Further fact-finding might reveal that the record 
keeping requirement is essential to enforcement of the tax and 
that keeping records on exempt sales is less burdensome than 
recording taxable sales. 
(d) Since the three-judge court did not consider 
whether the state can enforce the tax by assessing Indian 





3. State Motor Vehicle Tax 
If the Court has jurisdiction over challenges to 





MEMO TO FILE 
78-630 -washington v. Confederated Tribes (Colville 
and Yakima Tribes 
This is a brief and incomplete summary of key 
issues address by Greg in his bench memo of September 13. 
This is a consolidation of two suits: One by the 
Colville tribes against Washington's cigarette tax, motor 
vehicle tax, and assumption of jurisdiction over its 
reservation. The state's seizure of untaxed cigarettes 
moving in interstate commerce also is challenged. In the 
second suit, the Yakima tribes also attacked the cigarette 
tax and - seizure of untaxed cigarettes. The validity of the 
state sales tax (different from the cigarette tax) was also 
challenged when imposed on cigarettes. 
The tax issues in these cases apply only to 
cigarettes sold on the reservation by tribal retailers to 
non-Indian buyers. Substantial numbers of non-Indians live 
on the reservations, and since the tribal cigarette tax is 
lower than the state tax, substantial business - i.e. tax 
revenue - is at issue. Indeed, access to this revenue is 
central to the controversy. 
The three-judge court invalidated both the 
2. 
cigarette and sales taxes, holding (i) that they were 
preempted by the cigarette tax enacted by the tribes and -------, 
approved by federal authorities; and (ii) also, that the 
state taxes interferred with tribal self government. The 
three-judge court, on both of these grounds, distinguished 
Moe (that involved only sales by a private retailer on tribal 
land but who operated independently of tribal oversight or 
taxatio~ Y 
Jurisdiction 
Although doubtful, the three-judge court probably 
had jurisdiction over challenges to the state cigarette and 
sales taxes. The Supremacy Clause alone would not suffice 
for jurisdiction, but perhaps there was ancillary 
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause in view of the attack 
on the state's seizure of contraband cigarettes. 
There probably was no three-judge court 
jurisdiction over other issues in the case. 
Timeliness of Appeal 
It was timely. 
Merits 
Affirm as to state cigarette tax. The basic issue 
is tax revenue. The tribes• cigarette tax is lower than the 
state tax, deliberately so for the purpose of attracting 
business and bolstering the economy of the tribes. The state 
3. 
correspondingly loses tax revenues from non-Indians who trade 
with Indian retailers. As Greg put it, under the preemption 
theory, federal power - not tribal authority - lies behind 
'--- - -
the action of the tribe in imposing a cigarette tax. The 
remedy of the state is to seek relief within the federal 
government. 
Moe is distinguishable, as it involved a private 
retailer whose business had no substantial impact on tribal 
government. In these cases, the tribal governments both tax 
and engage in the business of selling cigarettes to non----
Indians. 
Probably reverse as to the state sales tax. The ~ 
sales tax is not levied on ciqarettes. Rather, it is levied ~ 
on persons who purchase a wide variety of goods and services. 
A tribal cigarette tax does not preempt the state sales tax 
when imposed on cigarettes. Nor does the sales tax interfere 
with tribal self government. 
Greg, in affirming with respect to the cigarette 
tax, would rely solely on the preemption doctrine. He 
argues, with reason, that "interference with tribal self 
qovernment" is too broad a ground, and one that could set a 
troublesome precedent. 
Other Issues 




SUPPLEMENTAL BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 4 October 1979 
From: Gregory May 
No. 78-630: Washington v. Confederated Tribes(~~ 
:f f(Lf) 
Appls have just filed a reply brief which is 
considerably clearer and more helpful than their opening brief. 
Although the new brief does not change my view of the case, it 
does make several interesting arguments on the basic cigarette 
tax issue. 
I. Interference with Tribal Self-Government 
A. Appls' Arguments 
First, in a reformulation of an old argument, the appls 
say that the Indians need to market a tax exemption to non-
Indian customers in order to compensate for the poor location of 
their smoke shops. In other words, appls argue, recognition of 
the tax exemption just forces the state to make a transfer 
payment that compensates the Indians for their commercial 
disadvantage. 
· .... 
Second, the state argues that the tribal cigarette 
businesses are purely proprietary rather than governmental 
~-·--., --· -·--- -----~ 
activities. The tribes are not taxing cigarettes, they are just ~3 
marking up cigarette prices. In tax immunity cases, appls 
continue, this Court consistently has drawn a distinction 
between a government's governmental and proprietary activities. 
See Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695-96 (1976) 
(summarizing cases). 
B. Comments 
The first argument states the obvious, and the second 
just expresses in a different way my earlier observation that 
~ the courts have refused to immunize tribal businesses from state . 
taxation on tribal self-government grounds. See 
. ~ 
II. Federal Pre-emption 
A. Appls' Arguments 
First, appls argue that the Indian commerce clause does 
not prevent the states from taxing non-Indians who buy goods on 
the reservations, whether or not the tribes tax the non-Indian 
buyers. Moe, 425 U.S. 463, 481 n.17 (1976), clearly declares 
that the Indian commerce clause itself provides no "automatic" 
exemptj.on .from state taxes. And the tribes' attempt to make a 
"multiple ' burd~ns" argument by analogy to the interstate 
commerce clause fails because multiple burdens analysis only 
applies in situations where two jurisdictions--in a territorial 
sense--seeks to tax the same commercial activity. 
Second, appls note that none of the federal statutes 
that explicitly preserve tax exemptions for the Indians refer to 
tax exemptions for the non-Indians who buy from them. Appls 
also note that the American Indian Policy Review Commission 
(they don't say what that is) recommended federal legislation 
exempting persons and activities taxed by the tribes from state 
taxation. Final Report of the American Indian Policy Review 
Commission 182 (1977), quoted at Appls' Reply Brief 30 n.22. 
Third, appls say that the treaties between the United 
States and these tribes do not pre-empt state taxation of non-
Indians on the reservation. Such state taxation, appls contend, 
is consistent with the treaty language that sets aside the lands 
for the Indians' "exclusive use." 
B. Comments 
5~~~ 
!)~ advance their case because they do not come to grips with the 
Appls' arguments against the pre-emption theory do not 
~~.At eff,ect o :__f~.::_ approval for the tribal cigarette taxthees 
~~- involved in this case. Indeed, appls do not mention 
~ federaly-approved tribal constitutions that confer tax powers on 
~ the tribeGsl~ven T'o the plenary federal power over Indian affairs, • V / the pre-emption analysis in this case seems to rest rather 
_ ~ easily on an "occupation of the field" argument. The difficult 
·~ question here is whether the Executive--acting through the 
. , 
Bureau ·of Indian Affairs--should have the power to pre-empt 
state taxes. The answer should depend upon how much 
Congress 
power I 
None of the 
parties have given this issue enough attention, and it could be 
has delegated to the executive agerycy. 
the most profitable focus for oral argument. 
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THE CHIEF JUSTICE October 15, 1979 
RE: 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
of the Colville Indian Reservation 
Dear Bill: 
Except for the jurisdictional aspect on Yakima, my 
vote was the same as yours in the above. On the Yakima 
jurisdiction, I'm prepar~d to go along. By coincidence I 
had assigned this to you. You haven't had your share of 
Indian cases! 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
··. 
•. 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Greg 
Re: No. 78-630--Washington v. Confed. Tribes 
Attached is Mr. Justice Brennan's redraft of n.40 in the 
-
other Justice. The sentence in the old footnote about upholding 
the sales tax as to sales of other goods has been--his clerk tells 
me--shifted to another footnote. 
As far as I can see, the redraft does not meet your -objection. In fact, it does not rest the sales tax decision on 
the strongest possible ground: viz. that the state sales tax 
"would inject state law into an on-reservation transaction which 
the Indians have chosen to subj8ct to their own laws." Op. at 20. 
I think that Mr. Justice Brennan would agree to pitch the result 
on that ground if you suggested it. But that ground is really 
broader than the one he has chosen, so I would not make the 
suggestion. 
I have two observations on the continuing disagreement. 
First, the basic sticking point is Mr. Justice Brennan's 
insistence on lumping together all taxes that affect the same 
transaction. He thinks that it makes no difference what the taxes 
are called; the critical question for him is whether they raise 
the ultimately price of cigarettes to the non-Indian customers of 
the tribal retailers. There apparently is no way to resolve this 
dif:t;erence . 
. -----------
Second, the next case to come before this Court is 
! 
likely to be one in which the state allows the Indian retailers to 
credit tribal taxes against the state's tax claims. See Op. at 20 
n.37 (leaving open the question of the validity of a credit 
scheme). In that case, the practical effect of Mr. Justice 
Brennan's QOSition will be to allow a credit of all tribal taxes 
affecting the same transaction against all state taxes affecting 
it. Thus, a tribe that chases to impose a cigarette tax greater 
than the state cigarette tax would still be able to sell 
cigarettes at the off-reservation price as long as the tribal 
cigarette tax did not exceed the sum of the state's cigarette and 
sales taxes. In other words, a tribe can draw revenue from one 
sort of tax away from the state by enacting a different sort of 
tax on the same transaction. I am not sure how well that result 
squares with this Court's sales tax vs. use tax cases. But 
assuming that the states go to a tax credit system, the practical 
effect of Indian taxes on state revenues will not be very severe 
in any case. The credit system will equalize the consumer price 
for goods on and off the reservation. 
If you dissent and garner some votes, your opinion might 
lead the Court to reconsider the proper pairing of taxes in a 
credit scheme case. I suspect, however, that the Court would 
adhere to the decision in this case--perhaps invoking the broader~ 
rationale that I mention above. Thus, I am inclined to think that 
a dissent would be useless. 
NEW FOOTNOTE 40 
!QI As applied to cigarettes, it seems to us that the state 
sales and cigarette taxes present essentially the same 
question. Each imposes an economic burden on the distribution 
of cigarettes. Each falls on the non-Indian purchaser, and the 
amount of each is directly proportional to the amount of 
cigarettes purchased. Nomenclature aside, they are, in short, 
indistinguishable from either an economic or a formal 
perspective. And in consequence, they are properly analyzed as 
dual components of a single state imposed burden on tribal 
cigarette sales, a burden that must to some extent yield when 
the tribe chooses to impose its own analagous burden on those 
sales. 
The District Court did note one distinction between the two 
taxes: the sales tax was smaller. Thus, while under that 
court's view the cigarette tax was invalid for two reasons 
it (1) would interfere with tribal self government by 
drastically reducing the volume of cigarette sales and the 
tribal revenues produced by such sales and (2) had in any event 
been preempted by the tribes' exercise of their federally 
delegated powers, 446 F.Supp. at 1360-1366, -- the sales tax 
was invalid only for the second reason. It had been preempted 
-2-
by the tribes taxing scheme, but it was simply not large enough 
to have an impact upon tribal self-government, id. at 
1370-1371. Even if our own analysis dovetailed in other 
respects more closely with that of the District Court, we would 
be unwilling to accept the proposition that the permissibility 
of a tax must turn upon a highly fact-specific inquiry into 
demand elasticities and actual impacts. Thus, in the present 
case we hold the presence of some competitive disadvantage to 
be enough without attempting to quantify that disadvantage. 




Confederated Tribes of the On Appeals from the United 
States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Wash~ 
ington. 
~ q~ille Indian Reser-U vation et aL 
State of W ashington1 
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United States et al. 
[ . ovember -, 1979] 
MR. JusTIC]<] BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 
463 (1976), held that the State of Montana could require 
Indian operators of on-reservation "smoke shops" to collect 
cigarette taxes from the non-Indian purchasers on whom those 
taxes fell. 425 U. S., at 481-483. Today we consider a chal-
lenge to similar cigarette taxes imposed by the State of Wash-
ington on similar transactions. But while in Moe the ciga-
rette retailing business was largely a private operation, the 
Tribes involved in these coJtsolidated cases have adopted 
comprehensive ordinances regulating aud taxing the distribu-
tion of cigarettes by on-reservation smokt> shops. The prin-
cipal question for decision, therefore. is whether the tribal 
regulatory and taxing in vol vemen t present here and absent in 
Moe mandates a different conclusiOn as to the validity of the 
Washington taxes. The three-judge District Court for the 
Eastern District of Washington concluded that it does, and 
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2 WASHINGTON v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES 
distribution of cigarettes, the Washington taxing scheme was 
brought into conflict with the Tribes' federally sanctioned 
functions and activities. The effect was Impermissibly to 
jeopardize tribal authority and place thr Indian smoke shops 
at a competitive disadvantage. 
'These cases are here 011 the State of WashmgtOJlS appeal 
from declaratory JUdgments and permanent injunctions en-
tered by the District Court at the close of consolidated pro-
ceedings in two separate cases that raised related issues. 446 
F. Supp. 1339 (ED Wash. 1978). The first case. Cot/federated 
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservatwn v. State of Wash-
ington, Civ. No. 3868, was filed on May 17, 1973, by the Col-
ville, Makah, and Lummi Tribes. The second, United States 
of America and Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima 
i ndian Reservation v. State of Washington, Civ. No. 3909, 
was commenced on July 18, 1913, by the United States on 
behalf of the Yakima Indian N atio11. 1 In each action, the 
complainants contended that the State 's cigarette and tobacco 
products taxes 2 could not lawfully be applied to sales by on-
reservatiOn tobacco outlets. They sought declaratory judg-
ments to that effect, as well as in.lunctions barring the State 
from taking any measures to enforce the challenged taxes. In 
particular, the plaintiffs sought to enJoill the State from se1z-
1 On April 24, 1!:174, the Yakima Indian Nahou mtervened as a plmnt111 
in the FnitPd Stat<•,;' casr. h::; rom plaint ap]>('ar::; at Ap]wnchx (App.) 149. 
2 The State tobaeco product~ tax, winch Is nnposed on cigar,: and pipe 
tobacco )l\ll':"tUtllt to R.. C. W Ch. R2 .26, 1" not beforr u:s. The D1stnct 
Conrt ronrluclrd' that tl~at. tax fdl upon the Indwn seller~ and not upon 
the non-Indian p11rcha ~<:>r~ . -1-46 F Supp., at la55, n. 15 . The State did 
not appeal from tin,.; holding, appellant;; ' bnrf at 55, n. 40, and allpart1e~ 
ap;r<:>e that. m consequence tlw tobac('o product:; tax may not. be impo~ed 
on sale:; by tribal dealrr::. McClanahan \ Anzona State Tax Comnussion, 
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ing as contraband untaxed cigarettes destined for delivery to 
their reservations.8 Iu the Colville case, the Tribes also chal-
lenged the State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction 
over their reservations and, by amended pleadings, attacked 
the application of the State's vehicle excise taxes to Indian-
owned vehicles. 'The Yakima case did not present these latter 
issues, but it did make a broad attack on the application of 
the State's general retail sales tax to on-reservation transac-
tions. Both complaints alleged that the challenged state 
practices were contrary to the Indian Commerce Clause (U. S. 
Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3), and various federal treaties and 
enactments. 
}""rom the time of filing, the two cases pursued closely paral-
lel courses. On November 5, 1973, a temporary restraining 
order against the State's enforcement of the taxing statutes 
was issued in each. Appendix (App.), at 13, 147. Thereafter, 
because the complaints sought i1ijunctive relief against the 
enforcement of state statutes, a three-judge District Court was 
convened pursuant to tl1e then applicable requirement of 28 
U. S. C. § 2281 (1970).4 On September 6, 1974, the three-
judge court issued preliminary injunctions restraining the 
State from enforcing the challenged taxes against the Tribes. 
App. 15, 156. There followed extensive discovery,& after 
which the parties to each case reached agreemeut in pretrial 
orders, setting forth facts and clarifying the issues. 
3 The Tribes abo sought damages for interference with their cigarette 
busines~eH. The damage is~ues m both cases were remanded by the three-
judge Court to a single di~triet judge. 446 F. Supp., at 1367, 1373. 
'1 Although § 2281 was :;ub~equently repealed, Act of AuguHt 12, 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 1, 90 Stat. 1119, it WW:i expre:;~ly left in place for 
eases which, like t.ho:;e before u~, wen• pcndiug on the da.te of repeal. 
Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 7, 90 Stat. 1120. W(' consider i:;~ues concernmg the 
applicability of the former § 2281 to the~<> caSt>i:l 111 Part III, ·infra. 
5 ProceedingH iu both ea."ieR were ~t ayed for !'iPvernl month,;, however, 
pending thii:l Court's deciH:on in Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai 







4 WASHINGTON v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES 
Trial was held in both cases on March 28, 1977, and the 
three-judge court entered its consolidated decision on May 10, 
1978. The court concluded (1) that it had jurisdiction as a 
three-judge court to consider the issues presented; (2) that 
the state cigarette tax could not be applied to on-reserva-
tion transactions because it was pre-empted by the tribal tax-
ing ordinances and constituted an impermissible interference 
with tribal self-government; (3) that the state retail sales tax 
could not be applied to tribal cigarette sales, but could be 
applied to sales of other goods to. non-Indians; (4) that the 
State could not impose certain recordkeeping requirements 
in connection ·with various tax exempt sales; ( 5) that the 
State could not impose its vehicle excise taxes upon vehicles 
owned by the 'Tribes and their members, and (6) that the 
State's assumptio11 of civil and criminal J-urisdiction over the 
Makah and Lummi Tribes was unconstitutional. The court 
enjoined enforcement of the statutes it had struck down, and 
the State moved unsuccessfully for a new trial. This appeal 
followed. We ·postponed consideration of certain jurisdic-
tional questions to the merits. - U. S. - (1979). We 
now conclude that we have jurisdiction of the appeal and 
affirm the judgment of the District Court with one 
modification. 
We begin by sketching the relevant factual background, 
which · is not seriously in dispute.6 ·Thereafter, we explore 
the jurisdictional questions previously postponed and then 
turn to the merits. 
II 
(a) The State Taxiny Schemes 
The State of Washington levies a cigarette excise tax of' 
$1.60 per carton/ ou the "sale, use, consumption, handling, 
<J Our ~1 at.enwnt of Uw factual backgrotmd i~ drawn ill large mea~ure 
from the OlJlllion of the District Court, 446 F . Supp., at. 1345-1349, 1367-
1370. 
7 The cigarette exci~e tax is imposed pur~uant to R C. W. 82.24.020 •. 
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rossession or distribution " of cigarettes Within the State. 
RCW 82.24.020. The tax is enforced with tax stamps; and 
dealers are required to sell only cigarettes to which such stamps 
have been affixed. R. C. W. 82.24.030. Indian tribes are 
permitted to possess unstamped cigarettes for purposes of 
resale to members of the tribe, but are required by regulation 
to collect t.he tax with respect to sales to nonmembers. 
R. C. W. 82.24.260, WAC 458-20-192.ti The District Court 
found, ou t~1e basis of its examination of state authorities, 
that the legal incidence of the tax is on the purchaser in 
transactions between an Indian seller and a non-Indian buyer.0 
The State has sought to enforce its cigarette tax by seizing 
as contraband unstamped cigarettes bound for various tribal 
reservations. It claims that it is entitled to make such seiz-
ures whenever the cigarettes are destiued to be sold to non-
Indians with.put affixation of stamps or collection of the tax. 
R. C. \V. 82.24.040 . 
. That proviHion authorizeil a levy of 6.5 null:, per cigarette. The tax JS 
brought. up to 11~ full amount by R. C. W. 28A.47.440, and 73.32.130, 
which add 0.5 m11l~ and 1 mill r(·~pechvel). 
8 Imtwlly tlw State al:'serted that 11 eould tax all tnbal cigarette !iales, 
,regardle:;::; of whether thr buyer wa~ lndiau or non-Indian. Its throry was 
that Pub. L. No. s:~-2~0, 67 Stat. 51\8, rh . 505 (HJ5:3), granted it general 
authonty to tax reservation Indwns. Aft£•r thi::. theor·~r was rrJected in 
B1'yan v. Itasca County, supra, thr State abandoned any claim of authority 
to tax ::>ales to tnbal mt•mbrr><. See 446 F Supp., at 1346, 11. 4 
u 446 F. Supp., at 1:352-1355. Es,.;entially the Court aerepted the 
State's contention that the tax fall::> upon the fir,;t event. which may con-
stitutionally be ~ubjected to 11 . In the ca::;e of ::;ales by non-Indians to non-
Indians, this mean" thr mcidence of the tax IS on the seller, or perhap::; on 
emeone evrn further up the cham of di::;tnbution, b('£•au~e that per::;on 11; 
tlw one who fir::;t ~ell~;, use,;, cou~ume,;, handlt's, po~~es::;cs or ch::>tributes the 
products. But where the wholesaler or retailer i~ an Indian on whom 
the tax cannot be nnposrd uudrr M cClwwltan ". AI''!Zona State 1'ax Corn-
. rn~sswn, supra. thr fir:'lt t.axable t•vent LS thr u::>e, consumptiOn or po::>ce::>swn 
by the non-Indian pttr<'haser. Henee, tlw Distnct Court concluded, the 
tax falls on that JHtrcha~er While the que~twn 1::; not free from doubt, we-
accept th1:, eonclu,.;wn . 
18-630-0PINION 
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Washington also imposes a sales tax on sales of personal 
property, including cigarettes. R. C. W. 82.08.020. This tax, 
which was 5% during the relevant period, is collected from 
the purchaser by the retailer. R. C. Vl. 82.08.050. It does 
not apply to on-reservation sales to reservation Indians, 
WAC 458-20-192. 
The State Motor Vehicle Excise Tax is imposed on "the 
privilege of using in the state any motor vehicle." R. C. W. 
82.44.020. The tax is assessed annually, and during the rele~ 
vant period the amount was two percent of the fair market 
value of the vehicle in question. 1 bid. In additon, the State 
imposes an annual tax in the amount of one percent of fair 
market value on the privilege of using campers and trailers 
in the State. R. C. W. 82.50.10 
(b) The Tribes 
Each of the Tribes involved in this litigation is recognized 
by the United States as a sovereign Indian Tribe. Each is 
governed by a business or tribal council approved by the Sec-
retary of Interior.11 ·The Colville Tribe has some 5,800 mem-
bers, of whom about 3;200 ·uve on the Colville Indian Reser-
vation.12 Enrolled members of the ·Tribe constitute just. 
under half of the reservation's population. ·The Lummi Tribe 
has approximately 2,000 members. Roughly 1,250 of them 
10 The same chapter provided for an · excise tax on mobile homes. Ini-
tially, the State smtght to apply this tax to Indians as well; but after 
Bryan v. lta~ca County, supra, and Moe v. Coufederated Salish and 
Kouteuai 'l'ribes, supra, it no longer attempts to do ~o . 446 F . Supp., at 
1365. 
11 The Mn.kah Tribe j,.; organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et ~Seq. Wh1le the Lumrm aud Colville Tribes do· 
have federally approved constitutions, they voted in 1935 not to com~ 
under that Act. 446 F. Supp., at 1:345, n. 2 
12 The Colville Reservation encompasses 1.3 Jmlhon acreH in the north-
eastern section of Wn.~hmgton . It was eHtablished by Exeeutive Order on 
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live on the reservation.13 The Makah Tribe has about 1,000 
members. Some 900 live on the reservation.11 The Colville, 
Lummi and Makah reservations are isolated a.ncl underde-
veloped. Many members reside in mobile homes. Most own 
at least one automobile which is used both on and off the res-
ervation. Unemployment is a serious problem on the Colville 
and Makah reservations. 
The Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian 
Nation have more than 6,000 members, of whom about 5,000 
live on the rservation.1 '' Enrolled members, however, consti-
tute less than one fifth of the reservation's population. The 
balance is made up of approximately 1,500 Indians who are 
not members of the Tribes and more than 20,000 non-Indians. 
(c) '!'he Tnbal Ctyarette Buswess 
The Colville, Lumuu, and Makah Tribes have uearly iden-
tical cigarette 5ales and taxing schemes. Each Tribe has 
enacted ordinances pursuant to which it has established one 
or morP on-reservation tobacco outlets. 16 These ordinances 
have been approved by the Secretary of Interior; and the 
dealer at each tobacco outlet 1s a federally licensed Indian 
tradet'. All three Tribes use federally restricted tribal funds 17 
13 The Lummi R<'~ervatwn encompa~,;e:-- 7,319 acre:;, mo:;t of them on •t 
1Jeninsula nrar Bellingham, Wa.~h It. was establislwd by lhe treaty of 
Point Elliot. in 1855. 12 Stat . 927 
u The Makah He:sPrvatJOn rneompas,;e~ 28,000 acre~ at the northwe::;t tip 
of the Olympic P('nm,;ula. It too wn~:; ~tabh,;hed by treaty m 1855. 12 
Stnt. 039. Roughly 63% of Its mhabitants a.re PllT'olled membrr8 of the 
Tribe. 
lG The Yakima Indmn ReservatiOn was ~ct a,~Ide for thP Tnbe by treaty 
ra.tifiPd .Marrh 8, 18511, 12 Stat 951 lt rneompasses about 1.4 million 
acrrs in south rrntral WaKhington 
10 The trihal ordm:mres r('gttlating the ::~ale, distnbution ami taxing of 
cigar('tte:; arP ~C't. forth at App. 104, 115, and 111 
17 The fund:< arP mam1amed m mdividual aceount;~ in tlw Bureau of 
Indian Affa.irs agency servmg the reHervatwn pm::matlL to 25 CFR Part 104 
(1U78). App. 32- 34. 
78-630--0PINION 
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to purchase cigarettes from out-of-state dealers. 1" The Tnbes 
distribute the cigarettes to their tobacco outlets and collect 
from the operators of those outlets both the wholesale dis-
tribution price and a tax of 40-to-50 cents per carton. The 
cigarettes remain the property of the Tribe until sale. The 
taxing ordinances specify that the tax is to be passed on to 
the ultimate consumer of the cigarettes. From 1972 through 
1976, the Colville Tribe realized approximately $266,000 from 
its cigarette tax; the Lummi Tribe realized $54,000 and the 
Makah Tribe realized $13,000 
While the Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes function as 
retailers, retaining possession of the cigarettes until their sale 
to consumers, the Yakima Tribe acts as a wholesaler. It pur-
chases cigarettes from out-of-state dealers and then sells them 
to its licensed retailers. The Tribe receives a markup over the 
wholesale price from those retailers as well as a tax of 22.5 
cent per carton. There is no requirement that this tax be 
added to the selling price. In 1975, the Yakima Tribe derived 
$278,000 from its cigarette business. 
Indian tobacco dealers make a large maJority of their sales 
to non-Indians-residents of nearby communities who journey 
to the reservation especially to take advantage of the tribal tax 
exemption. The purchaser saves more than a dollar ou each 
carton, and that makes the trip worthwhile. All parties agree 
that if the State were able to tax sales by Indian smoke shops 
and eliminate that one-dollar saving the stream of nou-Indian 
bargain hunters would dry up. In short, the Indian retailer's 
business is to a substantial degree dependent upon his tax 
exempt status, and if he loses that status his sales will fall off 
sharply. 
ITI 
We first address our jurisdictiOn to hear the State's appeal. 
Two attacks are made upon that jurisdiction. one grounded in 
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· the intricacies of the now-repealed statute governing three-
judge district courts and the other having to do with the timing 
of the State's appeal. Both are lacking in merit. 
Under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, a direct appeal lies to this court 
from an order granting or denying an injunction in a suit 
"required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined 
by a district court of t4ree judges." At the time the Yakima 
·and Colville cases were filed, 28 U.S. C. ~ 2281 provided that: 
"An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining 
the enforcement, operation or execution of any State stat-
ute by restraining the action of any officers of such State 
in the enforcement or execution of such statute .. . 
shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof 
upon the ground of unconstitutionality of such statute 
unless the application therefor is heard and determined by 
a district court of three judges . . .. " 10 
After the State filed its JUrisdictional statement in this appeal, 
'the United States moved to dismiss the Yakirna case on the 
'ground that it was not one required by § 2281 to be heard by 
'a court of three judges and thus did not fall within the grant 
of appellate jurisdiction in § 1253. Although directed only to 
the Y akirna case because that is the only one to which the 
'government is a party, this challenge is quite clearly germane 
to the Colville case as well. 
Section 2281 does not require a three-judge court where a 
constitutional challenge to a state statute is grounded only m 
the Supremacy Clause. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 
ll1, 128-129 (1965) . In addition, § 2281 is not brought into 
play by constitutional claims that are "insubstantial," Goosby 
v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973). The United States argues 
that the substantive tax claims raised by these cases fall into 
one or the other category. and thus failed to trigger § 2281.2(} 
10 The repeal of thi~ provi~ion m 197f:i doeR not. affect its application t~ 
these cases. Sec n. 4, supra. 
~As the government rt>eogni:M's, its po:,ition in tin:, regard J:; somt'what· 
• 
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Further, the government continues, the attacks on the State;s 
seizure of cigarettes, while perhaps raising genuine Commerce 
Clause issues, are not properly characterized as challenges to 
the constitutionality of a state statute. Rather, the govern-
ment asserts, they go to the constitutionality of the result ob-
tained by the 1fSe of the statute. We find neither contention 
persuasive. 
The original complaints in these actions ·contended that 
the state taxes were unconstitutional under the Indian Com-
merce Clause as well as the Supremacy Clause. Relying 
primarily upon language in footnote 17 in Moe, Moe v. Con-
federated Salish and Kootenai Tn:bes, supra, at 481, n. 17, the 
United States asserts that the Tribes' Commerce Clause claims 
were insubstantiaJ.21 Footnote 17 does suggest that chal-
lenges to taxing statutes like the ones before us are to be 
analyzed under the Supremacy Clause. But Moe was decided 
in 1976-long after a three-judge court was convened to hear' 
these cases-and it is thus apparent that footnote 17 alone· 
cannot be dispositive, whatever its precise thrust. There is· 
language in that footnote, however, which suggests that the· 
insubstantiality of Commerce Clause 'Claims such as those· 
before us flows from Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 
U. S. 145 (1973), and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)-both of which were decided 
anomalous since it was the Umted States which initially reque:;ted a tJuee-
judge court in the Yakima carse. App. 145. At that t1me the government 
seemed to have no doubt that it sought to enjoin the enforcement of a, 
state statute on grounds of it::; unconstitutwnality withm the meaning of 
§ 2281. 
21 The Di:;trict Court sef'ms to have found this contention persuasive, 
446 F . Supp., a.t 1350, i1lthough it addreso;ed it only briefly. Presumably 
it saw no need lo explore the matter more fully since It was confident 
that the three-judge reqnil'ement of § 2281 had m any event been satisfied 
by the Tribers' challenge,; to the State's enforcement measures, 446 ·:F .. 






















WASHINGTON v. CONFEDERATED TIUBI<JS 11 
before the present suits were filed. 22 We think the United 
States reads too much into this language. Goosby v. Osser, 
supra, made it clear that constitutional claims will not lightly 
be found insubstantial for purposes of § 2281. Indeed, Goosby 
explicitly states that prior decisions are not sufficient to sup-
port a conclusion that certain claims are insubstantial unless 
those prior decisions "inescapably render the claims frivolous." 
409 U. S., at 518. We cannot say here that the Goosby test 
has been met. Neither Mescalero nor McClanahan "inescap-
ably render[s] the fTribes' Commerce Clause] claims frivo-
lous" because neither holds that that clause is wholly without 
force in situations like the present. And even footnote 17 
merely rejects the stark and rather unhelpful notion that the 
Commerce Clause provides an "automatic exemption[] 'as a 
matter of constitutional law [emphasis added j' " in such cases. 
It does not take that clause entirely out of play in the field of 
state regulation of Indian affairs. 
In addition, it seems quite clear that the Tribes' attack 
on the official sehmre of cigarettes bound for the reserva-
22 Footnote 17 in Jt8 en tJrety reads a:> follow:>. 
"lt JS thus clear that the basb for thP mvalidity of the:se taxmg meas-
ures, whicii we have found to be inron~i;;tent with PXJ:stlug federal statutes, 
is the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CmJ.St.. Art . VI, cl. :l, and not any automatiC 
exemption:; 'a,; a mattc•r of con:,titutwnal law' Pither under til(' Com-
merce Clause or the mtprgovcrmnental-immumty doctnne as lrud down 
originally in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). If so, thPn the 
basi~ for convening a thn·e-Judge eourt m tins type of caRe has pffectively 
disappeared, for thi8 CourL ha;,: exprr:;~ly held that attacks on state statutes 
rai:,;ing only Supremacy Clause mvalidity do not fall witluu the scope of 
28 :U. S. C.§ 2281. Swtft & Co. v. Wickham. ;{82 ll. S. 111 (1965). Here, 
however, the D1strwt Court properly convened a § 221\1 court, becau;;e 
at the out:;Pt the Tribp';; attack as~crtl'd uncon,.;tJtutJOnality of the"e ~;tatutP::l 
under the Commerce Clau;;c, a not m"ub,.;tantml clann ~:>incc Mescalero 
[Apache Tribe Y. Jolle8, 411 U. S. 145 (197:-l),j all(! McClanahan rv 
Arizona State 'l'ax Comm'n, 411 U S. 164 (1!)73) ,] had not yet been 
decided SPe Goo8by v Osser, 409 lr. S. 512 (Hl7;{) " 425 U S, at 481, 
n. 17. 
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tions also triggers the three-judge requirement of § 2281. 
The United States concedes that that attack raised Com-
merce Clause issues, but maintains that the Tribes' target 
was not really the state enforcement statutes themselves, 
but rather the discretionary official conduct undertaken pur-
suant to those statutes. We have no quarrel with the prop-
osition that the mere fact that executives seek shelter under 
various state statutes will not necessarily convert a suit to 
restrain their lawless behavior into a § 2281 case, Phillips v. 
Un·ited States, 312 U.S. '246, 248_:252 (1941). But this is not 
a situation in which the only connection with state statutes 
arises when officials accused of taking various ultra vires ac-
tions seek to trace their conduct back to vague statutes grant-
ing them broad executive discretion. Phillips, 312 U. S., at 
252. Here the state officials involved were attempting to 
enforce the state tax laws ·by using the tools authorized for 
such enforcement by the state legislature. They manifested 
an intention to continue to use those tools for that purpose. 
And it is those tools, as applied to cigarettes in Indian com-
merce, which the Tribes challenged.n We hold that this 
suffices to bring these cases within ~ 2281. 
The other jurisdictioual question postponed last February 1s 
relevant only to the Colville case. It concerns the timeliness 
under 28 U. S. C. ~ 2101 (b) of the State's appeal from the 
District Court's resolution of the motor vehicle tax and as-
sumption of j urisdictiou issues. Basically, the problem is 
this: the Notice of Appeal on these two issues was filed more 
than 60 days after the District Court's decision. but withiu 60 
days of the deni~1l of a state motion for partial new trial-a 
motion that was not addressed to the motor vehicle and as-
sumption of jurisdiction issues. The question is whether a 
motion for partial new trial renders nonfinal the District 
2 ~ ScP Turne1· v. Ji'ouche, 396 U.S. :346, ;{54, n. 10 (1970). S('e aloo-
Department of Employment v. United State8, 3H5 U. S 355 (1966) ; 
·• Query v United States, :n6 U.S 486, 490 (1942) . 
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Court's holding on all issues between the parties, or merely 
renders nonfinal the disposition of those issues actually raised 
in the new trial motion. If the former, the State's Notice 
of Appeal on the vehicle taxes and assumption of jurisdiction 
issues was timely. If the latter, that notice was filed out of 
time and to that extent the appeal is JUrisdictionally time 
barred.2-1 
We think that the filing of a motion for partial new trial 
in these circumstauces must have rendered nonfinal the dis-
position of all issues betweeu the parties. A contrary conclu-
sion would serve no useful purpose. At best it would make 
little difference save to force future appellants to include in 
what might otherwise have been narrow motions for partial 
new trials a blanket request for reconsideration of all issues. 
And at worst it would be a procedural pitfall, devoid of any 
sound supporting rationale but capablP of occasionally tripping 
those who failed to insert a line of boilerplate or file a redun-
dant slip of paper. Accordingly, we hold that the appeal of 
21 The ad ual chronology wa:; <U:i follow~: On May 10, 1978, the D1,;tnct 
Court entered 1ts final order. On -:\fay 22, the State fiiPd a motion for 
partial nPw trial on th<;> eigarf'tte and l-':tles tax i~:;urs. On .July 1:2, wlule 
that motion was !WIH.iing, the Statr filed a Notier of Appeal rai:;ing the 
motor veh1cle excise tnx and as15umption of juri:;dictwn IH::;ue,; . On July 17, 
the motion for partial nPw trial wa:; clemed; and on August H, the State 
filed a Notice of Appe<d ou tlw sale,; and cigarette tax is:sueH. On Sep-
tember R, the State filPd an Amend<>d Notice of Appeal nu,mg all n·lc-
vant i:;sues. The July 12 Notice of Appeal wm; filed more than 60 days 
after the ol'lginal Di:stnct Court. order. Accordmgly, under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2).01 (b), it w:ts out of tunc. The 'N otJce of August 14 and the Amended 
Notice of September 8, however, were filed with111 60 day:; of the District 
Court'll denial of the motwn for partml new trwl. It ~eems clear that 
the filing of that mot ion reudPrecl nonfinal tlw di~po~ltiOn of all covered' 
bsue~;-if not, one :-;eckmg a partial new tnal would have to jeopardize 
his right to appeal. Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 41-! U. S. 441, 445-
446 (1974), Department of Banhng v. Pink, 317 U. S. 264, 266 (1942) . 
Thus, the only remaining question 18 wlwther the motion for partwl new 
trial also Hllspended thl' finality of thr Di:-;tnci Court'~ cliHposition ol' 
issues not; covered by that mohon .. 
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the District Court's vehicle tax and assumption of jurisdiction 
holding is properly before us. 
IV 
We turn now to the merits. The primary questions con~ 
cern the validit:YOnfie Wasf1ington cigarette and sales taxes. 
In our view, these questions are considerably more narrow 
than some of the briefs suggest. We are not required to re-
construct the foundations of Indian sovereignty, locate the 
precise source of Indian power to assess taxes on non-Indians 25 
or fiually define the relationship between state and Indian 
revenue-raising authority. All that is before us is a challenge 
to the application of a particular state taxiu schemeto'j)ar-
ticu ar ransactwns t are a so su ject to particular tribal 
taxing an<l regulatory ordinances. And all we decide is fuat 
that state scheme may not ~ applied to those transac~ions. 
We begin w'"'itfl"'a Drief overview. ""It 1s no longer the law 
that Indian reservations partake of the full territorial sov-
ereignty of states or foreign countries. although they do retain 
important attributes of such sovereignty.26 As a result, the 
25 Ser Morris v. I·btchcocl•. 194 U.S. 384 (1904), Iron Crow v. Oglala 
Siou.c 'l'ribe, 231 F. 2d R9 (CA8 1956), rf. 55 L D. 14 (19:34) 
26 The starkrxt tPI'ntoriril eoncl'ptwn of Indian sovereignty was sketched 
by Chi<·f Justiee ~Tar::<ha11 in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U. S. (6 Pet.) 515, 
557-561 (18:32) . An Inaian reservation , he ;;tated, was "a diE'tinct com-
munity, occup~·ing iti:i own tNritor~' .. . in winch the law;; of Georgia 
can have no forcr .... " See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law 122 (1942). Williams v. Lei', 358 U . S. 217, 219 (1959), nott>d that. 
t.hi~:~ vit•w 1mcl l)et•n "modified .. . 111 ca~-;e;; whpre t"Ssential tribal rela-
tiotL~ wt•rr not mvolved." Organized Village of Kake Y. Egan, :369 U. S. 60, 
71-75 ( 1962) , noted a sluft a~ well. And M rClanahan v. Anzona State 
Tax Commisswn , I!U])ra. at 172, ob~erved that " the trend ha:s bren away 
from the idea of inherPnt Inclimt sovereignty as a, bar to state jurisdic· 
tion." Rather, M cCianana.n concluded, ~overr1gnty is bett.rr ;;een as a 
" backdrop against wluch the apphcable treaties and federal statntrs must 
be read." Ibid. Iu a ~imilar vein, Ohphant \'. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 
435 U. S. 191, :208 (1978), recogmzed that Indian tribes are "prohibtted 
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boundary between state and tribal authority has become in~ 
creasingly difficult to define. Still, there are some guideposts. 
First, it seems clear that in the absence of tribal consent state 
law generally does not reach on-reservation conduct involving 
only Indians. Thus we have held that tribal courts have ex~ 
clusi ve jurisdiction over adoption proceedings involving the 
on-reservation conduct of tribal members. Fisher v. District 
Court, 424 U. S. 382 (1976); that States cannot apply their 
income taxes to the receipts derived by reservation 1 ndians 
from reservation sources. McClanahan v. Arizoua State Tax 
Commission, 411 U. S. 164 (H)73); and that States may not 
levy cigarette taxes on on-reservation sales to reservation 
Indians or impose personal property taxes 011 property owned 
by such Indians, Moe, supra, at 480-481. 
Second, thf're is a significant territorial component to tribal 
power. Thus state taxes on the off-reservation activities of 
Indians are permissible. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 
U.S. 145 (1973), and tribaJ laws will often govern the on-
reservation conduct of non-Indians. Williams v. Lee, 358 
U. S. 217 (1959). See also United States v. Mazurie, 419 
u.s. 544, 558 (1975) .27 
terminated by Congress and tho~e powers 'incon~1stent with the1r status.' " 
(Emphasi~:~ aud citation:; omitted.) Still, Un£ted i:itate~ v. Wheeze,·, 435 
U.S. 313, 322-326 (1978), empha;o;Jzed the sovere1gn nature of tribal au-
thority over Indians. See abo Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 
145, 148 (1973); Antoine v. Washingtou, -!20 U.S. 19-!, 201-203 (1975) . 
27 Thil'l territorial component 1s also suggested b~· recent ~tatutes like the 
Clean Air Aet AmPndment,; of 1977, 91 Stat. 685, 7a5, wluch provide thnt 
· " lands w1thin tlw E'X(Prior boundane:; of re:>ervatwn:s of federally recog-
nized Indim1 tribPs" may hE' red€'~1gnated for mr quality purpo,:E':; "only by 
the appropriat(• Indian governing body." A :::nnilar note 1:; :sounded m the 
Surface !\lining and ReclamatiOn Art of 1977, 41 Stat. 445, 523. In addi-
tion, a geographieal or territorial ,.;ourc€' for Indian authonty may be 
found in the. Wa;-;hington Enabling Act, 25 SwL. 676, ch. 180, 4 (1889), by 
whieh the State wa.~ required to dt~clann ''all nght and title" to lands 
"owned or held by any Indian or lndim1 tnbe" and to agree that such 
lands ":;hall remain nuder the absolute Jnn,.;dJrtwn and control of the 
'Congress .. . !' 
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Third, where it is necessary to resolve a conflict between 
state and tribal authority over on-reservatiou conduct involv· 
ing Indians aud non-Indians, a relatively particularistic look at 
the interests of state and tribe and the federal policies that 
govern relations with Indian tribes is appropriate. We have 
concluded, for example, that a tribe lacks jurisdiction to try 
a non-Indian for a crime, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 
U.S. 191, 208 (1978), but that a State may not resolve a dis-
pute arising out of on-reservation transactions between an 
Indian purchaser and a liOn-Indian seller. Williams v. Lee, 
supra, or tax the gross receipts of a federally licensed retail 
trading post that deals ou the reservation with reservation 
Indians, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Com-
mission, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) . 
l 
And fourth, the preceding results flow from an mtricate 
web of sources including federal treaties and statutes, the 
broad policies and notions that uuderhe those federal enact-
ments, and a presumption of sovereignty or autonomy that 
has roots deep in aboriginal independence. The prevalent 
mode of analysis is one of pre-emption. It takes as its start-
ing point the exclusive ·power of the Federal Government to 
regulate Indian Tribes and proceeds to bound state power 
where necessary to give vitality to the federal concerns at 
stake. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376, n. 2 (1976). 
Only rarely does the talismanic invocation of constitutional 
language or rigid conceptions of state and tribal sovereignty 
shed light on difficult problems. Moe, supm, at 481, n. 17, 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, supra, at 172. 
For present )Urposes, two federal conc~.ws seem especially 
important. 01 e IS the Strong and oft-cited poliCYOT en-
couraging tn al self -government. United States v. Wheeler, 
435 U.S. 313, 322-326 (1978); Fisher v. District Court, supra, 
at 386-388; · McClanahan v. A.rizona State Tax Commission, 
~at 179; wmiarns V. Lee, supra, at 219-220. And the 
~is a complementary wterest in stimulating Indian eco-
nomic and commercial development. Both found expression 
' I 
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in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U. S. C. § 461 
et seq./8 Mescalero Apache 'l'ribe v. Jones, supra, at 151-152/g 
and are manifest in more recent statutes as welP0 They are, 
we believe, of central importance in analyzing any conflict of 
state and tribal law. 
28 As we have already noted, of the Tribe::~ before u:s only one--the 
Mnkah Tribe-iR organized under the Indian Hrorganization Act. The 
others, although governed by federally approved constitutions, have voted 
not to eome under that Aet. ThiH is not particularly relevant to the preH-
ent eases beenn~e that Act is important, here primarily as an indic1a of 
congrrs:;ional policy regardmg uU Indians. Moreover, the concenm under-
lying that Act have been reatfimwcl in more reernt legislation a~ wc•ll. See 
n. 30, infra. A year after the Reorg;:mization Art was enac·ted, Congre~s 
provided that "All law::;, general and RpPcial, and all treaty provisions 
affecting any Indian re~ervahon whiCh ha~ votrd or may vote to exclude 
it~;elf from [thii'i Act] . . . :::hall be deemed to have been continuou~ly 
effective as to ~uch re~ervatwn, notwith::;tnnchng the pat-~~age of L this Act] ." 
25 U. S. C. 478b (1976), 49 Stat . :378 (1935) . 
20 We notrcl there that thr ''intent and purp~e of the Heorgamznt10n 
Act was 'to rehab1litate the Indian's economic life and to g1ve hnn a chance 
to develop tht> initiative de:;troyed by a eent ury of oppre:;sion and pater-
nalism.'" Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, ai 152, quoting H. R. 
Rep. No. 1804, nd Conf., 2d Sf'SS., (j (19:34) . The Act Itself contains a 
number of provi~1ons that demon:;trate Congres:; ' concern with t>ncouraging 
Indian economic development. S<'e 25 U. S. C. §§ 469, 470, and 477. Sec 
also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 43G U. S. 49 , 59-60 ( 1978) . 
30 See the Indian Self-Detrrmination and Education A~:;i~timre Act, 25 
U. S. C. § 450 et seq. and the Indian Financing Art of 1974, 25 U. S.C. 
§ 1451 et seq. The fir:>t :;ertion of tlw latter ,;ta1ute .-<tateR as follow:; ~ 
"H is hereb) cleelared to be· the policy of C'ongre~~ to provide capi-
tal . .. to help develop and utilize> Indian re:>Otli'C't'l:l, both phy:;ical am! 
human, to a point where the Indian,; will fully exerci~c rp:;pon~iuility for 
the utilization and management of their own re:;ourcf':; and whrrr thry will 
enjoy a ::;tandnrd of living from their own produetivr effort"' comparable to 
that enjoyed by non-India.m; in neighuormg communities." 
AdhPrrner to tlw polirie~ unclerlyin~~; the Reorganization Act ha~ not lw('JJ 
without ,;ome interrnption. The TerminatiOn Act .. of the 1950's, ~ee, e. g., 
25 U. S. C. §§ 564, 721-728, 741- 760, and ~91-901 , ~eem to have , ignallecf 
a congrr~:-<ional urge to pur~ue an a:;:similatiOnJ;;t. policy ,.:omf'what akin to 
the approach that wa:s dominant pnor to the Heorgunizatiou Aet . See 
generally Menominee Tribe v. Umted States, :3H1 U S. 404 (1968) . Btd, 
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With this as background, "•'C turn to the particular problem 
before us. Our starting point is Moe, supra. There we con-
sidered a state cigarette tax similar-to the one at issue here."1 
Noting that the District Court had concluded that the tax fell 
not on the Indian seller, but on the non-Indian buyer,a2 wo 
observed that our decisions dealing with Indian tax exemptions 
were not directly applicable. Id., at 483. Indeed, we viewed 
the tax itself as "concededly lawful"-it neither fell upon 
tribal members nor impinged on tribal functions. The key 
problem, as we saw it, was one of enforcement--could the 
State of Montana require the Indian seller to collect a tax 
validly imposed on the non-Indian purchaser. We determined 
that the burden of collectiou was minimal and noted that it 
would in no sense "frustrate[] tribal self-government." :w 
Accordingly, we concluded that it could be imposed to prevent 
wholesale tax avoidance by non-Indian purchasers. 
Moe necessarily suggests a number of limits upon Indian 
sovereignty in general and the federal interests in tribal self-
government and economic growth in particular: It permits 
state law to come onto the reservation in the form of a tax 
aud collection requirement a11d it upholds the imposition of a. 
tax that will undoubtedly hurt Indian retailing activities by 
depriving tribal smoke shops of a competitive edge.H 
presPnt. pohcr "appear::: to lw returuing to a fo('tt,.; upon ~lrengtheuing­
tribnl ::;elf-govemmrnt." Bryan v. itasca Cow1t,11. supra. at :~89, 11. 14. 
:n The tax in Moe wm; 1:! C'eut~ a pack or 1);1.20 a. carton. Confederatec! 
Salish and Kootenai 'J'ribex \', Moe , :~02 F. Supp. 12\17, 1:3:33 (~Iont. 1975} 
( thrrr-j udgf• t'ourt.) . 
~·Moe. supra, at 4~1-!R2. Set> Cunfederatfd :iuLish am! Kootenai 'J'ribelf 
v. Moe, supra, at 1297, 100S for the Di~trid Court'~ ('Onclu:;ion in Llu:s-
rcgard. 
~a Mot>, ~upra, aL 48a, cttin~ Wtllwm~ \ , Le~: , :35H U ~ 217, ~Hl-220 
(1950) . 
~ ~The Di~trict Comt found lt-foe to U!' disJlo~itiv(• of th!' Trio!·~ ' cla1nr 
that impo:;itiOn of the tax ('Oilrrtwn hurdl'll drpm·Pd I lwm of duP proc-
r~~ and thrir a,;:-;l'rtion that. tlw tax wa~ pn•-pmpl<>d by thr Indian· 
'l'radcrH Act, 25 U. S C .. § 261 et ~eq., and frderal poliey underlying 11Hs 
'. 
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The major factual difference between the present cases and 
Moe is that here the Tr.ibesj).ave elected to tax a11d regulate 
on-reservation ci arette sales ~ 5 while in Moe they had not.ao 
Phrase differently, th~ ribes before us are acting in federally 
sanctioned and encouraged ways--they are raising govern-
mental revenues, establishing commercial enterprises and 
struggling to escape from " 'a century of oppression and pater-
nalism.'" Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 152, 
quoting H. R. Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934). 
That difference has a number of consequences. First, it 
means that in this case the sharp drop in cigarette sales that 
would result from imposition of the state tax will reduce 
revenues not only of individual Indian retailers. but of the 
Tribes themselves as governmental units. Second, it means 
that a decision permitting application of the state tax would 
place Indian goods at an actual competitive disadvantage as 
Indian Reorgamzation Act of 1934, 25 U. S. C § 461 et seq., the Indian 
Self-Det!:'rmination and Education ARsiFitance Act, 25 U. S. C. § 450 
et seq. and the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. § 1-151 et seq. 
See 446 F. Supp., at 1:356-1360. 
au The Unitrd States argu!:'H that. therr exist;; a Rerond important dif-
ference ns well-the pre::;cnce here of evidrJH·e that pNm1tting impoMition 
of the state tax would sharply reduce sale,; by tribal tobarco outlets. In 
Moe, the government as~erts, there wa::; no ~bowing that. the rconomic 
impact would br thii'i grave. Brief for the United States, at 14-15. We 
think the United States rrads Moe too parsimoniously. That deci,·ion 
does make clear that Indian tribe::; have no right to 11 rrrtain volume of 
saleH. And the presrnt one doe:,: not turn upon thr mere drop in sales 
which impo:;ition of the tax would produce. 
so The State suggest~ that tribal involvmwnt in Moe wa;; in many re-
spect.,; comparable to that in tlwse cm;es, and tllll~ that Moe is directly 
controlling. But whilr the District Court opinion iu that rase does refer 
to an admini:;trative fee imposrd by thr Tribr on tohaeco rrtailrrs, unci to 
some regulatory involvement a.~ wrll, ;~92 F. Supp., at l!Ha, 11rither eomt 
in Moe srrms to have focussecl upon thrHr fact~. Indred, the District 
Court specifically notrd that the Tribe~ h:td not impo:<ed any ta.'\ on 
cigarette::;, ibid., aJ1d wr obscrYrd that. the ca:-;e pre~PJJtrd 110 conflict with 
tribal self-government, 4~5 U S., at 483. 
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compared to 11on-Indian ones because the former would have 
to bear two tax burdens while the latter bore but one. And 
third, it leads to au actual conflict of jurisdiction and sover-
ciguty because impositon of the Washington tax would inject 
state law into an on-reservation transaction which the Indians 
have chosen to subject to their own laws. 
In our view, these three consequences, and particularly the 
latter two, bring tfie Washington taxes into sharp collfii with 
important fe<. era po ICies. er aps mos stn ing is the fact 
that a rule pennittingrii1positon of the state taxes would have 
the curious effect of making the federal concerns with tribal 
self-government and commercial development inconsistent 
with one-another. In essence, Tribes are put to an uusatisfac-
tory choice. They are free to tax sales to non-Indians, but 
doing so will place a burden upon such sales which may well 
make it profitable for non-1ndian buyers who are located on 
the reservation to journey to surrounding communities to pur-
chase cigarettes.37 Or they can decide to remain competitive 
by not taxing such sales, and in the process forego revenues 
urgently needed to fill governmental coffers. Commercial 
growth, in short, can be had only at the expense of tax dollars. J 
And having to make that choice seriously intrudes on the 
Indiaus' right "to make their own laws and be ruled by them," 
Williams v. Lee, supra, at 219-220.38 
a7 ThiH problem ww; entirely ab:-;ent in Moe. Nothing in the result 
there di~favored the purcha:;p of Indian good::;. Hather, impo::;ition of the 
state tax on non-lnchans ,;imp]~· <:rra.ted a :>ituation in which prr:-:ons were 
encouraged to buy cigarl'ttes on the basis of factor~ other than tax bene-
fitl:i tU1d a voidall<:<'--fact or:-; likl' geograpl1ical location and (·onven1rncc. 
In the ]Jrrsent ~ituation, the balanrr adually tip~ again;;t the Indians. 
This mi~ht be uvoifl<•d via a ~httP t;tX that allowrcl sonw form of cr('dit for 
the amount of any tribal (ax. Wl' an· not now fael'd with a ~tatP l'Cheme 
that provHles for sueh a credit, and we exprc::;:; 110 vit•w as lo the validity 
of such a. scheme. 
u& It might be nrgll(•d that the ehoiee we describe is entire]~· common-
place-that in making its taxing d<'ei;;Jon::; every govrrnmental unit is 
required to balance its revenue need8 again:st thr economic impact of the· 
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'l'he State urgPs that an affirmance in these cases would 
eviscerate jlf oe by making it turn soldy on the presence or 
abseuce of eveu a token tribal tax. The result. the State 
continues, would be to accord to l])(Jian tribes the right to 
"market" to Ilon-India.ns the tax-exempt status recognized in 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm·iss-iott, supra, and 
related cases. In the State's vie\v, that iu turn would give 
the Tribes carte blanche to establish vast tax-exempt shopping 
centers dealing in every imaginable good. 
We disagree. By permittiug imposition of a state tax that 
would doubtless hurt sales by Indian smoke shops. Moe made 
clear that Indians do not have a right to market their tax-
exempt status. Nothin we do today is in an wa to the 
contrary. We have simply struck own one of many con-
ceiVafife state taxing schemes. And, our holding is not that 
taxe:'i it cou~ider~ . Iu one srm;e, thi~ is quite lrne : If one State has 1t 
wry low ,;nle:s tax, a neighboring State';; ability to impo~t· a higher one may 
as a ]Jracticnl matter be impaired. In ~Some rircum:stanc<'s, 1t rau cope 
with this ~ituation b~· imposiug a romplementary tax on the in-state U!SC of 
good" purchased clsewlwre. National Geogmphic Soczety v. California 
Bd. of Equalization. -!ilO 1.'. S. 551, 555 (1977). And in other:; there will 
exist 110 efficaciouH wa~· of collecting :such a tax. Whatever the ca:se, how-
evl•r, the two StnteH will fare each other acro~:s their common border with 
equal ar~rnal~. 
The pre~t·nt :situation is qu1t l' different for the simple rea~on that [nclian 
reservations nrc not State~ . Thi~ hnR two sort~ of con;;equmce~. Fir~t, 
it menns the equality notrd in the precPcliug paragraph i;; ab~ent. Moe 
holds that :sellers on an Indian reservation may bP requin·d to collect ~tate 
taxes 011 :sale~ to non-Indian~ that occur entirely on thr reservation. Yet 
it i:s high]~· unlikely that thr Tribr~ in these CHH('~ could requirP ~ellers in 
wa~hington to eollf'rt tribal taxe~. And R('('Oild, [ndian Tribes, while le8:s 
autonomous than State~ in important re~pect,;, arf' the ~pPcwl beneficiaries 
of tlw fedeml roJH't' l'll~ and poliei~ we di:;cu:s~ m text . A;; a re:snlt, while 
wr are rontf'nt to recognize eert a in t radcoffs ami frictwn:s in th<· stnte-:state 
context a~ inevitabl<>, ,;imilar problem~ in tlw ~tate-rP~ervation ('ontext 
demand ,.:prcial ,;crutin~·· Tribe~ may lack tlw toob ll(:.'f:'drd to protect 
them!Selve~, and protecting tlwm i:< l\11 llllportant federal concern . cr. 
Morton v. Mancari , 417 l'. S. 535, 551-555 (1974) . 
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Inuians have an absolue right to enter markets with the com-
petitive boost that comes from tax-exempt status,30 but merely 
that the State is not free to eliminate that competitive boost 
in ways that force tribes to choose between federally sanc-
tioned goals, place tribal goods at an actual disadvantage and 
compel tribal members to collect a tax that subjects their 
goods to a double burden. Accordingly, the specter of enor-
mous tribal tax havens recedes considerably, 
The State co1icedes that the Washington cigarette and I 
sales 40 taxes may not be imposed on sales to Indians. We 
no;; hoiCl that the application of those taxes to cigarette sales 
to non-Indians is also impcrrnissible. 
v 
Several questions remam before us, but none reqUires ex-
tensive discussion. 
80 Indeed, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 152, ~uggests that 
the federal interest in tribal economic development adde:;:oe,; it~elf primarily 
to the need to en::;ure that Indian::; can compete with non-Indians on an 
equal footing . 
40 The District Court anal~·zpd the cigarette nut! Hales t axp,.; se Jarately. 
It concluded that th<' former (1) wou c mterfere with tribal :srlf govrrn-
ment by drastically reducing the volume of cigarette "ale,: aucl the tribaf 
revenues produced by :such sale:- and (2) had in any event bl'f.'n pre-empted 
by the tribe.-' exercise• of their fedrrally delegated powers to regulate and 
tax cigarette sales. 446 F. Supp., at 1360-1366. Turning to the ~:>ale~:~ 
tax, the Court found the second argument equally applicabiP, but concluded 
that the first was not becau::;e that tax was so ~mall it would have little 
effect on cigarette sales and tribal revenues. Beyond that, the Court 
approvrd the application of the ~ales tax to :sale;; to non-Indians of goods 
other than cigarette~~good which W<'re not ~ubject to tribal taxation. 
!d., at 1370-1371 . ThP latter ronclu~ion is, of cour~;e, entirely unexcep-
tional under Moe . We nl~o agree thai the sales tax may not be applied' 
to cigarette sales. But \ve ar<' not per:suaded then' is any reason to· 
analyze the ~ an<l'r1garettejaxes ~mtcly. BoT!i will have the effect 
of subjecting Indian goods to a competitive di:-;advantagt• when tho~c 
goods are also the target of tribal taxes, and we do not think it would be 
wi:se to make the permissibility of such a di::;advantage depend in every-
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The first concerns the challenge in the Colville case to 
the Washington motor vehicle and mobile home, camper and 
travel trailer taxes. R. C. W. chs. 82.44 and 82.50. Although 
not identical, these taxes are quite similar. Each is denomi-
nated an excise tax for "the privilege of using in the State" 
the covered vehicle, each is assessed annually at a certain per-
centage of fair market value, and each is sought to be imposed 
upon vehicles owned by the Tribe or its members and used 
both on and off the reservation.41 
Once again, our departure point is Moe. There we held 
that Montana's personal property tax could not validly be 
applied to motor vehicles owned by tribal members who re-
sided on the reservation. 425 U. S., at 480-481. The vehicles 
Montana attempted to tax were apparently used both on and 
off the reservation/ 2 and the tax was assessed annually at a 
percentage of market value of the vehicles in question. Thus, 
the only difference between the taxes now before us and the one 
struck down in Moe is that these are called excise taxes and 
imposed for the privilege of using the vehicle in the State, 
while the Montana tax was labelled a personal property tax. 
The State asserts that this difference mandates a different 
result. In Moe, it argues, the District Court concluded that 
the taxable event was "the ownership of a motor vehicle on 
case upon a highly fact-:;pecific inquiry into demand elasticitie:; and actual 
impacts. 
41 In the wake of McClanahan v. A1'izona State Tax Cornmis11ion, supra, 
and Moe, the State does not claim that it can impose these taxes upon 
vehicles used wholly within the re~ervation . Appellants' brief, at 111, anq 
n. 77. 
42 Moe did not focu:; upon vehicle u:;e at all . The Di:;trict Court opm-
ion in that case, however, indicates that some of the vehicles to which 
Montana sought to apply its tax were used both on and off the reserva-
tion. Confederated: Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Montana. 3~2 F. Supp. 
1325, 1328-1329 (Mont. 1975) (three-judge court) (Smith, J ., concurring 
~nd; di~:renting) . 
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January 1 of each year," 43 and that even took place on the 
reservation. Accordingly, under McClanahan v. Arizo·na 
State Ta.T Commission, supr·a, Montana was without authority 
to impose its tax. In the present case, the State continue~, 
the taxable event is the use within the State of the vehicle in 
question. Thus, we are told, the McClanahan principle is 
inapplicable and the tax should be upheld under M esoalero 
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). 
We do not think Moe and McClanahan can be this easily 
circumvented. It is the substance of what was done, not its 
form only, wl1ich Moe found invalid. Cf. Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274, 285-286 (1977). While· 
Washington may well be free to levy a tax on the use outside 
the reservation of Indian-owned vehicles. it may not under 
that rubric accomplish what Moe held was prohibited. Had 
Washington tailored its tax to the amount of actual off-reser-
vation use, or otherwise varied something more than mere 
nomenclature, this might be a different case. But it has not 
done so, and we dec1ine to treat the case as if it had. 
The second question still before us concerns the tax status· 
under Moe and McClanahan of Indians who are present on 
the reservation but do not belong to the goveruing Tribe. 
This issue arose in the Y aki·ma case in the wake of the District 
Court's determination that the state retail sales tax could be· 
applied to the purchase by non-Indians of goods other than· 
cigarettes.14 It was. of course, quite clear that under Moe 
and McClanahan the sales tax could 11ot be applied to similar · 
purchases by tribal members. but the State argued that this 
exemptiou should not extend to Indians who reside on the · 
reservation but are not enrolled m the governing ·Tribe. 
Relying in part on the lower court opiniou in Moe, Confede-
rated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297,. 
13 /d., al 1327, citing the :\Iontana statute, R C. M. 1947, § 84-406 (2)• 
(1074 Suw.)) 
14 See ll . 40, supra .. 
.... 
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1312 (Mont. 1975) (three-judge court), the District Court 
rejected this contention, 446 F. Supp. 1371. Moe did not 
reach this question because Montana failed to raise it on 
appeal. We do reach it now, and we affirm. The State has 
failed to suggest a persuasive reason for treating Indians resi-
dent on the reservation differently depending upon whether 
they are formally enrolled in the governing tribe:1• 
The third issue that requires attention is the State's mecha~ 
nism for enforcement of its cigarette and sales taxes. Most 
questions concerning enforcement are simply not before us 
because the underlying taxes have in large measure been held 
invalid. The District Court did, however, conclude that the 
State could uot require the Tribes to keep records of certain 
cigarette and other sales to Indians-sales coucededly exempt 
even under Moe. 446 F. Supp. 1358- 1359, 1373. Thesa 
recordkeeping requirements were apparently tailored to en-
forcement of taxes on nonexempt sales. Having concluded 
that there are uo nonexempt cigarette sales in this case, it 
is difficult to see why a recordkeeping requirement geared to 
collection of a tax on such sales presents a live controversy. 
Accordingly, we express uo opinion as to the District Court's 
holding that the State could not require Indian retailers to 
keep records of cigarette sales to Indians. As for the Court's 
seemingly parallel holding that the State could not require the 
Tribes to keep records of exempt sales of goods other than 
cigarettes-a requirement apparently intended to facilitate 
the collection of valid taxes on the sales of such goods to non-
Indians--there does seem to be an actual controversy. The 
District Court based its holding entirely on its conclusion 
that the record was inadequate to show any need for the re-
45 Thi~ couclu:oiou i:; ron:-;i~ted with that reached by a munbcr of lower 
courts. In addition to Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 
392 F . Supp., at 1:312, ~<'(',e. g., Pox v. Bureau of Revenue. 87 N. M. 261, 
531 P. 2d 1234 (1975), rert. dt'uied, 42-! U.S. (1976); Dillon v. State of 
Montana. 451 F . Supp. 168 (1\Iont. 197g) . Cf. tlw dPfinition of "lncliuu'1 
in the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U. S. C. § 479. 
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quirement. Accepting that finding. we affirm that Coures 
result. Nothing in Moe permits the State to impose unneces~ 
sary burden upon tribal retailers, and we save an exploration 
of what burdens are and are not truly necessary for a case in 
which this issue is actually presented. 
The final question that must be considered concerns the 
challenge by the Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes to the 
State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction over them. 
The District Court found that assumption unlawful as regards 
the Makah and Lummi reservations and lawful as regards the 
Colville reservation. 446 F. Supp., at 1366-1367. The State 
challenges the former findings. 
All parties apparently recognize that this issue is controlled 
by the intervening decision in the State's favor in Washington 
v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Na-
tion, 439 U. S. 463 (1979). 'There a pattern of jurisdiction 
identical to those created on the Makah and Lummi reserva-
tions was upheld, and the holding of the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit on which the District Court in the present 
case relied for its conclusion that such patterns are unconsti-
tutional was reversed. Accordingly, the judgment of the Dis-
trict Court in this respect is reversed and in all other re-
~pects ·l 6 is 
Affirmed. 
46 We note probable jurisdiction in No. 78-60, Confederated 1'1ibes of 
the Colville Indian Reservation; Lummi Indian Tribe; and Makah Indian 
Tribe v. Washington, e,t al., which i~:; pending on appeal. There the Col-
ville Tribe appeal::; from ~o much of the District. Court's judgment ar~ 
reflects the holding that Wai:lhington 's assumption of total juri,;diction 
over that Tribe'~ re,:ervation wa~ lawful. See 446 F. Supp., at 1366. 
Tlw Colville Tribe chnlle11ge::; that holding on ground,: (1) that Washing-
ton could not a~:~Sumf:' juri::;diction without amending its constitution and 
(2) that the assumption of tot:tl jurisdiction over only selectf:'d reserva.-
tions violatC's the Equal Protection Clause. lVashington v. Confederated 
Bands and Tribes of the Yakima hulian Nation, 4a9 U. S. -!6:3 (1979), 
disposes of the first contention, id., at 493, and make" elear tha.t the 
second must fail if the assumption of jurisdiction i:; rationally related t<>; 
, 
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some valid state purpose, id., at 500-502. We find thr pattR.rn of jmis-
dirtion in the present case mtional: The Colville Tribe consrnted in 1965 
to the State's as~umption of jurisdiction over it, and the State has ru:;sumecl 
total jurisdiction only over Tribes that have so consented. The presence 
or absence of tribal consent is a rational basi!l for ctistinguishing among 
reservations, und there is thus no com;titutional infirmity. 
C HAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
j)u.vrtmt Clfltttri l1f tfrt 'Jnittb j)tattg 
· ';$asfrittg~ ~. OJ. 2l!&f~;l 
November 26, 1979 
Re: No. 78-630 - Washington v, Confederated Tribes 
Dear Bill: 
In due course, I will circulate a dissent in t h is 
case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 












Novemher 27, 1q79 
No. 78-630 Washington v. Confed. Tribes 
Dear Bill: 
You were generous to assign this difficult Indian 
case to yourself, and you have written a fine oPinion. 
I aqree with most of it. ~v vote at the 
Conference, however, was that the state sales tax on Indian 
cigarette sales to non-Indians orobablv was valid. 
Because the tribes do not levv a sales tax, 
imposition of the state's sales tax on Indian cigarette sales 
would not put Indian goods at a "competitive disadvantage.• 
Non-Indian consumers simply would pay the same surcharge no 
matter where they made their purchases. Thus, the state 
sales tax--unlike the state cigarette tax--does not subiect 
Indian transactions to a double exaction or impose state 
regulation over a sale that the tribes have chosen to 
regulate. Indeed, absolving In~ian retailers of the 
obligation to collect the state sales tax would all ow them to 
gain a "competitive edge" by marketing their tax exemPtion. 
But Moe, as you have pointed out, held that Indian businesses 
are not entitled to such an edqe. Oo.at 18, 21-22. 
If after further consideration, I adhere to my 
Conference view, I will join most of your opinion but dissent 
briefly as to the sales tax issue. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rrennan 
lfp/ss 








JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.iupt-tntt Ofttnrt ttf tlft ~b .italt$ , 
Jla$Jri:ngtlttt. ~. Of. 2!1,?~~ 
November 28, 1979 
RE: No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
Colville Indian Reservation 
Dear Lewis: 
Thanks very much for your comments on the circulated 
opinion in the above. Perhaps before you undertake to 
write something I might try to expand upon why I think the 
sales tax and cigarette tax should not be treated different-
ly. I'll let you have a revision of footnote 40 within a 
day or two. 
Sincerely, 
Mr.Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
December fi, 1979 
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Dear Bill: 
I so much appreciate your sendina me a draft of a 
proposed new footnote 40, in re~ponse to ~v letter of 
November 27. The redraft of the note does not meet the view 
I expressed as to the nifference between the ciqarette and 
sales tax, and I suppose we simply have different perceptions 
of this issue. Yet, I oo think the most imPortant qoal is to 
resolve doubt and provide quidance in this area. 
Accordinqly, it is possible that I will ioin your entire 
opinion. For the time beinq, however, I think I will await 
writinas by other Justices and see what is said about the 
sales tax. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
·' 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA~ 
No. 78-630 
State of Washington et al., 
Appellants, 
v. 
Confederated Tribes of the On Appeals from the United 
Colville Indian Reser- States District Court for the 
vation et al. Eastern District of Wash-
State of Washington, 
ington. 
v. 
United States et al. 
[January -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS, dissenting in part. 
In Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai 'l'ribes, 425 
U. S. 463, 481-483, the Court held that a State that imposes a 
cigarette tax on non-Indian purchasers may require Indian 
merchants to collect and remit that tax. The State's require-
ment was objectionable to the Indians for two r(;)asons: it de-
stroyed their competitive advantage over non-Ind\an sellers 
and it imposed an administrative burden on the llidian mer-
chants. Because the competitive advantage was derived 
solely from the willingness of a significant number of non-
Indian purchasers to flout their obligations under state law 
to pay sales and excise taxes, the Court found it unworthy of 
federal protection. And the Court squarely held that the 
"minimal" administrative burden of collecting the tax was 
not a "burden which frustrates tribal self-government." Id., 
at 483. 
The Washington cigarette tax discussed in Part IV of the 
opinion the Court announces today is indistinguishable from 
the state tax at issue in Moe . It is perfectly clear that Wash-
ington's taxation of the tribal sales of cigarettes to non-
~&'ILil k~e- r.e.../ -fi.--. 
~ ~~ ~ /~~.__._-
·~·~-
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Indians would be vahd if the Tribes did not also tax those 
sales. I am unable to accept the Court's conclusion that the 
Tribes have the power, by their own action, to render an 
otherwise valid state tax invalid. Cf. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. 
Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 280, n. 16. 
The Court's conclusion IS particularly anomalous because 
the action of the Tribes has not strengthened either of the 
objections to the state tax that were rejected in Moe. The 
administrative burden of collecting the state tax remains es-
sentially the same whether or not a tribal tax is also involved. 
Moreover, the economic interest at stake in this litigation is 
precisely the same as that involved in Moe, namely a com-
petitive advantage accruing to the Indian Tribe that " ... is 
dependent on the extent to which the non-Indian purchaser 
is willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the tax." 425 
U. S., at 482. 
Because I believe the Court's refusal in Moe to a1Iow the 
Indian Tribes to gain a significant advantage over their non-
Indian competitors by mat·keting their tax-exempt status 
requires a like result here. I respectfully dissent from the 
Court's principal holding. l do, however, join Parts I , II1 







.§u:prttttt Qfllllrl.ttf t!rt 'J!l.ni:U~ .§httt.s 
~MJri:ngimt. ~. <!J. 2ll~J!.~ 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
December 11, 1979 
Re: No. 78-630, Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
Dear Bi 11, 
' 
You were a good soldier to assign this one 
to yourself, and I am sure we are all grateful. You 
may remember that at the Conference I was alone in 
believing that the Washington sales and cigarette 
taxes were valid if they credited the taxes imposed 
by the Tribes. At present I am simply not at rest and 
shall await the dissenting opinion. ----------------" _________ ..._, ---
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
... 
CHAMeE:RS 01'" 
.JUSTICE WN • .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
~tntt Of curl cf flrt ~b i)taft.tr 
-M~ ~. Of. 2Ll~~~ 
December 12, 1979 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
/ 
In response to John's dissent I propose to add the language 
marked in the margin to my footnote 37 so that that note would 
read as follows: 
~ This problem was entirely absent in Moe. Nothing in the 
result there disfavored the purchase of Indian goods. Rather, 
imposition of the state tax on non-Indians simply created a 
situation in which persons were encouraged to buy cigarettes 
on the basis of factors other than tax benefits and avoidance -
factors like geographical location and convenience. In the 
present situation, the balance actually tips agains the Indians. 
Accordingly, our brother Stevens' statement that the "economic 
interest at stake in this litigation is precisely the same as 
that involved in Moe", dissent infra at p. 2, overlooks a 
crucial distinction-- that between the preservation of a tax 
advantage, which was at stake in Moe, and the elimination of 
a tax disadvantage, which is at the core of this case. This 
distinction might not be present if the state tax allowed some 
form of credit for the amount of any tribal tax. We are not 
now faced with a state scheme that provides for such a credit, 




..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~uprtmt <!fcu.rt cf t~t ~nittb ~tatts 
'lllaa~ingtcn. W. <!f. 2ll,?Jl~ 
December 13, 1979 
Re; No. 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
Deal;' Bill: 
r join your opinion but strongly suggest that 
you delete the words ''and particularly the second" 
in the first full paragraph on page 20. 
I consider all three of them to be equally 
important and especially the third one so it seems 
it would be easier to leave out the whole phrase. 
Sincerely, 
~· 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc' The Conference 
\ 
CHAMSERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~tmt afourl !tf tlrt ~ttittb ~httts 
JruJrittgfon. ~. <!f. 2.llgt'l~ 
December 14, 1979 
Re: No. 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
Dear Bill: 
This, indeed, is a complicated and "messy" case. I am 
prepared to join Parts I, II, and III of your opinion. 
Part v affords me difficulty, particularly with respect 
to the motor vehicle tax. I shall await the dissent from 
Bill Rehnquist as to this Part. 
I have ~om ~servations about Part IV along the lines 
suggested b Le s. The state sales tax and the state ciga-
rette tax, 1 seems to me, are separate and distinct. One 
certainly can argue that they should be treated separately 
and that, if the facts warrant, one of them should be sal-
vaged. On this approach, the "credit" issue sought to be. 
avoided in note 37, lurks in the background. This means ·that 
I am not entirely persuaded by the suggestion in note 40 that 
the two ~es must be lumped together. 
It may ·be that I shall not dissent from Part IV {or most 
of it} even if it remains in its present form. For now, how-
ever, I shall await any other writing that may be forthcoming. 
Could it be said that the last paragraph of Part IV {on 
page 22} is literally too broad? Could not the final sen-
tence be read to apply to a sale of cigarettes to any casual 
purchaser in a Seattle smoke shop? Would this be cured by 
the insertion of an appropriate reference to "on~reservation" 
sales by Indians? 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
.:§u:prtutt <!fuurluf flrt ~b ;§taft~ , 
Jlrutfri:ttgLm. ~. <!f. 2ll&f~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WH . J . BRENNAN, JR. December 17, 1979 
RE: No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
Dear Harry: 
Thanks for your memorandum of December 14. Your 
comment about the last paragraph of Part IV is of 
course well taken. It will be corrected by an appro-
priate reference to 11 0n-reservation 11 sales by Indians 
to non-Indians. 
As to the treatment of the motor vehicle tax in 
Part V,I prefer to leave it as it is though of course 
I 1d also consider any dissent. 
As to the treatment of the state sales tax in ll 
Part IV, I can only await further developments. I 




Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J. BRENNAN, JR. December 17, 1979 
RE: No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
Dear Thurgood: 
Thank you for your note in the above. 
of course, make the change you suggested. 
I shall, 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 








Novemher 27, 1q79 
No. 78-630 Washington v. Confed. Tribes 
Dear Bill: 
You were generous to assign this difficult Indian 
case to yourself, and you have written a fine oPinion. 
I aqree with most of it. ~v vote at the 
Conference, however, was that the state sales tax on Indian 
cigarette sales to non-Indians orobablv was valid. 
Because the tribes do not levv a sales tax, 
imposition of the state's sales tax on Indian cigarette sales 
would not put Indian goods at a "competitive disadvantage.• 
Non-Indian consumers simply would pay the same surcharge no 
matter where they made their purchases. Thus, the state 
sales tax--unlike the state cigarette tax--does not subiect 
Indian transactions to a double exaction or impose state 
regulation over a sale that the tribes have chosen to 
regulate. Indeed, absolving In~ian retailers of the 
obligation to collect the state sales tax would all ow them to 
gain a "competitive edge" by marketing their tax exemPtion. 
But Moe, as you have pointed out, held that Indian businesses 
are not entitled to such an edqe. Oo.at 18, 21-22. 
If after further consideration, I adhere to my 
Conference view, I will join most of your opinion but dissent 
briefly as to the sales tax issue. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Rrennan 
lfp/ss 








JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
.iupt-tntt Ofttnrt ttf tlft ~b .italt$ , 
Jla$Jri:ngtlttt. ~. Of. 2!1,?~~ 
November 28, 1979 
RE: No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
Colville Indian Reservation 
Dear Lewis: 
Thanks very much for your comments on the circulated 
opinion in the above. Perhaps before you undertake to 
write something I might try to expand upon why I think the 
sales tax and cigarette tax should not be treated different-
ly. I'll let you have a revision of footnote 40 within a 
day or two. 
Sincerely, 
Mr.Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
December fi, 1979 
78-630 Washinqton v. Confederated Tribes 
Dear Bill: 
I so much appreciate your sendina me a draft of a 
proposed new footnote 40, in re~ponse to ~v letter of 
November 27. The redraft of the note does not meet the view 
I expressed as to the nifference between the ciqarette and 
sales tax, and I suppose we simply have different perceptions 
of this issue. Yet, I oo think the most imPortant qoal is to 
resolve doubt and provide quidance in this area. 
Accordinqly, it is possible that I will ioin your entire 
opinion. For the time beinq, however, I think I will await 
writinas by other Justices and see what is said about the 
sales tax. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
·' 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA~ 
No. 78-630 
State of Washington et al., 
Appellants, 
v. 
Confederated Tribes of the On Appeals from the United 
Colville Indian Reser- States District Court for the 
vation et al. Eastern District of Wash-
State of Washington, 
ington. 
v. 
United States et al. 
[January -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS, dissenting in part. 
In Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai 'l'ribes, 425 
U. S. 463, 481-483, the Court held that a State that imposes a 
cigarette tax on non-Indian purchasers may require Indian 
merchants to collect and remit that tax. The State's require-
ment was objectionable to the Indians for two r(;)asons: it de-
stroyed their competitive advantage over non-Ind\an sellers 
and it imposed an administrative burden on the llidian mer-
chants. Because the competitive advantage was derived 
solely from the willingness of a significant number of non-
Indian purchasers to flout their obligations under state law 
to pay sales and excise taxes, the Court found it unworthy of 
federal protection. And the Court squarely held that the 
"minimal" administrative burden of collecting the tax was 
not a "burden which frustrates tribal self-government." Id., 
at 483. 
The Washington cigarette tax discussed in Part IV of the 
opinion the Court announces today is indistinguishable from 
the state tax at issue in Moe . It is perfectly clear that Wash-
ington's taxation of the tribal sales of cigarettes to non-
~&'ILil k~e- r.e.../ -fi.--. 
~ ~~ ~ /~~.__._-
·~·~-
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Indians would be vahd if the Tribes did not also tax those 
sales. I am unable to accept the Court's conclusion that the 
Tribes have the power, by their own action, to render an 
otherwise valid state tax invalid. Cf. Moorman Mfg. Co. v. 
Bair, 437 U. S. 267, 280, n. 16. 
The Court's conclusion IS particularly anomalous because 
the action of the Tribes has not strengthened either of the 
objections to the state tax that were rejected in Moe. The 
administrative burden of collecting the state tax remains es-
sentially the same whether or not a tribal tax is also involved. 
Moreover, the economic interest at stake in this litigation is 
precisely the same as that involved in Moe, namely a com-
petitive advantage accruing to the Indian Tribe that " ... is 
dependent on the extent to which the non-Indian purchaser 
is willing to flout his legal obligation to pay the tax." 425 
U. S., at 482. 
Because I believe the Court's refusal in Moe to a1Iow the 
Indian Tribes to gain a significant advantage over their non-
Indian competitors by mat·keting their tax-exempt status 
requires a like result here. I respectfully dissent from the 
Court's principal holding. l do, however, join Parts I , II1 







.§u:prttttt Qfllllrl.ttf t!rt 'J!l.ni:U~ .§httt.s 
~MJri:ngimt. ~. <!J. 2ll~J!.~ 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
December 11, 1979 
Re: No. 78-630, Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
Dear Bi 11, 
' 
You were a good soldier to assign this one 
to yourself, and I am sure we are all grateful. You 
may remember that at the Conference I was alone in 
believing that the Washington sales and cigarette 
taxes were valid if they credited the taxes imposed 
by the Tribes. At present I am simply not at rest and 
shall await the dissenting opinion. ----------------" _________ ..._, ---
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
... 
CHAMeE:RS 01'" 
.JUSTICE WN • .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
~tntt Of curl cf flrt ~b i)taft.tr 
-M~ ~. Of. 2Ll~~~ 
December 12, 1979 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
/ 
In response to John's dissent I propose to add the language 
marked in the margin to my footnote 37 so that that note would 
read as follows: 
~ This problem was entirely absent in Moe. Nothing in the 
result there disfavored the purchase of Indian goods. Rather, 
imposition of the state tax on non-Indians simply created a 
situation in which persons were encouraged to buy cigarettes 
on the basis of factors other than tax benefits and avoidance -
factors like geographical location and convenience. In the 
present situation, the balance actually tips agains the Indians. 
Accordingly, our brother Stevens' statement that the "economic 
interest at stake in this litigation is precisely the same as 
that involved in Moe", dissent infra at p. 2, overlooks a 
crucial distinction-- that between the preservation of a tax 
advantage, which was at stake in Moe, and the elimination of 
a tax disadvantage, which is at the core of this case. This 
distinction might not be present if the state tax allowed some 
form of credit for the amount of any tribal tax. We are not 
now faced with a state scheme that provides for such a credit, 




..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~uprtmt <!fcu.rt cf t~t ~nittb ~tatts 
'lllaa~ingtcn. W. <!f. 2ll,?Jl~ 
December 13, 1979 
Re; No. 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
Deal;' Bill: 
r join your opinion but strongly suggest that 
you delete the words ''and particularly the second" 
in the first full paragraph on page 20. 
I consider all three of them to be equally 
important and especially the third one so it seems 
it would be easier to leave out the whole phrase. 
Sincerely, 
~· 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc' The Conference 
\ 
CHAMSERS OF" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~tmt afourl !tf tlrt ~ttittb ~httts 
JruJrittgfon. ~. <!f. 2.llgt'l~ 
December 14, 1979 
Re: No. 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
Dear Bill: 
This, indeed, is a complicated and "messy" case. I am 
prepared to join Parts I, II, and III of your opinion. 
Part v affords me difficulty, particularly with respect 
to the motor vehicle tax. I shall await the dissent from 
Bill Rehnquist as to this Part. 
I have ~om ~servations about Part IV along the lines 
suggested b Le s. The state sales tax and the state ciga-
rette tax, 1 seems to me, are separate and distinct. One 
certainly can argue that they should be treated separately 
and that, if the facts warrant, one of them should be sal-
vaged. On this approach, the "credit" issue sought to be. 
avoided in note 37, lurks in the background. This means ·that 
I am not entirely persuaded by the suggestion in note 40 that 
the two ~es must be lumped together. 
It may ·be that I shall not dissent from Part IV {or most 
of it} even if it remains in its present form. For now, how-
ever, I shall await any other writing that may be forthcoming. 
Could it be said that the last paragraph of Part IV {on 
page 22} is literally too broad? Could not the final sen-
tence be read to apply to a sale of cigarettes to any casual 
purchaser in a Seattle smoke shop? Would this be cured by 
the insertion of an appropriate reference to "on~reservation" 
sales by Indians? 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
.:§u:prtutt <!fuurluf flrt ~b ;§taft~ , 
Jlrutfri:ttgLm. ~. <!f. 2ll&f~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WH . J . BRENNAN, JR. December 17, 1979 
RE: No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
Dear Harry: 
Thanks for your memorandum of December 14. Your 
comment about the last paragraph of Part IV is of 
course well taken. It will be corrected by an appro-
priate reference to 11 0n-reservation 11 sales by Indians 
to non-Indians. 
As to the treatment of the motor vehicle tax in 
Part V,I prefer to leave it as it is though of course 
I 1d also consider any dissent. 
As to the treatment of the state sales tax in ll 
Part IV, I can only await further developments. I 




Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J. BRENNAN, JR. December 17, 1979 
RE: No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
Dear Thurgood: 
Thank you for your note in the above. 
of course, make the change you suggested. 
I shall, 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
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Rec i r0ulated: 
1rd DRAft 
SUfREME COURT OF THE UNITED STA~ 
No. 78-ij30 
State of Washington et al., 
Appellants, 
v. 
Confederated Tribes of the 
Colville Indian Reser-
et- ( va~ t . . a ............. _ 
1 t te of Washington, 
(". lt}.< I 
Up.ited States et al. 
On Appeals from the United 
States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Wash-
ington. 
) 
[November -, 1979] 
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Moe v. 'Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 
463 (1976), held that the State of Montana could require 
Indian operators of on-reservation "smoke shops" to collect 
cigarette taxes from the non-Indian purchasers on whom those 
taxes fell. 425 U. S., at :t.Sl-483. Today we consider a chal-
lenge ·to similar cigarette taxes imposed ·by the State of Wash-
ington on similar transactions. But while in Moe the ciga-
rette retailing pusiness was largely a private operation, the 
Tribes mvolved in these consolidated cases have adopted 
comprehensive ordinances regulating and taxing the distribu-
tion of cigarettes by on-reservation smoke shops. The prin-
cipal question for decision, therefore, is whether the tribal 
regulatory and taxing involvement present here and absent in 
Moe mandates a different conclusion as to the validity of the 
'1 Washington taxes. The three-judge District Court for the 
Eastern District of Washington concluded that it does, and 
we affirm. When the tribal governments chose to tax the 
78-630-CPINION 
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distribution of cigarettes, the Washington taxing scheme was 
brought into conflict with the Tribes' federally sanctioned 
functions and activities. The effect was impermissibly to 
jeopardize tribal authority and place the Indian smoke shops 
at a competitive disadvantage. 
I 
These cases are here on the State of Washington's appeal 
from declaratory judgments and permanent injunctions en-
tered by the District Court at the close of consolidated pro-
ceedings in two separate cases that raised related issues. 446 
F. Supp. 1339 (ED Wash. 1978). The first case, Confederated 
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. State of Wash-
ington, Civ. No. 3868, was filed on May 17, 1973, by the Col ... 
yille, Makah, and Lummi Tribes. The second, United States 
of America and Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima 
Indian Reservation v. State of Washington, Civ. No. 3909, 
was commenced on July 18, 1973, by the United States on 
behalf of the Yakima Indian Nation.1 In each action, the 
complainants contended that the State1s cigarette and tobacco 
products taxes 2 could not lawfully be applied to sales by on-
reservation tobacco outlets. They sought declaratory judg-
ments to that effect, as well as injunctions barring the State 
from taking any measures to enforce the challenged taxes. In 
particular, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the State from seiz-
1 On April 24, 1974, the Yakima Indian Nation intervened as a plaintiff 
m the United States' case. Its complaint appears at Appendix (App.) 149. 
2 The State tobacco products tax, which is imposed on cigars and pipe 
tobacco pursuant to R. C. W. Ch. 82.26, is not before us. The District 
Court concluded that that tax fell upon the Indian sellers and not upon 
the non-Indian purchasers. 446 F. Supp., at 1355, n. 15. The State did 
not appeal from this holding, appellants'' brief at '55, n. 40, and all parties 
agree that in consequence the tobacco products tax may not be imposed 
on sale::; by tribal dealers. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 
411 U. S. 164 (1973). See also Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373 
1(1'976). 
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'ing as contraband untaxed cigarettes destined for delivery to 
their reservations.8 In the Colville case, the Tribes also chal-
lenged the State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction 
over their reservations and, by amended pleadings, attacked 
the application of the State's vehicle excise taxes to indian-
owned vehicles. The Yakima case did not present these latter 
issues, but it did make a broad attack on the application of 
the State's general retail sales tax to on-reservation transac-
tions. Both complaints alleged that the challenged state· 
practices were contrary to the Indian Commerce Clause (U.S. 
Const., Art. I, §' 8, ci. 3), and various federal treaties and 
enactments. 
From the time of filing, the two cases pursued closely paral-
lel courses. On November 5, 1973, a temporary restraining· 
order against t1ie State's enforcement of the taxing statutes· 
was issued in each. Appendix (App.), at 13, 147. Thereafter, 
because the complaints sought injunctive relief against the' 
enforcement of state statutes, a three-judge District Court was· 
convened pursuant to tlie tlien ·applicable requirement of 28' 
U. S. C. § 2281' (1970).4 On &lptember 6, 1974, the three-
judge court issued· preliminary injunctions restraining the' 
State from enforcing· the cliallenged taxes against the 'l"ribes. 
App. 15, 156. There followed extensive discovery,~ after· 
which the parties to each case reached agreement on pretrial 
orders setting forth facts and clarifying the issues. 
s The Tribes also sought damages for interference with their cigarette· 
businesses. The damage issues in both cru;;es were remanded by the three-
judge Court to a single district· judge. 446 F. Supp., at 1367, 1373. 
4 Although § 2281 was subsequently repealed, Act of Augu!lt 12, 1976; 
Pub. L. No. 94-381; § 1, 90 Stat. 1119, it was expressly left in place for 
cases which, like those before us, were pending on the date of repeaL 
Pub. L. No. 94-381, § 7, 90 Stat. 1120. We consider issues concerning the 
applicability of the former § 2281 to these cru;;es in Part III, infra. 
5 Proceedings in both cases were stayed for several months, however; 
pending this Court's. decision in Moe v. COnfederated SalU!h and· Kootenai · 
T.fibes,.425 -u . S. 463::(1976) , and Bryan v. l{asca County, supra. 
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Trial was held in both cases on March 28, 1977, and the 
three-judge court entered its consolidated decision on May 10, 
1978. The court concluded (1) that it had jurisdiction as a 
three-judge court to consider the, i8sues presented; (2) that 
the state cigarette ta}f could ..;ot be ·applied to on-reserva--
tion transactions because it was pre-empted by" the tribal tax-
ing ordinances and constituted an impermissible interference 
with tribal self-government; (3) that the state retail sales tax 
could not be applied to tribal cigarette sales,· but could be 
applied to sales of other goods to non:Indians; ( 4) that the 
State could not impose certain recordkeeping requirements 
in connection with various tax-exempt sales; (5) that the 
State could n_ot impose its vehicle ·excise taxes upon vehicles 
owned by the Tribes and their members, and ( 6) that the 
State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction over the 
Makah and Lummi Tribes was unconstitutional. 'The court 
enjoined enforcement of the statutes it had struck down, and 
the State moved unsuccessfully for a new trial. "This appeal 
!ollowed. We postponed consideration of certain ·jurisdic-
tional questions to the merits. - U. S. - (1979). We 
now conclude that we have jurisdiction of the appeal and 
· affirm the judgment of the District Court with one 
modification. 
We begin by sketching the relevant factual background, 
which is not seriously in dispute.6 Thereafter, we explore 
the jurisdictional questions previously postponed and then 
turn to the merits. 
II 
(a) The State Taxing Schemes 
The State of Washington levies a cigarette excise tax of 
$1.60 per carton/ on the "sale, use, consumption, handling, 
6 Our statement of the factual background is dra.wn in large measu11e 
from the opinion of the District Court, 446 F. Supp., at 1345-1349, 1'367-
1370. 
7 The cigarette excise tax is imposed pul'llttant to R. C. W. 82.24.020. 
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possession or distribution" of cigarettes within the State. 
RCW 82.24.020. The tax is enforced with tax stamps; and 
dealers are required to sell only cigarettes to which such stamps 
have been affixed. R. C. W. 82.24.030. Indian tribes are 
permitted to possess unstamped cigarettes for purposes of 
resale to members of the tribe, but are required by regulation 
to collect the tax with respect to sales to nonmembers. 
R. C. W. 82.24.260, WAC 458-20-192.8 The District Court 
found, on the basis of its examination of state authorities, 
that the legal incidence of the tax is on the purchaser in 
transactions between an Indian seller and a non-Indian buyer.9 
The State has sought to enforce its cigarette tax by seizing 
as contraband unstamped cigarettes bound for various tribal 
reservations. It claims that it is entitled to make such seiz-
ures whenever the cigarettes are destined to be sold to non-
Indians without affixation of stamps or collection of the tax. 
R. c. w. 82.24.040. 
That provi~ion authorizes a levy of 6.5 mills per cigarette. The tax is 
brought up to its full amount by R. C. W. 28A.47.440, and 73.32.130, 
which add 0.5 mills ana 1 mill respectively. 
8 Initially the State asserted that it could tax all tribal cigarette sales, 
regardless of whether the buyer was Indian or non-Indian. Its theory was 
that Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588, ch. 505 (1953), granted it general 
~uthority to tax reservation Inaians. After this theory was rejected in 
B1·yan v. lt(]Jjca County, supra, the State abandoned any claim of authority 
to tax sales to tribal members. See 446 F. Supp., at 1346, n. 4. 
0 446 F. Supp., at 1352-1355. Essentially the Court accepted the 
State's contention that the tax falls upon the fir~t event which may con-
stitutionally be subjected to it. In the case of sales by non~ Indians to non-
Indians, this means the incidence of the tax is on the seller, or perhaps on 
someone even further up the chain of distiibution, ·because that person ·is 
• the one who first sells, uses, consumes, handles, pos::;esses or distributes the 
' products. But where the wholesaler or retailer is an Indian on whom 
the tax cannot be impo:sed under McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Com-
mission, supra, the first taxable event· is the use, consumption or possession 
by the non-Indian purchaser. Hence, the District Court concluded, the 
tax falls on that purchaser. While the question is not free from doubt, we 
I accept this conclusion. 
I • 
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Washington also imposes a sales tax on sales of personal 
property, including ciga.rettes. R. C. W. 82.08.020. This tax, 
which was 5% during the relevant period, is. collected from 
the purchaser by the retailer. R. C. W. 82.08.050. It does 
not apply to on-reservation sales to reservation 'Indians. 
WAC 458-20-192. ·' 
The State Motor Vehi~le Excise Tax is imposed on "the 
privilege of using in the state any motor v.ehicle." R.. C. W. 
82.44.020. The tax is assessed annually, and during the .r~Ie. 
vant period the amount was' two percent ,of the fair market 
value of the vehicle in question. · Ibid. In additon, the State 
' imposes an an~mal tax in the amount of one percent of fair 
market value on the privilege of using campers and trailers 
r in the State. R. C. W. 82.50/0 
(b) The Tribes 
Each of the Tribes involved in this litigation is recognized 
by the United States as a sovereign Indian Tribe. · Each is 
governed by a bus.iness or tribal council approved by the Sec-
retary of Interior.11 The Colville Tribe has some 5,800 mem-
bers, of whom about 3,200 live on the Colville Indian Reser-
vation.12 Enrolled members of the·'-Tribe constitute just 
r. under half of the reservation's population. · '"The Lummi Tribe 
has approximately 2,000 members. "Roughly 1,250 of them 
10 The same chapter provided for an excise tax on mobile homes. Ini-
tially, the State sought to apply this tax to Indians as well; but after 
Bryan v. Itasca County, supra, and Moe v. Confederated Salish and 
Kootenai Tnbes, supra, it no longer attempts to do so. 446 F. Supp., at 
1365. 
11 The Makah Tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq. While the Lummi and Colville Tribes do 
have federally approved constitutions, they voted in 1935 not to come 
under that Act. 446 F. Supp., at 1345; n. 2. 
12 The Colville Reservation encompasses 1.3 million acres in the north-
eastern section of Washington. It was· established by Executive Order on 
July .~, 1872 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affa~rs, Laws and Treaties 916 (1903). 
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live on the reserva.tion.13 The Makah Tribe has about 1,000 
members. Some 900 live on the reservation.14 . The Colville, 
Lummi and Makah reservations are isolated : and underde-
veloped. Many members reside in ·mobile 'homes. Most own 
at least one automobile which is ·used both on and off the res-
ervation. Unemployment is a serious·problem on the Colville 
and Makah reservations. 
The Confederated Bands and'Tribes of the Yakimaindian 
Nation have more than '6,000 members, of whom about 5,000 
live on the reservation.15 Enrolled members, however, consti-
tute less than one fifth of the reservation's population. . The 
balance is made up of approximately ·1,500 Indians who are 
not members of the Tribes and more than 20,000 non.:.Indians. 
(c) ·The ··Tribal Cigarette Business 
· The Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes have nearly iden-
tical cigarette sales and taxing schemes. Each · Tribe has 
enacted ordinances pursuant to which it has established one 
or more on-reservation tobacco outlets.16 ·These ordinances 
have been approved· by the Secretary of· Interior; and the 
· dealer at each tobacco outlet is a federally licensed · Indian 
trader. All three Tribes use federally restricted tribal funds ·l'r 
13 The Lummi Reservation encompasses 7,319 acres, most of them on a 
peninsula near Bellingham, Wash. It was established by ·the treaty of 
Point Elliot in 1855. 12 Stat. 927. 
14 The Makab Reservation encompasses 28,000 acres at the northwest tip 
of the Olympic Peninsula. It too was established by treaty in 1855. 12 
Stat. 939. Roughly 63% of its inhabitants are enrolled members of the 
'l'ribe. 
15 'l'he Yakima Indian Reservation was set aside for the Tribe by treaty 
ratified Match 8, 1859, 12 Stat. '951. It encompasses about 1.4 million 
acres in south central Washington . 
16 The tribal ordinances regulating the sale, distribution and taxing of 
cigarettes are set forth at App. 104, 118, and 111. 
17 The funds are maintained in individual accounts in · the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs agency serving the reservation pur::mant to 25 CFR Part 104 
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to p~rchase cigarettes from out-of-state dealers.18 The Tribes 
distribute the cigarettes to their tobacco outlets and collect 
from the operators of those outlets both the wholesale dis-
tribution price and a tax of' 40-to-50 cents per carton. The 
cigarettes remain the property of the.'Tribe until sale. The 
taxing ordinances specify that the tax is to be passed on to 
the ultimate .consumer of the cigarettes. From 1972 through 
1976, the Colville Tribe realized approximately $266,000 from . . 
its cigaxette tax;; the Lummi Tribe realized $54,000 and · the 
Makah Tribe realized $'13,000. 
While the Colville, Lummi, and 'Makah ·Tribes function as 
retailers, retaining possession of the ·cigarettes until their sf.l,le 
to consumers, the Yakima Tribe acts as a wholesaler. It pur-
chases cigarettes from out-of-state dealers and then sells them 
to its licen~ed retailers: The Tribe receives a markup over i;he 
wholesale price from those retailers as well as a tax of ··22.5 
~ent per carton. ·. There is no requirement that this tax be 
added to the selling price. · In 1975, the Yakima Tribe derived 
$278,000 from its cigarette business. 
Indian tobacco dealers make a large majority of their sales 
to non-Indians-residents of nearby communities who journey 
to the reservation especially to take advantage of the triba,.l tax 
e~emption. The purchaser saves inore than a dollar on each 
carton, and that makes the trip worth while. All parties agree 
that if the State were able to tax sales by Indian smoke shops 
and eliminate that one-dollar saving the stream of non-Indian 
bargain hunters would dry up. In short, the Indian retailer's 
b11siness is to 11 substantial de~ree dependent upon his ta~ .. 
exempt status, and if he loses that status his sales will fall off 
sharply. 
III 
We first address our jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal. 
Two ~tttacks are made upon that jurisdiction, one grounded in 
18 These Otlt-of-state whole§alers ar~ also f~erally licensed Indian 
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the intricacies of the now-repealed statute governing three-
judge district courts and the other having to do with the timing 
of the State's appeal. Both are lacking in merit. 
Under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, a direct appeal lies to this court 
from an order granting or denying an injunction in a suit 
"required by any Act o:f Congress to be heard and determined 
by a district court of three judges." At the time the Yakima 
aml Colville cases were filed, 28 U. S. C. § 2281 provided that: 
"An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining 
the enforcement, operation or execution of any State stat-
ute by restraining the action of any officers of such State 
in the enforcement or execution of such statute . .. 
shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof 
upon the ground of unconstitutionality of such statute 
unless the application therefor is heard and determined by 
a district court of three judges . ... " 19 
After the State filed its jurisdictional statement in this appeal, 
the United States moved to dismiss the Yakima case on the 
ground that it was not one required by § 2281 to be heard by 
a court of three judges and thus did not fall within the grant 
of appellate jurisdiction in § 1253. Although directed only to 
the Yakima case because that is the only one to which the 
government is a party, this challenge is quite clearly germane 
to the Colville case as well. 
Section 2281 does not require a three-judge court where a 
constitutional challenge to a state statute is grounded only in 
the Supremacy Clause. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 
111, 128- 129 (1965). In addition, § 2281 is not brought into 
play by constitutional claims that are "insubstantial," Goosby 
v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973). ·The United States argues 
that the substantive tax claims raised by these cases fall into 
one or the other category, and thus failed to trigger § 2281,2° 
19 The repeal of this provision in 1976 does not affect its application to 
these cases. See n. 4, supra. 
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Further, the government continues;· the ~ttacks on the State'.s 
seizure of cigarettes, while perhaps raising genuine CommercJ 
Clause issues, are not properly charaeterized as challenges to 
the constitutionality of a state statute, Rather, the ·govern-
ment asserts, they go to the constitutionality of~the result ob-
~ained by the us/3 of the statute .. We 'nnd neith~r contention 
persuasiye. · 
The original complaints in these actions contended that 
the state taxes were unconstitutionai under the "Indian Com~ 
merce Clause as well a8 the Supremacy Clause. 'Relying 
primarily upon language in footnote i7 i~ Moe, Moe v. Con.:. 
federated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, supra, at 481, n. l7, the 
United States asserts that the Tribes' Commerce Clause claims 
were iqsubstantiaP1 Footnote 17 does suggest that chal~ 
lenges to taxing statutes iike the on~s before us are to be 
' analyzed under the Supremacy Clause. But Moe was decided 
I . • 
in 1976-long after a three-judge court was convened to hear 
these cases-and it is 'thus apparent that footnote 17 alone 
I , .. 
cannot be dispositive, whatever its precise thrust. There is 
~anguage in that footnote, howe~.er, which suggests that th~ 
insubstantiality of Commerce Clause claims such as those 
• r 1 ' ., 
pefore us flows_ from l.fesqalero .4pache T,ribe v. Jones, 411 
p. S. 145 (1973), an~ McClanaha~ v. Ar{z~na State X~ 
Cornm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)-both of which were decided 
rnomalous since it was the United States which initially requested a three-
Judge court in the Yakim.a case. App. 145, At, tqat time the government 
seemed to have no doubt that it sought to enjoin the enforcement of a 
tate ;;tatute on grounds of its unconstitutionality within the meaning of 
§ 2281. 
21 The District Court seems to have found this contention persuasive, 
446 F. Supp., at 1350, although it addressed it.onlx briefly. Presumably 
it saw no need to explore the matter more fully sjnce it was. confiden~ 
1hat the three-judge requirement of § 2281 h11-d in,-l'lny event 1btten s11-ti~fi~.d 
~Y the Tribes' ~hallenges to the State's enforcement measures. 446 F. 
Stipp., at 1350-11351. 
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before the present suits were filed. 22 We think the United 
States. reads too much into this language. Goosby v. Osser, 
o'Upra, made it clear that constitutional claims will not lightly 
be found insubstantial for purposes of § 2281. Indeed, Goosby 
explicitly states that prior decisions are not sufficient to sup-
port a conclusion that certain claims are insubstantial unless 
those prior decisions "inescapably render the claims frivolous.'' 
409 U. S., at 518. We cannot say here that the Goosby test 
has been met. Neither Mescalero nor McClcmahan "inescap-
ably render[s] the [Tribes' Commerce Clause] claims frivo-
lous" because neither holds that that clause is wholly without 
force in situations like the present. And even footnote 17 
merely rej"ects the stark and rather unhelpful notion that the 
Commerce Clause provides an u automatic exemption [] 'as a 
matter of constitutional law [emphasis added]' " in such cases. 
It does not take that clause entirely out of play in the field of 
state regulation of Indian affairs. 
In addition, it seems quite clear that the Tribes' attack 
an the official seizure of cigarettes bound for the reserva-
22 Footnote 17 in its entirety reads as follows: 
"It i8 thus clear that the basis for the invalidity of these taxing meas~ 
nrrs, whicli we have found to be inconsistent with existing federal statutes, 
iR the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Canst., Art. VI, cl. 2, and not any automatic 
exl'mptions 'as a matter of constitutional law' either under the Com-
merce Clause or the intergovernmental-immunity doctrine as laid down 
originally in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). If so, then the 
basis for convening a three-judge court in this type of case has effectively 
dit;appeared, for this Court has expressly held that attacks on state statutes 
rabing only Supremacy Clause invalidity do not fall within the scope of 
28 U. S. C. § 2281. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111 (1965). Here, 
however, the District Court properly convened a § 2281 court, because 
at the outset the Tribe's attack asserted unconstitutionality of these statutes 
under the Commerce Clause, a not insubstantial claim since Mescalero 
[Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973),] and McClanaha:n [v, 
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164 (1973),] had not yet been 
decided. See Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973)." 425 U.S., at 481, 
n. 17. 
18-630-0PINION 
12 WASHINGTON v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES 
tions also triggers the three-judge requirement of § 2281. 
The United States concedes that that attack raised Com-
merce Clause issues, but maintains that the · Tribes' target 
was not really the state enforcement statutes themselves, 
but rather the discretionary official conduct undertaken pur-
suant to tho~e statutes. ·we have no quarrel with the prop-
osition that the mere fact that executives seek shelter under 
various state statutes will not necessarily convert a suit to 
, restrain their lawless behavior into a '§ 2281 case, Phillips v. 
United States, 312 U. 8. '246, 248~252 ('1941) . .. But this is not 
a situation in which the only connection with state statutes 
arises when officials accused of taking various ultra vires ac-
tions seek to trace their conduct back to vague statutes grant-
ing them broad executive discretion. Phillips, 312 U. S., at 
252. Here the state officials involved were attempting to 
enforce the state tax laws 'by using the tools authorized for 
such enforcement by the state legislature. ·They manifested 
an intention to continue to use those tools for that purpose. 
And it is those tools, as applied to cigarettes in ·Indian com-
merce, which the Tribes challenged.28 We hold that this 
suffices to bring these cases within § 2281. 
The other jurisdictional question postponed last February is 
relevant only to the Colville case. It concerns the timeliness 
under 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (b) of the -state's appeal from the 
District Court's resolution of the motor vehicle tax and as-
sumption of jurisdiction ·issues. Basically, the problem is 
this: the Notice of Appeal on these two issues was filed more 
,:than 60 days after the District Court's decision, but within 60 
days of the denial of a state motion for partial new trial-a 
motion that was not addressed to the motor vehicle and as-
sumption of jurisdiction issues. The question is whether a 
motion for partial new trial renders nonfinal the District 
23 See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 354, n. 10 (1970) . See als() 
Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U. S. 355 (1966); 
Query v United States, 316 U.S. 486, 490 (1942) . 
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Court's holding on all issues between the parties, or merely 
renders nonfinal the disposition of those issues actually raised 
in the new trial motion. If the former, the State's Notice 
of Appeal on the vehicle taxes and assumption of jurisdiction 
issues was timely. If the latter, that notice was filed out of 
time and to that extent the appeal is jurisdictionally time 
barred.24 
We think that the filing of a motion for partial new trial 
in these circumstances must have rendered nonfinal the dis-
position of all issues between the parties. A contrary conclu-
sion would serve no useful purpose. At best it would make 
little difference save to force future appellants to include in 
what might otherwise have been narrow motions for partial 
new trials a blanket request for reconsideration of all issues. 
And at worst it would be a procedural pitfall, devoid of any 
sound supporting rationale but capable of occasionally tripping 
those who failed to insert a line of boilerplate or file a redun-
dant slip of paper. Accordingly, we hold that the appeal of 
21 The actual chronology was as follows: On May 10, 1978, the District 
Court entered its final order. On May 22, the State filed a motion for 
J)Hrtial new trial on the cigarette and sales tax issues. On July 12, while 
thut motion was pending, the State filed a Notice of Appeal raising the 
motor vehicle excise tax and assumption of jurisdiction issues. On July 17, 
the motion for partial new trial was denied; and on August 14, the State 
filed a Notice of Appeal on the sales and cigarette tax issues. On Sep-
tember 8, the State filed an Amended Notice of Appeal raising all rele-
vant issues. The July 12 Notice of Appeal was filed more than 60 days 
after the original District Court order. Accordingly, under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2101 (b), it was out of time. The Notice of August 14 and the Amended 
Notice of September 8, however, were filed within 60 days of the District 
Court's d<>nial of the motion for partial new trial. It seems clear that 
the filing of that motion rendered nonfinal the disposition of aU covered 
issues-if not, one seeking a partial new trial would have to jeopardize 
his right to appeal. Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U. S. 441, 445-
446 (1974), Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U. S. 264, 266 (1942). 
Thus,. the only remaining question is whether the motion for partial new 
trial also suspended the finality of the District Court's disposition of 
issues not covered by that motion. 
>, 
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the District Court's vehicle tax and assumption of jurisdiction 
holding is properly before us. 
IV 
We turn now to the merits. ·The primary questions con-
cern the validity of the Washington cigarette and sales taxes. 
In our view, these questions are considerably more narrow 
than some of the briefs suggest. We are not required to re-
construct the foundations of Indian sovereignty, locate the 
precise source of Indian power to assess taxes on non-Indians 25 
or finally define the relationship between state and Indian 
revenue-raising authority. All that is before us is a challenge 
to the application of a particular state taxing scheme to par-
ticular transactions that are also subject to particular tribal 
taxing and regulatory ordinances. And all we decide is that 
that stafe scheme may not be applied to those transactions. 
We begin with a brief overview. It is no longer the law 
that Indian reservations partake of the full territorial sov-
ereignty of states or foreign countries, although they do retain 
important attributes of such sovereignty.26 As a result, the 
25 See Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U. S. 384 (1904); Iron Crow v. Oglala 
Siou:e Tribe, 231 F. 2d 89 (CA8 1956), cf. 55 I. D. 14 (1934) . 
26 The starkest territorial conception of Indian sovereignty was sketched 
by Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 
557-561 (1832) . An Indian reservation, he stated, was "a distinct com-
mum}y, occupying its own territory .. . in which the laws of Georgia 
cau h.:we no force ... . " See F . Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law 122 (1942) . Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 219 (1959), noted thlllt 
thit~ view had been "modified .. . in cases where essential tribal rela-
tions were not involved.'" Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 
71- 75 (l962}, noted a shift as well. And McClanahan v. Arizona State 
Tax Commission, supra, a.t 172, observed that "the trend has been away 
from the iqea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdic-
tion." Ra.~.her, McClanahan concluded, sovereignty is better seen as !J. 
'"backdrop pgainst which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must 
Df:J rea<! ." Ibid. In a similar vein, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 
~i35 U. S. 191, 208 (1978) , recognized that Indian tribes are "prohibited 
!rqm exerci~ing both those powers of autonomol,\s states that are expressly 
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boundary between state and tribal authority has become in-
creasingly difficult to define. Still, there are some guideposts. 
First, it seems clear that in the absence of tribal consent state 
law generally does not reach on-reservation conduct involving 
only Indians. Thus we have held that tribal courts have ex-
clusive jurisdiction over adoption proceedings involving the 
on-reservation conduct of tribal members, Fisher v. District 
Court, 424 U. S. 382 (1976); that States cannot apply their 
income taxes to the receipts derived by reservation Indians 
from reservation sources, McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Commission, 411 U. S. 164 (1973); and that States may not 
levy cigarette taxes on on-reservation sales to reservation 
Indians or impose personal property taxes on property owned 
by such Indians, Moe, supra, at 480-481. 
Second, there is a significant territorial component to tribal 
power. Thus state taxes on the off-reservation activities of 
Indians are permissible, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 
U. S. 145 (1973), and tribal laws will often govern the on-
reservation conduct of non-Indians. Williams v. Lee, 358 
U. S. 217 (1959). See also United States v. Mazurie, 419 
u. s. 544, 558 (1975) ,27 
terminated by Congress and those powers 'inconsistent with their status.'" 
(Emphasis and citations omitted.) Still, United States v. Wheeler, 435 
U. S. 313, 322-326 (1978), emphasized the sovereign nature of tribal au-
thority over Indians. See also Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 
145, 148 (1973); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U. S. 194, 201-203 (1975). 
27 This territorial component is also suggested by recent statutes like the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 91 Stat. 685, 735, which provide that 
"lands within the exterior boundaries of reservations of federally recog-
nized Indian tribes" may be redesignated for air qualit.y purposes "only by 
the appropriate Indian governing body." A similar note is sounded in the 
Surface Mining and Reclamation Act of 1977, 41 Stat. 445, 523. In addi-
tion, a geographical or territorial source for Indian authority may be 
found in the Washington Enabling Act, 25 Stat. 676, ch. 180, 4 (1889), by 
which the State was required to disclaim "all right and title" to lands 
"owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribe" and to agree that such 
lands "shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the 
Congress. • . ." 
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Third, where it is necessary to resolve a conflict between 
state and tribal authority over on-reservation conduct involv-
ing Indians and non-Indians, a relatively particularistic look at 
the interests of state . and tribe and the federal policies that 
gover(! relations with Indian trlbes is appropriate. ·we have 
coneluded, for example, that a tribe lacks jurisdiction to try 
a non-Indian for a crime, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 
U. S. 191, 208 (1978), but that a State may not resolve a dis-
pute arising out of on-reservation transactions between an 
Indian purchaser and a non-Indian seller, Williams v. Lee, 
supra, or tax tbe gross receipts of a federally licensed retail 
trading post that deals on the reservation with reservation 
Indians, Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Com-
mission, 380 U. S. 685 (1965) . 
And fourtb , the preceding results flow from an intricate 
web of sources including federal treaties and statutes, the 
'broad policies and notions that underlie those federal enact-
ments, and a presumption of sovereignty or autonomy that 
l1as roots deep in aboriginal independence. The prevalent 
1node of analysis is one of pre-emption. It takes as its start-
ing point the exclusive power of the Federal Government to 
regulate Indian Tribes and proceeds to bound state power 
where necessary to give vitality to the federal concerns at 
:stake. Bryan v. ltasca County, 426 U. S. 373, 376, n . 2 (1976). 
Only rarely does the talismanic invocation of constitutional 
language or rigid conceptions of state and tribal sovereignty 
shed light on difficult problems. Moe, supra, at 481, n. 17, 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, supra, at 172. 
For present purposes, two federal concerns seem especially 
important. One is the strong and oft-cited policy of en-
couraging tribal self-government. United States v. Wheeler, 
435 U. S. 313, 322- 326 (1978); Fisher v. District Court, supra, 
at 386-388; M cClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,. 
-supra, at 179; Williams v. Lee, supra, at 219-220. And the 
other is a complementary interest in stimulating Indian eco-
nomic and commercial development. Both found expression 
·. 
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in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U. S. C. § 461 
et seq./M Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 151-152/0 
and are manifest in more recent statutes as well.30 They are, 
we believe, of central importance in analyzing any conflict of 
state and tribal law. 
28 Ad we have already noted, of the Tribes before us only one-the 
Makah Tribe-is organized under the Indian Reorganization Act. The 
others, although governed by fede.rally approved constitutions, have voted 
not to come under that Act. This is not particularly relevant to the pres-
ent cases because that Act is important here primarily as an indicia of 
congres:sional policy regarding all Indians. Moreover, the concerns under-
lymg that Act have been reaffirmed in more recent legislation as well. See 
n. 30, infra. A year after the Reorganization Act was enacted, Congress 
provided that "All laws, general and special, and all treaty provisions 
affecting any Indian reservation which has voted or may vote to exclude 
it:self from [thi:s Act] ... shall be deemed to have been continuously 
effective as to such reservation, notwithstanding the passage of [this Act]." 
25 U.S. C. 478b (1976), 49 Stat. 378 (1935) . 
2u We noted there that the "intent and purpose of the Reorganization 
Act was ' to rehabilitate the Indian's economic life and to give him a chance 
to develop the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and pater-
nalism.'" Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 152, quoting H. R. 
Rep. No. 1804, 73d Conf., 2d Sess., 6 (1934). The Act itself contains a 
number of provisions that demonstrate Congress' concern with encouraging 
Indian economic development. See 25 U. S. C. §§ 469, 470, and 477. See 
also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49, 1'19--60 (1978) . 
30 See the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 
U. S. C. § 450 et seq. and the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. 
§ 1451 et seq. The first section of the latter statute sta.tes as follows: 
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to provide capi-
tal ... to help develop and utilize Indian resources, both physical and 
human, t.o a point where the Indians will fully exercise responsibility for 
the utilizat.ion and management of their own resources and where they will 
enjoy a standard of living from their own productive efforts comparable to 
that enjoyed by non-Indians in neighboring communities." 
Adherence to the policies underlying the Reorganization Act has not been 
without some interruption. The Termination Acts of the 1950's, see, e. g., 
25 U. S. C. §§ 564, 721-728, 741-760, and 891-901, seem to have signalled 
:t congressional urge to pursue an assimilationist policy somewhat akin t& 
the approach that was dominant prior to the Reorganization Act. See 
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The major factual difference between the present cases and 
Moe is that here the Tribes have elected to tax and regulate 
on-reservation cigarette sales 85 while in Moe they had not.86 
Phrased differently, the Tribes before us are acting in federally 
sanctioned and encouraged ways--they are raising govern-
mental revenues, establishing commercial enterprises and 
struggling to escape from " 'a century of oppression and pater-
nalism.'" Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 152, 
quoting H. R. Rep. No. 1804, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934). 
That difference has a number of consequences. First, it 
means that in this case the sharp drop in cigarette sales that 
would result from imposition of the state taxes will reduce 
revenues not only of individual Indian retailers, but of the 
Tribes themselves as governmental units. Second, it means 
that a decision permitting application of the state taxes would 
place Indian goods at an actual competitive disadvantage as 
ludian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq., the Indian 
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U. S. C. § 450 
et 8eq. and the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq. 
See 446 F. Supp., at 1356-1360. 
35 The United States argues that there exists a second important dif-
fen'nco a::; well-the presence here of evidence that permitting imposition 
of the state tax would sharply reduce sales by tribal tobacco outlets. In 
Moe, the government asserts, there was no showing that the economic 
impact would be this grave. Brief for the United States, at 14-15. We 
think the United States reads Moe too parsimoniously. That decision 
doe~ make clear that Indian tribes have no right to a certain volume of 
::,n lc~. And the present one does not turn upon the mere drop in sales 
which imposition of the tax would produce. 
na The State suggests that tribal involvement in Moe was in many re-
~pects comparable to that in these cases, and thus that Moe is directly 
cont rolling. But while the District Court opinion in that case does refer 
to au administrative fee imposed by the Tribe on tobacco retailers, and to 
;;orne rPgulat~ry involvement as well, 392 F. Supp., at 1313, neither court 
in Moe seems to have focussed upon these facts. Indeed, the District 
Court >'pecifically noted that the Tribes had not imposed any tax ott 
cigaretteo;, ibid., and we observed that the case presented no conflict with 
~rihal self-government, 425 U. S., at 483. 
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compared to non-Indian ones becaul;)e the former would have 
to bear t,wo tax burdens w~ile the latter bore but one. And 
third, it Jeads to an actual conflict of jurisdiction and sover-
eignty because imposition of the Washington tax would inject 
state law into an on-reservation transaction which the Indians 
have chosen to subject to their own laws. 
In our view, these three consequences bring the Washington ( 
taxes into sharp conflict with important federal policies. Per-
haps most striking is the fact that a rule permitting imposition 
of the sta.te taxes would have the curious efl'ect of making the 
federal concerns with tribal self-government and commercial 
development inconsistent with one-another. In essence, 
Tribes are put to an unsatisfactory choice. They are free to 
tax sales to non-Indians, but doing so will place a burden upon 
such sales which ma.y well make it profitable for non-Indian 
buyers who are located on the reservation to journey to sur-
rounding communities to purchase cigarettes.37 Or they can 
decide to remain competitive by not taxing such sales, and in 
the process forego revenues urgently needed to fill govern-
mental coffers. Commercial growth, in short, can be had only 
at the expense of tax dollars. And having to make that choice 
seriously intrudes on the Indians' right "to make their own 
~ 7 This problem was entirely absent in Moe. Nothing in the result 
there disfavored the purchase of Indian goods. Rather, imposition of th& 
state tax on non-Indians simply created a situation in which persons were 
encouraged to buy cigarettes on the basis of factors other than tax bene-
fits and avoidance-factors like geographica.I location and convenience. 
In the present situation, tJie balance actually tips against the Indians. 
Accordingly, our Brother S·rEVENs' statement that the "economic interest 
at :;take in thi:; litigation is precisely the same as that involved in Moe," 
dissent infra, at 2, overlooks a crucial distinction-that between the 
preservation of a tax advantage, which was at stake in Moe, and the 
elimination of a tax disadvantage, which is at the core of this case. This 
distinction might not be present if the state tax allowed some form of 
credit for the amount of any tribal tax. We are not now faced with a 
state scheme that provides for such a credit, and we express no view as to.· 
the validity of such a scheme .. 
~~-· .. 
•· , ~· ' ,.· 
...,. 
' . ,", 
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laws and be ruled by them," Williams v. Lee, supra, at 
2l9-220.8 ~ 
The State urges that an affirmance in these cases would 
eviscerate Moe by making it turn solely on the presence or 
absence of even a token tribal tax. The result, the State 
continues, would be to accord to Indian tribes the right to 
"market" to non-Indians the tax-exempt status recognized in 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Ta;x Commission, supra, and 
rtjlated cases. In the State's view, that in turn would give 
the Tribes carte blanche to establish vast tax-exempt shopping 
c~nters dealing in every imaginable good. 
We disagree. By permitting imposition of a state tax that 
would doubtless hurt sales by Indian smoke shops, Moe made 
88 It might be argued that the choice we describe is entirely common~ 
place-that in making its taxing decisions every governmental unit ·is 
required to balance its revenue needs against the economic impact of the 
taxes it considers. In one sense, this is quite true: If one State has a 
very low sales tax, a neighboring State's ability to impose a higher one may 
as a practical matter be impaired. In some circumstances, it can cope 
with this situation by imposing a complementary tax on the in-state use of 
goods purchased elsewhere. National Geographic Society v. California 
Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, M5 (1977). And in others there will 
exist no efficacious way of collecting such a tax. Whatever the case, how-
ever, the two States will face each other across their common border with 
equal arsenals. 
The present situation is quite different for the simple reason that Indian 
reservations are not States. This has two sorts of consequences. First, 
it means the equality noted in the preceding paragraph is absent. Moe 
holds that sellers on an Indian reservation may be required to collect state 
taxes on sales to non-Indians that occur entirely on the reservation. Yet 
it is highly unlikely that the Tribes in these cases could require sellers in 
Washington to collect tribal taxes. And second, Indian Tribes, while less 
autonomous than States in important respects, are the special beneficiaries 
of the federal concerns and policies we discuss in text. As a result, while 
we are content to recognize certain tradeoffs and frictions in the state-state-
context as inevitable, similar problems in the state-reservation context 
de.Qland special scrutiny. Tribes may lack the tools needed to protect 
themselves, and protecting them is an important federal concern. Cf~ 
~or.ton v . .{!{ancari •til' U, S .. 535., 551-555_ (19H) .. 
.... 
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clear that Indians do not have a right to market their ta.x. 
exempt status. Nothing we do today is in any way to the 
contrary. We have sfmply struck down one of many con-
ceivable state taxing schemes. And our holding is not that 
Indians have an absolute right to enter markets with the com-
petitive boost that comes from tax-exempt status,30 but merely 
that the State is not free to eliminate that competitive· boost 
in ways that force tribes to choose ·between federally sanc-
tiolled goals, place triba] goods at an actual disadvantage and 
compel tribal men1bers to collect a tax that subjects their 
goods to a aouble burden. Accordingly, the ·spectre of enor-
mous tribal tax ·havens recedes considerably. 
The State concedes that the Washington cigarette and 
sales 40 taxes may not ·be imposed on s~:i.les to Indians. ·we 
39 Indeed, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, supra, at 152, suggests that 
the federal interest in tribal economic development addesses itself primarily 
to the need to ensure that Indians can compete with non-Indians on an 
equal footing . 
40 As applied to cigarettes, ·it seems to us that the state sales and 
cigarette taxes present essentially the same question. Each imposes an 
economic burden on the distr"ibution of cigarettes. Each falls on the non-
Indian purchaser, and the amount ·of each is directly proportional to the 
amount of cigarettes purchased. Nomenclature aside, they are, in short, 
indistinguishable from either an economic or a formal perspective. In 
consequence, they are properly analyzed as ·dual components of a single 
stat.e-imposed burden on tribal cigarette sales, a· burden that mu&1 to some 
extent yield when the tribe chooses to impose its own analogous burden 
on those sales. 
The Di:>trict Court did note one distinction between the two taxes: the 
·sales tax was smaller. Thus, while under that court's view the cigarette 
tax was invalid for two · reasons-it ( 1) ·would interfere with tribal self-. 
governm!:'nt by dra::;tically reducing the volume of cigarette sales and the 
tribal revenues produced by such sales and (2) had in any event been 
pre-empted by the Tribes' exercise of their federally delegated powers, 446 
F . Supp., at 1360-1366,-the sales tax was invalid only for the second 
reason. It had be!:'n pre-empted by the Tribes' taxing schemes, but it was 
simply not large enough to have an ·impact upon tribal self-government, id., 
at 1370-1371. Even if our own analysis dovetailed in other respects more 
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now hol<.l that the application of those taxes to on-reservation I 
cigarette sales by Indians to non-Indians is also impermissible. 
v 
Several questions remain before us, but none requires ex-
tensive discussion. 
The first concerns the challenge in the Colville case to· 
the Washington motor vehicle and mobile home, camper and 
travel trailer taxes. R. C. W. chs. 82.44 and 82.50. Although 
not identical, these taxes are quite similar. Each is denomi-
nated an excise tax for "the privilege of using in the State" 
the covered vehicle, each is assessed annually at a certain per-
centage of fair market value, and each is sought to be imposed 
upon vehicles owned by the Tribe or its members and used 
both on and off the reservation.41 
Once again, our departure point is Moe. ·There we held 
that Montana's personal property tax could not validly be 
applied to motor vehicles owned by tribal members who · re-
sided on the reservation. 425 U. S., at 480-481. ·The vehicles 
Montana attempted to tax were apparently used both on and 
off the reservation,~2 and the tax was assessed annually at ·"a 
percentage of market value of the vehicles in question. Thus, 
the only difference between the taxes now before us and the one· 
the proposition that the permissibility of a tax must turn upon a highly 
:fact-specific inquiry into demand elasticities and actual impacts. Thus, in 
t he present case we hold the presence of some competitive disadvantage to 
be enough without attempting to quantify that disadvantage. 
4 1 In the wake of McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, supra, 
and Moe, the State does not claim that it can impose these taxes upon 
vehicles used wholly witni'n the reservation. Appellants' brief, at 111, and' 
D. 77. 
42 Moe did not focus upon vehicle use at all. The District Court opin-
ion in that case, however, indicates that some of the vehicles to which 
Montana sought to n.pply its tax were used both on and off the reserva-
tion. Confederated' Salish and' Kootenai Tribes v. Montana, 392 F. Supp. 
1325, 1328-1329 (Mont. !975) (tnree-judge court) (Smith, J ., concurring: 
:lml dissenting}. 
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struck down 'in Moe is that these are called excise taxes and 
imposed for the privilege of using the vehicle in the State, 
while the Montana tax was labelled a personal property tax. 
The State asserts that this difference mandates a different 
result. In Moe, it argues, the District Court concluded that 
the taxable event was "the ownership of a motor vehicle on 
January 1 of each year," 43 and that event took place on the 
reservation. Accordingly, under McClanahan v. Arizona 
State Tax Commission, supra, Montana was without authority 
to impose its tax. In the present case, the State continues, 
the taxable event is the use within the State of the vehicle in 
question. Thus, we are told, the McClanahan principle is 
inapplicable and the tax should be upheld under M esoalero 
;J..pache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). 
We do not think Moe and McClanahan can be this easily 
circumvented. It is the substance of what was done, not its 
form only, which Moe found invalid. Cf. Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U. S. 274,285-286 (1977). While 
Washington may well be free to levy a tax on the use outside 
the reservation of Indian-owned vehicles, it may not under 
that rubric accomplish what Moe held was prohibited. Had 
Washiqgton tailored its tax to the amount of actual off-reser-
vation use, or otherwise varied something more than mere 
nomen(llature, this might be a different case. But it has not 
done so, and we decline to treat the case as if it had. 
The second question still before us concerns the tax status 
under !Moe and McClanahan of Indians who are present on 
the reservation but do not belong to the governing Tribe. 
This issue arose in the Yakima case in the wake of the District· 
'Court's determination that the state retail sales tax could be 
applied to the purchase ·by non-Indians of goods other than 
cigarettes.44 It was, of course, quite clear that under Moe 
43 !d., at 1327, citing the Montana statute, R. C. M. 1947, § 84-406 (2) 
(1974 Supp.)) 
44 See p. 4, supra. This d~Jtermi:p.ation was, of course, entirely unexcep-. 
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and McClanahan the sales tax could not be applied to similar 
purchases by tribal members, but the State argued that this 
exemption should not extend to Indians who reside on the 
reservation but are not enrolled in the governing Tribe. 
Helying in part on the lower court opinion in Moe, Confede-
rated Salish and Kootenai 1'ribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297, 
1312 (Mont. 1975) (three-judge court), the District Court 
rejected this contention, 446 F. Supp. 1371. Moe did not 
reach this question because Montana failed to raise it on 
appeal. We do reach it now, and we affirm. The State has 
failed to suggest a persuasive reason for treating Indians resi-
dent on the reservation differently depending upon whether 
they are formally enrolled in the governing tribe.45 
The third issue that requires attention is the State's mecha-
nism for enforcement of its cigarette and sales taxes. Most 
questions concerning enforcement are simply not before us 
because the underlying taxes have in large measure been held 
invalid. The District Court did, however, conclude that the 
State could not require the Tribes to keep records of certain 
cigarette and other sales to Indians-sales concededly exempt 
even under Moe. 446 F. Supp. 1358-1359, 1373. These 
recordkeeping requirements were apparently tailored to en-
forcement of taxes on nonexempt sales. Having concluded 
that there are no nonexempt cigarette sales in this case, it 
is difficult to see why a recordkeeping requirement geared to 
collection of a tax on such sales presents a live controversy. 
Accordingly, we express no opinion as to the District Court's 
holding that the State could not require Indian retailers to 
keep records of cigarette sales to Indians. As for the Court's 
seemingly parallel holding that the State could not require the 
45 This conclusion is consistent with that reached by a number of lower 
courts. In addition to Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 
392 F. Supp., at 1312, see, e. g., Fox v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N. M. 261, 
531 P. 2d 1234 (1975) , cert. denied, 424 U. S. (1976); Dillon v. State of 
Montana, 451 F. Supp. 168 (Mont. 1978). Cf. the definition of "Indian,. 
in tne Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U. S. C. § 479. 
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Tribes to keep records of exempt sales of goods other than 
cigarettes-a requirement apparently intended to facilitate 
the collection of valid taxes on the sales of such goods to non-
Indians-there does seem to be an actual controversy. The 
District Court based its 'holding entirely on its conclusion 
that the record was inadequate to show ·any need for the re-
quirement. Accepting that finding, we affirm that Court's 
result. Nothing in Moe permits the -State to impose unneces-
sary burden upon tribal retailers, and we save an exploration 
of what burdens are and are not truly necessary for a case in 
which this issue is actually presented. 
The final question that must be considered concerns the 
challenge 'by the Colville, 'Lummi, and Makah 'Tribes to the 
State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction over them. 
The District ·court found that assumption unlawful as regards 
the Makah and Lummi reservations and lawful as regards the 
Colville reservation. 446 F. Supp., at 1366-1367. 'The State 
challenges the former findings. 
All parties apparently recognize that this issue is controlled 
by the intervening decision in the State's favor in Washington 
v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the YakirruJ,1ndian Na-
tion, 439 U. S. 463 (1979). There a pattern of jurisdiction 
identical to those created on the Makah and Lummi reserva-
tions was upheld, arid the holding of the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit on which the District Court in the present 
case relied for its conclusion that such patterns are unconsti-
tutional was reversed. Accordingly, the judgment 46 of the 
46 We note probable jurisdiction in No. 78-60, Confedemted Tribes of 
the Colville I·ndian Reservation; Lummi Indian Tribe; and Makah' Indian 
Tribe v. Washington, et al., which is pending on appeal. There the Col-
ville Tribe appeals from so much of the District Court's judgment as 
reflects the holding that Washington's assumption of total jurisdiction 
over that Tribe's reservation was lawful. See 446 F. Supp., at 1366. 
The Colville Tribe challenges that holding on grounds ( 1) that Washing-
ton could not assume jurisdiction without amending its constitution and 
(2) that the assumption of total jurisdiction over only selected reserva--
... · ~ 
. . .,) ·, .. 
• 
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District Court in this respect is reversed and in all other 
respect is 
Affirmed . 
tions violates the Equal Protection Clause. · Washington v. Confederated 
Bands and Tribes of the' Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463 (1979), 
disposes of the first contention, id., at 493, aild makes clear that the 
second must fail if the assumption of jurisdiction is rationally related to 
some valid state purpose, id., at 500-502. We find the pattern of juris-
diction in the present case rational: The Colville Tribe consented in 1965 
to the State's assumption of jurisdiction over it, and the State has assumed 
total jurisdiction only over Tribes that have so consented. · The presence 
or absence of tribal consent is It rational basis for distinguishing among 
reservations, and there is thus no constitutional infirmity. Accordingly. l 
the judgment i.s in thi.s respect affirmed. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
,§np:rttm ~om-t ttf t4t ~1'!1: .;§tah.s: 
Jfagfrittghttt, ~. <!f. 2ll~Jl.~ 
January 2, 1980 
Re: 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes of The Colville 
Indian Reservation 
Dear Bill, 
I shall likely be in partial dissen~ 
in this case and before coming to rest, I 
am awaiting other writings. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
erne 
CHAMI!5ERS OF" 
~ttpTttttt <!Jcurl cf flrt ~b ~hd:t.« 
~a,g~ ~. OJ. 2llbill-~ 
..JUSTICE w ... ..J. BRENNAN, ..JR. January 16, 1980 
RE: No. 78-630 State of Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes 
Dear Bill: 
Thanks so much for your response. Since you are 
altering your draft dissent I'll await its circula-








Thank you for your memorandum on this case. For 
the reasons stated in my Nov. 27 letter, I still am inclined 
to adhere to my view that the state sales tax is not pre-
empted. I will await the end of this second round of 
"votinq," however, before I decide whether to dissent on that 
issue. ··.~ 
While I continue to aqree with most of what you 
have written, I think that wqR's dissent makes a point when 
it says that the Court has not fully identified the sour.ce of 
the ore-emotion in this case. Since it is no mere stroke of 
the tribal pen, but federal power that ousts the state tax, 
perhaps it would be well to address the qao that Rill 
identifies. 
Here, the Secretary of the lnterior--actinq under 
lawful requlations--has approved tribal constitutions that 
qive these tribes the power to tax non-Indians. See, e.q., 
Colville Constitution art. v, S l(e) (1938) fApp. 66). The 
Secretary also has approved the taxing schemes at issue. Our 
decisions show that such expressions of federal authority and 
policy can confer additional authority upon the Tribes and 
pre-empt inconsistent state laws. United States v. Mazurie, 
419 u.s. 544 (1975), recognizes that the federal qovernment 
can qive the Indians authority over non-Indians who come 
within the reservation because the tribes traditionally have 
had substantial independent authority over non-Indians within 
their territory. And Fisher v. District Court, 424 u.s. 392 
(1976), holds that federal approval of a tribal court could 
pre-emot state court iurisdiction over matters otherwise 
















' ~· ,. 
'•:' 
I do not, of course, insist upon chanqes alonq 
these lines, but perhaps some reference to these factors 
would emphasize the continuity in our Inoian law decisions. 
Sincerely, 



















.§uptt'!M ~Oltrt of ±4-t 'JMU.eb ~tat.es 
~asfringhm.tn. <!J. 2llp.l!~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE January 17, 1980 
Re: 78-630 - State of Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes of The Colville Reservation. 
Dear Bill, 
As you know, my vote in Conference was con-
trary to the view expressed in Part IV of your 
circulating opinion in this case. I have not 
changed my mind on the cigarette and sales tax 
questions, and in all likelihood I shall join 
John Stevens in this respect. 
With respect to sales to Indians not members 
of the tribe, I agree with Bill Rehnquist. Since 
I believe the state taxes on cigarettes are valid, 
I would also sustain the record-keeping require-
ments. Otherwise, I agree with your Part V. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
erne 
'f o: The c;:lief Justice 
Hr. Just it; :1 J:;:c'~nnan 
M:c. Jut;'CJG2 ::· t:;1vart 
Mr. JustJue lh.rshall 
Mr. JuBtico BJ.ackmun 
v1fr. Ju.sU.CG P;)well 
Mr. J·ua t lee R.~hnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: Mr. Ju~tice White 
Circulated: ___ 2 ___ 1_J_A_N_l_SS_O __ 
1st DRAFT 
Recirculated: ____________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
No. 78-630 
State of Washington et al., 
Appellants, 
v. 
Confederated Tribes of the On Appeals from the United 
Colville Indian Reser- States District Court for the 
va tion et al. Eastern District of Wash-
State of W ashiugton, 
mgton. 
v, 
UniLcd States et al. 
[February -, 1980] 
Mn. J UKTICE vVHITE, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
I view this case much as MH. Jus·ncE STEVENS does and 
have joined his partial dissent. I add only that the majority 
opinion proceeds on the assumption that federal law requires 
state tax laws to give way to Indian taxes on transactions 
between Indians and non-Indians on Indian reservations. I 
find nothing in our prior cases to support this result. Of 
course, the tribal tax involved here is a valid tax, but that 
alone does not warrant pre-empting state taxing power absent 
more definitivP guidance from Congress thall we have. 
Moe held that the tltates could impose a sales tax on sales 
by Ind1ans to non-Indians, evell though the tax, by removing 
a competitive advantage that otherwise would have existed, 
had serious economic impact on the Indians and their federally 
licensed Indian smoke shops. The Court does not disturb 
that holdillg here; and the result should be no dift'erent sim-
ply because the tribes have chosen, in eft'ect, to substitute for · 
their lost competitive advantage a tribal tax on sales to non-
Ittdiaus and hence;. abseu t a rollback of state taxes, to make· 
/ 
78-630-CONCUR & DISSENT 
2 WASHINGTON v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES 
cigarettes purchased by non-Iudians at Indian smoke shops 
more expensive than those purchased off the reservation. I 
seC' nothing in the federal law that gives the Indians first 
taxing preference with respect to sales to non-Indians. Any 
competitive disadvantage, as the Court calls it, can easily be 
removed by the tribes, rather than the State, rolling back 
thC'ir taxes. Sales to Indians, of course, remain completely 
free of state taxation. 
At the very least, the Court's competitive disadvantage 
rationale would not invalidate the entir·e state tax but require 
only a rebate or credit up to the amount of thEl Indian tax. 
But if it does not say so expressly, the Court strongly implies 
that any tribal tax automatically pre-empts the taxable inci-
dents of these sales for the benefit of the tribe and completely 
~state taxing power. It also seems to me that despite the 
Court's protestations to the contrary, its opinion striking 
down these state taxes would be equally applicable to Indian 
retailing enterprises dealing in other lines of goods: the tribes 
could create their own competitive advantage by taxing at a 
very modest rate all reservation sales to 110n-Indians, thereby 
foreclosing state taxes on these sales. Until and unless Con-
gress clearly construes and applies the Indian Commerce 
Clause to bar state taxes on reservation sales to non-Indians, 
I would sustain state revenue measures such as the cigarette· 




Mr. Justice, ~· 
I had Brennan clerk who's been 
working on Confederated Tribe • You miqht be interested to know: 
(1) Mr. Justice Brennan probably won't circulate 
anything more until he has heard from the Chief: 
(2) Mr. Justice Brennan probably will write that 
reservation Indians who are not members of the qoverninq tribe are 
not entitled to a tax immunity: he is swayed by the number of 
votes for this view as expressed by the Rehnquist dissent: he is 
also surprised that you have not joined Mr. Justice Rehnquist on 
this point: 
(3) The next draft from the Brennan chambers will 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE ~-7-f/ 
Re: No. 78-630 - Was hington v. Confederated Tri bes 
At our conference of October 12, I voted to affirm 
in part and to reverse in part. I am still of that view. 
Accordingly, on the assumption that the several opinions 
that have been proposed remain as they are, and that no 
different consensus develops, I propose to file one read-
ing as follows: 
"I join Parts I, II, and III of the Court's 
opinion. I am in agreement with Mr. Justice 
Rehnquist's analysis of the Washington motor 
vehicle excise tax issue, and I therefore join 
Part IIC of his separate opinion. 
"I ~lso join the respective opinions of Mr . 
Justice White and Mr. Justice Stevens, except 
to the extent that they are inconsistent with 
Part IIC of Mr. Justice Rehnquist's opinion." 
• •. 
CHAMI!IERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.prmtt Q}nttrl.of tqt~b ~brlts 
~agqmgron, ~· <!f. 20c?'~~ 
February 1, 1980 J 
Re: 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the 
Colville Indian Reservat~on 
Dear Bill: 
In reviewing our "inventory" before taking off for 
the Mid-Year ABA session, I find the above. 
I will await word from you as to anything you want 
me to do - other than join you! 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE w .. . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
February 4, 1980 
RE: No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
Dear Chief: 
Assuming that your memorandum of last Friday consti-
tutes a vote against my position in the above, I offer the 
following score sheet: There is a court for my facts and 
jurisdiction sections (parts I, II & III) and for the por-
tions of part V setting forth my views of the motor vehicle 
tax and the State's assumption of jurisdiction over the 
reservations. My positions on the cigarette and sales 
I taxes (part IV) and the proper treatment of Indians not en-rolled in the subject Tribes (part V) have not carried the day. And my position on the single enforcement issue be-
fore us -- whether the state may require tribal retailers 
to keep records of exempt sales of goods other than cigar-
ettes to facilitate collection of sales taxes on nonexem~t 
sales of such goods -- has yet to be the focus of attent1on 
in several chambers (although my impression is that it is 
entirely uncontroversial since the District Court found 
that the requirement served no purpose) . 
In light of this, it seems that you should reassign the 
opinion, presumably to someone whose views are in line with 
those of at least four others on all issues. Whoever winds 
up with it is of course free to take whatever he pleases 
from my draft. 
·-. 
Sincerely, 




cc: The Conference 









No. 78-630: Washinqton v. Confederaten Tribes  
z/7/ro 
Mr. Justice, 
You asked me whether vou could help out Mr. Justice 
Brennan by sayinq that you could ioin all of his opinion 
except for the sliqht part str.ikinq ctown the qeneral sales 
tax. That, of course, is the position that you have taken 
ever since Conference. From talkinq to the responsible 
Brennan clerk, I think that Mr. Justice Brennan has been 
counting vou as with him on substantially all of the opinion. 
Other votes are a little difficult to follow, but I 
' 
count only 4 votes aqainst the principal holdinq on the 
cigarette tax. They are from PS, BRW, WHR, and JPS. I count 
only 3 votes aqainst the holdinq that the tax exemption 
extends to all reservation Indians. Thev are BRW, WHR, and 
JPS. Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Brennan seems to have 
concluded that he does not have a Court for most of his 
opinion. The reason, his clerk tells me, is that he counts 
the CJ's memo of 1 Feb. as a neqative note--shiftinq the 
maiority on the principal ciqarette tax holdinq to the other 
side. Thus, it seems that the ball is in the CJ's court and 




If you want to lend moral support, however, you 
could send Mr. Justice Brennan a short note sayinq explicitly 
that you are prepared to ioin everythinq he has written 
except for the sentences and the footnote that invalidate the 
qeneral sales tax. I would advise aqainst that--althouqh not 
stronqly--for two reasons. First, you miqht well find 
yourself in substantial aqreement with a new maioritv opinion 
on such issues as the tax exemption for all reservation 
Indians. Second, you later rniqht think that Mr. Justice 
Brennan's opinion is inadequate as a dissent from a new 
maiority opinion for substantially the reasons that vou 
identified in your 17 Jan. letter to him. 
Grea 
C H AM BER S O F 
T HE CHI E F ..JU S TI CE 
.:§ttpumr C!J ourt of t~t 'J.llnitt b, $>hdts 
~aslrmgtan. gl. C!J . 2!lc?Jt2 
February 25, 1980 
RE: No. 78-630 - Washington v. Con f ederated Tribes 
Dear Bill: 
As I indicated to you earlier, I cannot join 
your opinion in this case. I could join Par ts I, 
II, and III, and although I agree with the results 
you reach in Part V on the motor vehicle tax and 
the State's assumption of jurisdiction over the 
reservations, I find that I do not agree with you 
regarding the cigarette and sales taxes, or on the 
issue of the proper treatment of Indians who are 
not enrolled members of the relevant tribes. 
Accordingly, I have decided to act on your 
suggestion that the case be reassigned, and will 
ask Byron to try his hand at an opinion that 
accommodates the positions of those who have expressed 
views similar to his own. 
This is a hard case to unravel and there will 
have to be some accommodation. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.§14tttuu• ~ourt of tlyt ~btitt!l, .§tatt.s 
'Jl]las!fingtcn. gl. <!f. 20~>1,3 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
February 25, 1980 
RE: No. 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
Dear Byron: 
Will you try your hand at an opinion for the 
Court in this Case? 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
~upt"tUtt <!fltUrlltf tift ~b ~hdt.l1 
J)'zur~ ~. <!f. 2Ilbi~~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.... __ _ 
April 17, 1980 
Re: 78-630 - State of Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes, etc. 
Dear Byron: 




Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JusTtcE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. Apri 1 17, 1980 
RE: No. 78-630 Washington v. Confederated Tribes, etc. 
Dear Byron: 
1•11 be attempting a dissent on the basic issue. I --------""----- - - ----.. 
hope to get it around shortly. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 





JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
Re: No. 78-630 - v.Confederated 
Dear Byron: 
I await the dissent. 
Sincerely, 
T .M. 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 17 April 1980 
From: Gregory May 
No. 79-630: Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
Mr. Justice White has written a very good opinion that 
can be summarized as follows: 
I. History of this Litigation (pp. 2-4) 
II. Factual Background (pp. 4-8) 
A. Description of Washington cigarette, sales, and 
vehicle excise statutes (pp. 4-6) 
B. Description of the Tribes (pp. 6-7) 
C. Description of tribal cigarette regulation and tax 
schemes (pp. 7-8): 
1. Colville tribes act as retailers; tax must be 
passed on to consumers 
2. Yakima Tribe acts as wholesaler; tax on 
retailer need not be passed on 
2. 
III. Jurisdiction (pp. 8-13) 
A. 28 U.S.C. § 2281: three-judge court properly 
convened because tribal Commerce Clause claims were not 
frivolous (pp. 8-12) 
B. 28 U.S.C. § 2101(b): Colville appeal timely because 
motion for partial new trial tolls time for appeal on all issues 
in the judgment (pp. 12-13) 
IV. Cigarette and Sales Taxes (pp. 13-25) 
A. Moe and the principles derived from it (pp. 13-15) 
1. Principles established by Moe: 
a. State sometimes may impose a 
nondiscriminatory tax on non-Indian customers doing business 
with Indian retailers on the reservation 
b. Tax may be valid even if it seriously 
disadvantages or eliminates the Indian retailer's business with 
non-Indians 
c. State may impose at least minimal burdens 
on the Indian retailer to aid in enforcing and collecting the 
tax 
2. Moe left open: 
a. Effect of tribal taxes and regulations on 
the State's ability to tax 
b. State's power to impose detailed record-
keeping, as opposed to simple precollection requirement, upon 
Indian retailers 
3. 
c. State's power to tax on reservation 
purchases by Indians not members of the governing tribe 
d. State's power to enforce its tax laws by 
seizures 
B. Basis and limitation of tribal tax powers (pp. 15-
22) 
1. Tribes have inherent power to tax non-Indians 
within the reservation (pp. 15-17) 
2. Tribal cigarette taxes do not oust state 
cigarette or sales taxes on cigarette transactions between 
Indian retailers and non-Indian consumers (pp. 17-22) 
a. Tribes have no legitimate interest in 
marketing a tax exemption--a value not arising from activity 
~ ~ ~h-L-4 ..... -/-..t-trV 
upon the reservation (p. 18) -~~~~
~~~-~-~1'·#44A.~ 
b. No fed~ statute cfr treaty shows that . 
~
Congress meant to occupy the field of taxation on non-Indians~AJ 
~{,./.A 
reservation; *****although tribes themselves might be 
to preempt through exercise of properly delegated 
authority, no such delegation in this case***** (p. 18-19) 
c. State taxes here do not interfere with 
tribal self-government; tribal interest in raising governmental 
revenues is weakest when the values taxed do not arise within 
the reservation (pp. 19-20) 
d. State taxes here do not burden commerce 
in violation of the Indian Commerce Clause; Moe said as much (p. 
20) 
4. 
e. State need not credit the tribal tax 
against the state tax because Tribes have not shown that such a 
credit would significantly reduce the impact on their cigarette 
business (pp. 20-21) 
f. State taxes do not conflict with tribal 
taxes or tribal regulation of cigarette trade; so, no preemption 
on this ground (pp. 21-22) 
C. State collection practices (pp. 22-23) 
1. Simple collection burden is valid under Moe 
(p. 22) 
2. Tribes have not borne their burden of proving 
that the state-imposed record-keeping requirements are not 
reasonably necessary for enforcement of the valid state tax (pp. 
22-23) 
D. State tax on reservation Indians not belonging to 
the Tribes (pp. 23-24) 
1. No federal statute preempts state power to tax 
persons not belonging to the governing Tribes (p. 24) 
2. Nor can such state taxes interfere with tribal 
self-government, because the objects of the tax stand on the 
same footing as non-Indian residents (p. 24) 
E. State enforcement practices (pp. 24-25) 
1. State can seize cigarettes off the reservation 
in order to enforce Indians' obligation to collect the tax on 
the reservation (p. 25) 
5. 
2. Question whether State can enter upon the 
reservation to make seizures is not before the Court (p. 25) 
V. Vehicle Excise Tax (pp. 25-27) 
Although called an excise tax, Washington's tax is 
legally indistinguishable from the personal property tax on 
vehicles invalidated in Moe 
VI. State Jurisdiction Over Reservation (p. 27) 
Resolved last Term in favor of the State, Washington 
v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979); companion appeal 
* ~ 
on this issue disposed of in footnote 32. 
Only Part 
---.--..--... 
Brennan's earlier draft. 
- -----
draf~ departs from Mr. Justice 
Mr. Justice Brennan probably could 
'\ 
accept Mr. Justice White's characterization of Moe. See Part 
IV-A, supra. And although it goes beyond anything that he said 
in his own opinion, WJB also would accept the new draft's 
discussion of the Tribe's inherent tax powers. See Part IV-
B( 1), supra. 
But WJB will dissent from BRW' s conclusion that the 
state taxes are notr- preempted and do not interfere with tribal 
self-government. See Part IV-B(2), supra. WJB also will 
dissent from the holding that the State may impose record-
I 
6. 
keeping requirements upon Indian retailers. See Part IV-C. 
Unless he has changed his mind (as his clerk once indicated that 
he had), WJB will dissent from the determination that the State 
can tax reservation Indians who do not belong to the governing 
tribe. See Part IV-D. Finally, WJB now may find it necessary 
to take a position on the off-reservation seizures sustained in 
Part IV-E of BRW's draft. 
* * * * * 
In the outline above, I have set off with asterisks 
the part of BRW's holding that most directly conflicts with your 
IY«AJ!J 
view of this case: viz.,~ conclusion that these tribal taxes 
.)' 
were not exercises of lawfully delegated federal authority. See 
Part IV-B(2)(b). WJB goes a bit further and suggests that the 
state taxes are invalid because they interfere with the interest 
in tribal self-government manifested through each tribe's tax. 
Perhaps because he takes that perspective, WJB also thinks that 
a tribal cigarette tax preempts all state taxes on cigarette 
transactions. 
After reading BRW' s opinion, I s_!: ill am incl.iJ;led to~ 
th~ tha(J{he tribal taxes preempt the state cigarette tax, but 
not the state sales tax. I am inclined to agree that the Tribes 
have not borne their burden of proving the invalidity of the 
record-keeping requirements associated with the sales tax law. 
7. 
Finally, I think that BRW makes a very good argument for not r 
extending blanket t~x_i~nity to re~ion Indians who do not ~ 
belong to the governing tribe. I am concerned, however, about -
situations where a tribal Indian marries an Indian from another 
tribe and brings the outsider to live upon the reservation; it 
seems a bit odd to tax one but not the other. I assume that at 
least some tribes do not treat a member 1 s spouse as being a 
member of the tribe. 
I recommend that you continue to await the dissent. 
When it arrives, you will have to consider whether you ( 1) 
continue to differ with WJB over the scope of preemption--i.e., 
the sales tax issue, ( 2) continue to agree with WJB 1 s comments 
about tribal self-government, (3) differ with WJB on whatever he 
says about the record-keeping questions, and (4) differ with WJB 
on whatever he now says about reservation Indians not belonging 
to the governing tribe. 
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Dear Byron: 










JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
;§u:prttttt Qfllltrl af tift 'Jtrittb ~btttg 
... ufring~ ~. <q. 2llbi~' 
April 23, 1980 
Re: No. 78-630 -Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
Dear Byron: 
I anticipate circulating an opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part as soon as I can. 
Sincerely,/ 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.§npumi Qfllllrl cf lftt ~b ~htltiY 
~Mfttttgictt, ~. ~ 2tTglJ1~ 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
April 30, 1980 
Re: No. 78-630, Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes 
Dear Byron, 
In due course I shall circulate a short 
separate opinion, concurring in part ' and 
dissenting in part. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.:§trpum.c ~cn.d of tlp• ~TnHd1 .§taftg 
'J)i'rctilqittg-hm.ltl. ~· ZObfJ~.;l 
May 22, 19/ 
Re: No. 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated Tribes 
Dear Byron: 
Bil l Brennan and you have done basic and helpful wor k on 
the many issues of this complicated case . I think there is 
some meri t in having as much unanimity as possible . 
I still have some mild concern as to certain minor issues , 
but they are not overwhelming , and I am willing to accommo-
date . You therefore may join me . 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
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Dear Byron: 
In view of the difficulties - unusual even for a 
complex Indian case - that we have had puttinq a Court 
toqether on a majority of the issues in this case, I write to 
say that I am willinq to join your opinion if my vote will ·~ 
qive you a Court. 
I may join you even if you end up only with a 
plurality of four, althouqh in that situation I reserve the 
riqht to take a second look. 
The principal difference between your conclusions 
and the views I have heretofore held is that you sustain the 
state's ciqarette tax. I had rather thouqht the Indians had 
the better of it on the preemption arqument. I hav~ not 
thought, however, that the principle of trihal self 
government was strona enough in itself to prevent the state 
from taxin~ cigarette sales to non-Indians. I note that Bill 
Brennan now rests his view primarily on this qround. 
·~ 
In any event, I think you have written a persuasive 
opinion. It is important to put a Court together, and settle 
these questions of power to tax. I therefore am willinq to 
join you as above indicated. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice 









To: The Chief ,Tustice 
Mr . Justice Brennan 
Mr . .Tust.Lce Stewart 
Mr . Justi.cG Mars'Jall 
Mr . Jnst .i ce Blaekmun 
L..-ri'. JuGtice Powell 
Hr . Just.i.ca R,hnquist 
Mr . Ju::;tl.ce Stevens 
STYLISTIC CW.NSES TH~OUGHOUT. 
~: 
From: Mr . Justice White 
Circulat ed : ____________ __ 
2nd DRAFT 
Recir culated: 4 JUN l9SO 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:m 
No. 78-630 
State of Washington et al., 
Appellants, 
v. 
Confederated Tribes of the On Appeals from the United 
Colville Indian Iteser.. States District Court for the 
vation et al. Eastern District of Wash .. 
ington. 
State of Washington, 
v. 
United States et al. 
[June -, 1980] 
MR. ,JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In recent Terms we have more than once addressed the 
intricate problem of state taxation of matters involving 
Indina tribes and their members. White Mountain Apache 
Tnbe v. Bracker, - U. S - (1980); Central Machinery 
Co. v. Arizona, - U. S.- (1980); Moe v. Salish&: Koo-
tenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona 
State 1'ax Comrn'n, 411 U. S. 164 (1973); Mescalero Apache 
Tribe . Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973) . We return to that 
vexing area in the present cases. Although a variety of ques-
tions are presented, perhaps the most significant is whether an 
Indian tribe ousts a State from any power to tax on-reserva-
tion purchases by nonmembers of the tribe by imposing its 
own tax on the transaction or by otherwise earning revenues 
from the tribal business. A three-judge District Court held 
for the Tribes. We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
/ 
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I 
These cases are here on the State of Washington's appeal 
from declaratory judgments and permanent injunctions en-
tered by the District Court at the close of consolidated pro-
ceedings in two separate cases that raised related issues. 446 
F. Supp. 1339 (ED Wash. 1978). The first case, Confederated 
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. State of Wash-
·ington, Civ. No. 3868, was filed on May 17, 1973, by the Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Reservation (Colville), 
Makah, and Lummi Tribes. The second, United States of 
Americ•:t and Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima 
Indian Reservation v. State of Washington, Civ. No. 3909, 
was commenced on July 18, 1973, by the United States on 
behalf of the Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima 
Indian Nation (Yakima Tribe).1 In each action, the com-
plainants contended that the State's cigarette and tobacco 
products taxes 2 could not lawfully be applied to sales by on-
reservation tobacco outlets. They sought declaratory judg-
ments to that effect, as well as injunctions barring the State· 
from taking any measures to enforce the challenged taxes. In 
particular, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the State from seiz-
ing as contraband untaxed cigarettes destined for delivery to 
their reservations.8 In the Colville case, the Tribes also chal-
lenged the State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction· 
1 On April 24, 1974, the Yakima Tribe intervened as a plaintiff in the 
United StatE'~ ' C'm;e. Its complaint appears at App. 149. 
2 The state tobaceo products tax, which is imposed on cigars and pipe 
tobacco pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code § 82.26 (1976), is not before us. 
The District Court concluded that that tax fell upon the Indian sellers 
and not upon the non-Indian purchasers. 446 F . Supp. 1339, 1355, n. 15 
(ED Wash. 1978) . The State did not appeal from this holding, Brief for 
Appellants 55, n 40, and all parties agree that in consequence the tobacco 
products tax may not be imposed on sales by tribal dealers. 
8 The Tribes also sought damages for interference with their cigarette-
businesses. The damage issues in both cases were remanded by the three-
judge court to a single district judge. 446 F. Supp., at 1367, 1373. 
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twer their reservations and, by amended pleadings, attacked 
the application of the State's vehicle excise taxes to Indian-
owned vehicles. The Yakima case did not present these 
latter is1mes, but it did make a broad attack on the applica-
tion of the State's general retail sales tax to on-reservation 
transactions. 
From the time of filing, the two cases pursued closely paral-
lel courses. On November 5, 1973, a temporary restraining 
order against the State's enforcement of the taxing statutes 
was issued in each. App. 13, 147. Thereafter, because the 
complaints sought injunctive relief against the enforcement 
of state statutes, a three-judge District Court was convened 
pursuant to the then-applicable requirement of 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2281 (1970). 1 On ~eptember 6, 1974, the three-judge court 
issued preliminary injunctions restraining the State from 
enforcing the challenged taxes against the Tribes. App. 15, 
156. There followed extensive discovery,5 after which the 
parties to each case reached agreement on pretrial orders set-
ting forth facts and clarifying the issues. 
Trial was held in both cases on Mar. 28, 1977, and the 
three-judge court entered its consolidated decision on Feb. 22, 
1978. The court concluded (1) that it had jurisdiction as a 
three-judge court to consider the issues presented; (2) that 
the state cigarette tax could not be applied to on-reserva-
tion transactions because it was pre-empted by the tribal tax-
ing ordinances and constituted an impermissible interference 
with tribal self-government; (3) that the state retail sales tax 
could not be applied to tribal cigarette sales, but could be 
4 Although § 2281 was subsequently repealed, Act of Aug. 12, 1976, § 1, 
90 Stat. 1119, it was expressly left in place for cases which , like those 
before us, were pending on the date of repeal. § 7, 90 Stat. 1120. We 
consider issues concerning the applicability of the former § 2281 to these-
cases in Part III, ·infra. 
11 Proceedings in both cases were stayed for several months, however, 
pending this Court.'s decisions in Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 42& 
V. S. 463 (1976) , and Br!fan v. I.t.ascq, Co?!J.nty, 426 U. S. 373 (1976). 
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applied to sales of other goods to non-Indians; ( 4) that the 
State could not impose certain recordkeeping requirements 
in connection with various tax-exempt sales; (5) that the 
State could not impose its vehicle excise taxes upon vehicles 
owned by the Tribes and their members, and (6) that the 
State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction over the 
Makah and Lummi Tribes was unconstitutional. The court 
enjoined enforcement of the statutes it had struck down, and 
the State moved unsuccessfully for a new trial. This appeal 
followed. We postponed consideration of certain jurisdic-
tional questions to the merits. - U. S.- (1979). 
We begin by sketching the relevant factual background, 
which is not seriously in dispute.6 Thereafter, we explore 
the jurisdictional questions previously postponed and then 
turn to the merits. 
II 
The State of Washington levies a cigarette excise tax of 
81.60 per carton/ on the "sale, use, consumption, handling, 
possession or distribution" of cigarettes within the State. 
Wash. Rev. Code § 82.24.020 (1976). The tax is enforced 
with tax stamps; and dealers are required to sell only ciga-
rettes to which such stamps have been affixed. § 82.24.030. 
Indian tribes are permitted to possess unstamped cigarettes 
for purposes of resale to members of the tribe, but are required 
by regulation to collect the tax with respect to sales to non-
members. § 82.24.260; Wash. Admin. Code § 458-20-192 
8 Our statement of the factual background is drawn in large measure 
from the opinion of the District Court, 446 F. Supp., at 134&--1349, 1368-
1370. 
7 The cigarette excise tax is imposed pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code 
182.24.020 (1976) . That provision authorizes a levy of 6.5 mills per 
cigarette. The tax is brought up to its full amount by Wash. Rev. Code-
I28A.47.440, and § 73 32.130 (1976) , which add 0.5 mills and 1 mill 
respectively. 
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( 1977) .M The District Court found, on the basis of its exami-
nation of state authorities, that the legal incidence of the tax 
is on the purchaser in transactions between an Indian seller 
and a non-Indian buyer.9 
The State has sought to enforce its cigarette tax by seizing 
as contraband unstamped cigarettes bound for various tribal 
reservations. It claims that it is entitled to make such seiz-
ures whenever the cigarettes are destined to be sold to non-
Indians without affixation of stamps or collection of the tax. 
Washington also imposes a sales tax on sales of personal 
property, including cigarettes. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.08.020 
(1976). This tax, which was 5% during the relevant period, 
is collectf'd from the purchaser by the retailer. ~ 82.08.050. 
It does not apply to on-reservation sales to reservation In-
dians. ·wash. Admin. Code§ 458-20-192 (1977). 
The state motor vehicle excise tax is imposed on "the 
privilege of using in the state any motor vehicle." Wash. 
Rev. Code § 82.44.020 (1976). The tax is assessed annually, 
8 Initially the State asserted that it could tax all tribal cigarette sales, 
regardless of whether the buyer was Indian or non-Indian. Its theory was 
that Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953), granted it. general authority to tax 
reservation Indians. After this theory was rejected in Bryan v. Itasca 
County, supra, the State abandoned any claim of authority to tax sales 
to tribal members. See 446 F . Supp., at 1346, n. 4. 
9 446 F. Supp., at 1352-1355. E~s(•ntially, the Court accepted the 
State's contention that the tax falls upon the first event which may con-
stitutionally be subjected to it. In the case of sales by non-Indians to non-
Indians, this means the incidence of the tax is on the seller, or perhaps on 
someone even further up the chain of distribution, because that person is 
the one who first sells, uses, consumes, handles, possesses or distributes the 
products. But where the wholesaler or retailer is an Indian on whom 
the tax cannot be imposed under McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax· 
Comm'n, +11 U. S. 164 (19i:n, the fir,.:! taxable event i;; the mif:', con-
sumption or possession by the non-Indian purchaser. Hence, the District 
Court concluded, the tax falls on that purchaser. We accept this, 
.cQnclusipn •. 
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and during the relevant period the amount was two percent of 
the fair market value of the vehicle in question. In addition, 
the State imposes an annual tax in the amount of one percent 
of fair market value on the privilege of using campers and 
trailers in the State. § 82.50.400.10 
Each of the Tribes involved in this litigation is recognized 
by the UHited States as a sovereign Indian tribe. Each is 
governed by a business or tribal council approved by the Sec-
retary of Interior.11 The Colville Tribe has some 5,800 mem-
bers, of whom about 3,200 live on the Colville Indian Reser-
vation.12 Enrolled members of the Tribe constitute just 
under half of the reservation's population. The Lummi Tribe 
has approximately 2,000 members. Roughly 1,250 of them 
live on the reservation.13 The Makah Tribe has about 1,000 
members. Some 900 live on the reservation.14 The Colville, 
Lummi and Makah reservations are isolated and underde-
veloped. Many members reside in mobile homes. Most own 
at least one automobile which is used both on and off the 
reservation. 
10 The same chapter provided for an excise tax on mobile homes. Ini-
tially, the State sought to apply this tax to Indians as well; but after 
Bryan v . ltasca County, supra, and Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra, 
it no longer attPmpt,.; to do ~o . 446 F. Supp., at 1365. 
11 The Makah Tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U. S. C. § 461 et seq. While the Lummi and 
Colville Tribe,; do have federally-approved con:stitution~, they voted in 
1935 not to come under that Act. 446 F . Supp., at 1345, n. 2. 
12 The Colville Reservation encompasses 1.3 million acres in the north-
eastern section of Washington. It was established by Executive Order on 
July 2, 1872. 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 916 (2nd 
ed. 1904). 
13 The Lummi Reservation encompasses 7,319 acres, most of them on a 
peninsula near Bellingham, Wash. It was established by the Treaty of 
Point Elliott in 1855. 12 Stat. 927. 
a The Makah Reservation encompasses 28,000 acres at the northwest tip 
of the Olympic Peninsula. It too was established by treaty in 1855. 
Treaty with the Makah Tribe, 12 Stat. 939. Roughly 63% of its inhabi-
tants are enrolled members of the Tribe. 
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The Yakima Tribe has more than 6,000 members, of whom 
about 5,000 live on the reservation.1 ~ Enrolled members, 
however, constitute less than one fifth of the reservation's 
population. The balance is made up of approximately 1,500 
Indians who are not members of the Tribes and more than 
20,000 non-Indians. 
The Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes have nearly iden-
tical cigarette sales and taxing schemes. Each Tribe has 
enacted ordinances pursuant to which it has authorized one 
or more on-reservation tobacco outlets.16 These ordinances 
have been approved by the Secretary of the Interior; and the 
dealer at each tobacco outlet is a federally licensed Indian 
trader. All three Tribes use federally restricted tribal funds 17 
to purchase cigarettes from out-of-state dealers.18 The Tribes 
distribute the cigarettes to the tobacco outlets and collect 
from the operators of those outlets both the wholesale dis-
tribution price and a tax of 40-to-50 cents per carton. The 
cigarettes remain the property of the Tribe until sale. The 
taxing ordinances specify that the tax is to be passed on to 
the ultimate consumer of the cigarettes. From 1972 through 
1976, the Colville Tribe realized approximately $266,000 from 
its cigarette tax; the Lummi Tribe realized $54,000 and the 
Makah Tribe realized $13,000. 
While the Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes function as 
retailers, retaining possession of the cigarettes until their sale 
to consumers, the Yakima Tribe acts as a wholesaler. It pur-
13 The Yakima Indian Reservation was set aside for the Tribe by treaty 
ratified March 8, 1859. Treaty with the Ya.kimas, 12 Stat. 951. It 
encompas&'s about 1.4 million acres in south-central Washington. 
16 The tribal ordinances regulating the sale, distribution and taxing of 
cigarettes are set forth at App. 104, 118, and 111. 
17 The funds are maintained in individual accounts in the Bureau or 
Indian Affairs agency serving the reservation pursuant to 25 CFR Part 104. 
(1978) . App. 32-34. 
18 Thes6 out-of-state whole@.let;s are aleo federally licensed Indian 
traders •. 
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chases cigarettes from out-of-state dealers and then sells them 
to its licensed retailers. The Tribe receives a markup over the 
wholesale price from those retailers as well as a tax of 22.5 
cents per carton. There is no requiremellt that this tax be 
added to the selling price. In 1975, the Yakima Tribe derived 
$278,000 from its cigarette business. 
Indian tobacco dealers make a large majority of their sales 
to non-Indians-residents of nearby commun'ities who journey 
to the reservation especia.lly to take advantage of the claimed 
tribal exemption from the state cigarette and sales taxes. The 
purchaser saves more than a dollar on each carton, and that 
makes the trip worthwhile. All parties agree that if the State 
were able to tax sales by Indian sinokeshops and eliminate 
that one-dollar saving the stream of non-Indian bargain 
hunters would dry up. In short, the Indian retailer's busi-
ness is to a substantial degree dependent upon his tax-exempt 
status, and if he losses that status his sales will fall off sharply. 
III 
We first address our jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal. 
Two attacks are made upon that jurisdiction, one grounded in 
the intricacies of the now-repealed statute governing three-
judge district courts and the other having to do with the timing 
of the State's appeal. 
Under 28 U. S. C. § 1253, a direct appeal lies to this court 
from an order granting or denying an injunction in a suit 
"required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined 
by a district court of three judges." At the time the Yakima 
and Colville cases were filed, 28 U. S. C. § 2281 provided that: 
"An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining 
the enforcement, operation or execution of any State stat-
ute by restraining the action of any officer of such State 
in the enforcement or execution of such statute ... 
shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof 
upon the ground of the unconstitutionality of such statute· 
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unless the application therefor is heard and determined by 
a district court of three judges . ... " 19 
After the State filed its jurisdictional statement in this appeal, 
the United States moved to dismiss the. Yakima case on the 
ground that it was not one required by § 2281 to be heard by 
a court of three judges and thus did not fall within the grant 
of appellate jurisdiction in § 1253. Although directed only to 
the Yakima case because that is the only one to which the 
government is a party, this challenge is quite clearly germane 
to the Colville case as well. 
Section 2281 does not require a three-judge court where a 
constitutional challenge to a state statute is grounded only in 
the Supremacy Clause. Swift ,& Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 
111, 128-129 (1965). In addition, § 2281 is not brought into 
play by constitutional claims that are "insubstantial," Goosby 
v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973) . The United States argues 
that the substantive tax claims raised by these cases fall into 
one or the other category, and thus failed to trigger § 2281,2° 
Further, the Government continues, the attacks on the State's 
seizure of cigarettes, while perhaps raising genuine Commerce 
Clause issues, are not properly characterized as challenges to 
the constitutionality of a sta.te statute. Rather, the Govern-
ment asserts, they go to the constitutionality of the result ob-
tained by the use of the statute. We find neither contention 
persuasive. 
The original complaints in these actions contended that 
. the state taxes were unconstitutional under the Indian Com-
merce Clause as well as the Supremacy Clause. Relying 
19 The repeal of this provision in 1976 does not affect its application to 
these cases. See n. 4, supra. 
20 As t he Government recognizes, its position in this regard is somewhat 
anomalous since it was the United States which initially requested a three-
judge court in the Yakima case. App. 145. At that time the government 
seemed to have no doubt that it sought to enjoin the enforcement of a 






10 WASHINGTON v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES 
primarily upon language in footnote 17 in Moe v. Salish & 
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 481, n. 17 (1976), the United 
States asserts that the Tribes' Commerce Clause claims ·were 
insubstantial. 21 But Moe was decided in 1976-long after ·a 
three-judge court was convened to hear these cases-and it 
is thus apparent that footnote 17 alone cannot be dispositive, 
whatever its precise thrust. There is language in that foot-
note, however, which suggests that the insubstantiality of 
Commerce Clause claims such as those before us flows from 
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973), and 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164 
(1973)-both of which were decided before the present suits 
were filed. 22 We think the United States reads too much into 
this language. Goosby v. Osser, supra, made it clear that 
constitutional claims will not lightly be found insubstantial for 
purposes of § 2281. Indeed, Goosby explicitly states tha.t 
21 The District Court seems to have found this contention persuasive, 
446 F . Supp., at 1350, although it addressed it only briefly. Presumably 
it saw no need to explore the matter more fully since it was confident 
that the three-judge requirement had in any event been satisfied by the 
Tnbes' challenges to the State's enforcement measures. /d., at 1350-1351. 
22 Footnote 17 in its entirety reads as follows : 
"It is thus clear that the basis for the invalidity of these taxing meas-
ures, whicfi we have found to be inconsistent with existing federal st.'ltutes, 
is the Supremacy Clause, U. S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2, and not any automatic 
exemptions 'as a matter of constitutional law' either under the Com-
merce Clause or the intergovernmental-i~munity doctrine as laid down 
originally in M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819). If so, then the 
basis for convening a three-judge court in this type of case has effectively 
disappeared, for th1s Court has expressly held that attacks on state statutes 
raising only Supremacy Clause invalidity do not fall within the scope of 
28 U. S. C § 2281. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 111 (1965) . Here, 
however, the District Court properly convened a § 2281 court, because 
at the outset the Tnbe's attack asserted unconstitutionality of these statutes· 
under the Commerce Clause, a not insubstantial claim since M escalerl" 
and McClanahan had not yet been decided See Goosby v. Osser, 409' 
U.S. 512 (1973)." 425 U. , at 481, n. 17. 
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prior decisions are not sufficient to support a conclusion that 
certain claims are insubstantial unless those prior decisions 
t'inescapably render the claims frivolous." Id., at 518. We 
cannot say here that the Goosby test has been met. Neither 
Mescalero nor McC"lanahan "inescapably render[s] the 
[Tribes' Commerce Clause] claims frivolous" because neither 
holds that that clause is wholly without force in situations 
like the present. And even footnote 17 merely rejects the 
stark and rather unhelpful notion that the Commerce Clause 
provides an "automatic exemptio[n] 'as a matter of constitu-
tional law'" in such cases. (Emphasis added.) It does not 
take that clause entirely out of play in the field of state regu-
lation of Indian affairs. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker,- U.S.-,- (1980). 
In addition, it seems quite clear that the Tribes' attack 
on the official seizure of cigarettes bound for the reserva-
tions also triggers the three-judge requirement of § 2281. 
The United States concedes that that attack raised Com-
merce Clause issues, but maintains that the Tribes' target 
was not really the state enforcement statutes themselves, 
but rather the discretionary official conduct undertaken pur-
suant to those statutes. We have no quarrel with the prop-
osition that the mere fact that executives seek shelter under 
various state statutes will not necessarily convert a suit to 
restrain their lawless behavior into a § 2281 case, Phillips v. 
United States, 312 U.S. 246, 248-253 (1941). But this is not 
a situation in which the only connection with state statutes 
arises when officials accused of taking various ultra vires ac-
tions seek to trace their conduct back to vague statutes grant-
ing them broad executive discretion. Here the state officials 
involved were attempting to enforce the state tax laws by 
using the tools authorized for such enforcement by the state 
legislature. They manifested an intention to continue to use 
those tools for that purpose. And it is those tools, as applied 
to cigarettes h1 Indian commerce, which the Tribes chal-
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lenged.23 We hold that this suffices to bring these cases within 
§ 2281. 
The other jurisdictional question postponed last February is 
relevant only to the Colville case. It concerns the timeliness 
under 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (b) of the State's appeal from the 
District Court's resolution of the motor vehicle tax and as~ 
sumption of jurisdiction issues. Basically, the problem is 
this : the Notice of Appeal on these two issues ·was filed more 
than 60 days after the District Court's decision, but within 60 
days of the denial of a state motion for partial new trial-a 
motion that was not addressed to the motor vehicle and as-
sumption of jurisdiction issues. The question is whether a 
motion for partial new trial renders nonfinal the District 
Court's holding on all issues between the parties, or merely 
renders nor{final the disposition of those issues actually raised 
in the new trial motion. If the former, the State's Notice 
, of Appeal on the vehicle taxes and assumption of jurisdiction 
issues was timely. · If the latter, that Notice was filed out of 
time and to that extent the appeal is jurisdictionally time-
barred.24 
23 See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 354, n. 10 (1970). See also 
· Department of Employment v. United States,- 385 U. S. 355 (1966); 
Query v. United States, 316 U. S. 486, 490 (1942) . 
24 The actual chronology was as follows: On May 10, 1978, the District 
Court entered its final order. On May 22, the State filed a motion for 
partial new trial on the cigarette and sales tax issues. On July 12, while 
that motion was pending, the State filed a Notice of Appeal raising the 
motor vehicle excise tax and assumption of jurisdicticn issues. On July 17, 
the motion for partial new trial was denied; and on August 14, the State 
filed a Notice of Appeal on the sales and cigarette tax issues. On Sep-
tember 8, the State filed an Amended Notice of Appeal raising all rele-
vant issues. The July 12 Notice of Appeal was filed more than 60 days 
after the criginal District Court order. Accordingly, under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2101 (b), it was out of time . The Notice of August 14 and the Amended 
Notice of September 8, however, were filed within 60 days of the District 
Court's denial of the motion for partial new trial. It seems clear that 
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We think that the filing of a motion for partial new trial 
in these circumstances must have rendered nonfinal the dis-
position of all issues between the parties. A contrary conclu-
sion would serve no useful purpose. At best it would make 
little difference save to force future appellants to include in 
what might otherwise have been narrow motions for partial 
new trials a blanket request for reconsideration of all issues. 
And at worst it would be a procedural pitfall, devoid of any 
sound supporting rationale but capable of occasionally tripping 
those who failed to insert a line of boilerplate or file a redun-
dant slip of paper. Accordingly, we hold that the appeal of 
the District Court's vehicle tax and assumption of jurisdiction 
holding is properly before us, and we turn to the merits. 
IV 
A 
In Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), 
we considered a state taxing scheme remarkably similar to the 
cigarette and sales 2 ~ taxes at issue in the present cases. Mon-
tana there sought to impose a cigarette tax on sales by smoke-
shops operated by tribal members and located on leased trust 
lands 'vithin the reservation, and sought to require the smoke-
shop operators to collect the tax. We upheld the tax, insofar 
issues-if not, one seeking a partial new trial would have to jeopardize 
his right to appeal. Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U. S. 
441, 4-!5-446 (Hl74); Department of Bauking v. Pink, 317 U. S. 264, 266 
(1942) . Thus, the only remaining question is whether the motion for 
partial new trial also suspended the finality of the District Court's disposi-
tion of issues not covered by that motion . 
2 ~ We are here generally concerned only with the application of Wash-
ington's retail sales tax to cigarette sales. The District Court upheld 
the sales tax as applied to sales of other goods to non-Indians, and the 
Tribe~ do not contest that holding. We do, howewr, ron::;ider the que::;-
tion of noncigarette sales when we d1scuss (1) whether Washington can 
tax purchases by Indians not members of the governing Tribe, and 
(~) whetber Washington's recordkeeping requirelOOnts are valid. 
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as sales to non-Indians were concerned/6 because its legal ihci. 
dence fell on the non-Indian purchaser. Hence, "the compet-
itive advantage which the Indian seller doing business on 
tribal land enjoys over all other cigarette retailers, within and 
without the reservation, is dependent on the extent to which 
the non-Indian purchaser is willing to flout' his legal obligation 
to pay the tax." I d., at 482 (emphasis in original). We 
upheld the collection requirement, as applied to purchases by 
non-Indians, on the ground that it was a "minimal burden" 
designed to aid the State in collecting an otherwise valid tax. 
!d., at 483. 
Moe establishes several principles relevant to the present 
cases. The State may sometimes impose a nondiscriminatory 
tax on non-Indian customers of Indian retailers doing business 
on the reservation. Such a tax may be valid even if it seri-
ously disadvantages or eliminates the Indian retailer's busi-
ness with non-Indians. 27 And the State may impose at least 
"minimal" burdens on the Indian retailer to aid in enforcing 
and collecting the tax. There is no automatic bar, therefore, 
to Washington's extending its tax and collection and record-
keeping requirements onto the reservation in the present cases. 
Although it narrows the issues in the present cases, Moe 
does not definitively resolve several important questions. 
First, unlike in Moe, each of the Tribes imposes its own tax 
on cigarette sales, and obtains further revenues by participat-
ing in the cigarette enterprise at the wholesale or retail level. 
Second. Washington requires the Indian retailer to keep 
detailed records of exempt and nonexempt sales in addition to 
simply precollecting the tax. Moe expressed no opinion 
26 We struck down the tax as applied to sales to Indians. Moe v. Salish 
& Kootenai Tribes , 425 U. S. 463, 475-481 (1976). 
27 The United States reads Moe too parsimoniously in asserting its inap-
plicability to cases, such as the present ones, in which the economic 
impact on tribal retailers is particularly severe. Moe makes clear that 
the Tribes have no vested right to a certain volume of sales to non-Indians,. 
or indeed to any such sales at all. 
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f'egarding the "complicated problems" of enforcement that 
distinctions between exempt and nonexempt purchasers might 
entail. I d. , at 468, n. 6. Third, Moe left unresolved the 
question of whether a State can tax purchases by on-reserva-
tion Indians not members of the governing tribe, as Washing-
ton seeks to do in the present cases. Id., at 480-481, n. 16. 
Finally, unlike in Moe, Washington has seized, and threatens 
to continue seizing, shipments of unstamped cigarettes en 
route to the reservations from wholesalers outside the State. 
We address each of these questions. 
B 
(1) 
At the outset, the State argues that the Colville, Makah, 
and Lummi Tribes have no power to impose their cigarette 
taxes on nontribal purchasers.28 We disagree. The power 
to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly 
involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute 
of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by 
federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status. 
Cf. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313 (1978). 
The widely held understanding within the Federal Govern-
ment has always been that federal law to date has not worked 
a divestiture of Indian taxing power. Executive Branch offi-
cials have consistently recognized that Indian tribes possess 
a broad measure of civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-
Indians on Indian reservation lands in which the tribes have 
a significant interest, 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134 (1881); 7 Op. 
28 The incidence of the Colville, Lummi, and Makah taxes falls on the 
cigarette purchaser, since the tribal ordinances specify that the tax is to be 
passed on to the ultimate consumer. The Yakima ordinance, in contrast, 
does not require that the tax be added to the selling price, and the inci-
dence of the Yakima tax therefore does not full on the purchaser. Th& 
State's chullenge is directed only at the Colville, Lummi, and Makah. 
taxes. 
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Atty. Gen. 174 (1855), including jurisdiction to tax, 23 Op. 
Atty. Gen. 214 (1900); Powers of Indian 'Pribes, 55 I. D. 14, 
46 ( 1934) . According to the Solicitor of the Department of 
the Interior: 
"Chief among the powers of sovereignty recognized as 
pertaining to an Indian tribe is the power of taxation. 
Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this power 
may be exercised over members of the tribe and over non-
members, so far as such nonmembers may accept privi-
leges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes may be 
attached as conditions." 'Ibid. (emphasis added). 
Federal courts also have acknowledged tribal power to tax 
· non-Indians entering the reservation to engage in economic 
activity. Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (CAS 1905), 
appeal dismissed, 203 U. S. 599 (1906); Iron Crow v. Oglala 
Sioux Tribe, 231 F. 2d S9 (CAS 1956); cf. Morris v. Hitch-
cock, 194 U. S. 3S4, 393 ( 1904). No federal statute cited to 
us shows any congressional departure from this view. · To 
the contrary, authority to tax the activities or property of 
non-Inrlians taking place or situated on Indian lands, in cases 
where the tribe has a significant interest in the subject matter, 
was very probably one of the tribal powers under "existing 
law" confirmed by § 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, 4S Stat. 9S7, 25 U. S. C. § 476. In these respects the 
present cases differ sharply from Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191 (197S) , in which we stressed the 
shared assumptions of the Executive, Judicial and Legislative 
Departmeu ts that Indian tribes could not exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
Tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the 
Tribes' dependent status. This Court has found such a dives-
titure in cases where the exercise of tribal sovereignty would 
be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National 
Government, as when the Tribes seek to engage in foreign 
relations, alienate their lands to non-Indians without federal 
1'8-630-0PINION 
WASHINGTON v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES 17 
consent, or prosecute non-Indians in tribal courts which do 
not accord the full protections of the Bill of Rights. See id., 
fl,t 208-210; United States v. Wheeler, supra, at 326. In the 
present case, we can see no overriding federal interest that 
would necessarily be frustrated by tribal taxation. And even 
if the State's interests were implicated by the tribal taxes, a 
question we need not decide, it must be remembered that 
tribal sovereignty is dependent on and subordinate to only 
the Federal Government, not the States. 
(2) 
The Tribes contend that their involvement in the operation 
and taxation of cigarette marketing on the reservation ousts 
the State from any power to exact its sales and cigarette taxes 
from nonmembers purchasing cigarettes at tribal smokeshops. 
The primary argument is economic. It is asserted that 
smokeshop cigarette sales generate substantial revenues for 
the Tribes which they expend for essential governmental serv-
ices, including programs to combat severe poverty and under-
development at the reservations. Most cigarette purchasers 
are outsiders attracted on to the reservations by the bargain 
prices the smokeshops charge by virtue of their claimed 
exemption from state taxation. If the State is permitted to 
impose its taxes, the Tribes will no longer enjoy any competi-
tive advantage vis-a-vis businesses in surrounding areas. 
Indeed, because the Tribes themselves impose a tax on the 
transaction, if the state tax is also collected the price charged 
will necessarily be higher and the Tribes will be placed at a 
competitive disadvantage as compared to businesses elsewhere. 
Tribal :::mokeshops will lose a large percentage of their ciga-
rette sales and the Tribes will forfeit substantial revenues. 
Because of this economic impact, it is argued, the state taxes 
are ( 1) pre-empted by federal statutes regulating Indian 
affairs; (2) inconsistent with the principle of tribal self-
government; and (3) invalid under "negative implications" 
()f the Indian Commerce Clause. 
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It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the 
13mokeshops to persons coming from outside is not generated 
on the reservations by activities in which the Tribes have a 
13ignificant interest. Cf. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, - U. S. - (1980); Moe v. Salish & Kootenai 
Tribe.~, supra, at 475-481; McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164 (1973). What the smokeshops offer 
these customers, and what is not available elsewhere, is solely 
an exemption from state taxation. The Tribes assert the 
power to create such exemptions by imposing their own taxes 
or otherwise earning revenues by participating in the reserva-
tion enterprises. If this assertion were accepted, the Tribes 
could impose a nominal tax and open chains of discount stores 
at reservation borders, selling goods of all descriptions at deep 
discounts and drawing custom from surrounding areas. We 
do not believe that principles of federal Indian law, whether 
stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal self-government, or 
otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemp-
tion from state taxation to persons who would normally do 
their business elsewhere. 
The federal statutes cited to us, even when given the 
broadest reading to which they are fairly susceptible, cannot 
be said to pre-empt Washington's sales and cigarette taxes. 
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 
U. S. C. § 461 et seq., the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88 
Stat. 77, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq., and the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 88 Stat. 
2203, 25 U. S. C. § 450 et seq., evidence to varying degrees a 
congressional concern with fostering tribal self-government 
and economic development, but none goes so far as to grant 
tribal enterprises selling goods to nonmembers an artificial 
competitive advantage over all other businesses in a State. 
The Indian traders statutes, 25 U. S. C. § 261 et seq., incor-
porate a congressional desire comprehensively to regulate 
businesses selling goods to reservation Indians for cash or· 
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exchange, see Centra.l Machinery Co. v. Arizona,- U.S.-
(1980); Warren Trading Post v. Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685 
(1965), but no similar intent is evident with respect to sales 
by Indians to nonmembers of the Tribe. The Washington 
Enabling Act, 25 Stat. 676, reflects an intent that the State 
not tax reservation lands or income derived therefrom, but 
the present taxes are assessed against nonmembers of the 
Tribes and concern transactions in personalty with no substan-
tial connection to reservation lands. The relevant treaties, 
Treaty of Point Elliott, 12 Stat. 927 (Lummi Tribe); Treaty 
with the Makah Tribe, 12 Stat. 939; Treaty with the Yakimas, 
12 Stat. 951, can be read to recognize inherent tribal power to 
exclude non-Indians or impose conditions on those permitted 
to enter ; but purchasers entering the reservation are not the 
State's agents and any agreements which they might make 
cannot bind it. Finally, although the Tribes themselves could 
perhaps pre-empt state taxation through the exercise of 
properly delegated federal power to do so, cf. Fisher v. District 
Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976) (per curiam); United States 
v. Mazur-ie, 419 U. S. 544 (1975), we do not infer from the 
mere fact of federal approval of the Indian taxing ordinances, 
or from the fact that the Tribes exercise congressionally 
sanctioned powers of self-government, that Congress has dele-
gated the far-reaching authority to pre-empt valid state sales 
and cigarette taxes otherwise collectible from nonmembers of 
the Tribe. 
Washington does not infringe the right of reservation 
Indians to "make their own laws and be ruled by them," 
Willia.rns v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959), merely because 
the result of imposing its taxes will be to deprive the Tribes 
of revenues which they currently are receiving. The principle 
of tribal self-government, grounded in notions of inherent sov-
ereignty and in congressional policies, seeks an accommoda-
tion between the interests of the Tribes and the Federaf 
{(;oNermnent, on the· on~t hand~ and· thQse of the State, on the· 
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other. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 
164, 179 ( 1973). While the Tribes do have an interest in rais-
ing revenues for essential governmental programs, that interest 
is strongest when the revenues are derived from value gen-
~rated on the reservation by activities involving the Tribes 
~nd when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services: ' The 
State also has a legitimate governmental interest in raising 
revenues, and that interest is likewise strongest when the tax 
is directed at off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is 
the recipient of state services. As we have already noted, 
Washington's taxes are reasonably designed to prevent the 
Tribes from marketing their tax exemption to nonmembers 
who do not receive significant tribal services and who would 
otherwise purchase their cigarettes outside the reservations. 
It can no longer be seriously argued that the Indian Com-
merce Clause, of its own force, automatically bars a.Il state 
taxation of matters significantly touching the political and 
economic interests of the Tribes. See Moe v. Salish & Koo-
tenai Ttibes, supra, at 481, n. 17. ·That clause may have a 
more limited role to play in preventing undue discrimination 
against, or burdens on, Indian commerce. But Washington's 
taxes are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner to a.ll trans-
actions within the State. And although the result of these 
taxes will be to lessen or eliminate tribal commerce with non-
members, that market existed in the first place only because of 
a claimed exemption from these very taxes. The taxes under 
consideration do not burden commerce that would exist on the 
reservations without respect to the tax exemption. 
We cannot fault the State for not giving credit on the· 
amount of tribal taxes paid. It is argued that if a credit is 
not given, the tribal retailers will actually be placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage, as compared to retailers elsewhere, due 
to the overlapping impact of tribal and state taxation. While 
this argument is not without force, we find that the Tribes· 
have failed to demonstrate that business at the smokeshops: 
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would be significantly reduced by a state tax without a credit 
as compared to a state tax with a credit. With a credit, prices 
at the smokeshops would presumably be roughly the same as 
those off the reservation, assuming that the Indian enter-
prises are operated at an efficiency similar to that of businesses 
elsewhere; without a credit, prices at smokeshops would exceed 
those off the reservation by the amount of the tribal taxes, 
about 40-to-50 cents per carton for the Lummi, Makah, and 
Colville Tribes, and 22.5 cents per carton for the Yakima 
Tribe. It is evident that even if credit were given, the bulk 
of the smokeshops' present business would still be eliminated, 
since nonresidents of the reservation could purchase ciga-
rettes at the same price and with greater convenience nearer 
their homes and would have no incentive to travel to the 
smokeshops for bargain purchases as they do now. Members 
of the Tribes, of course, would be indifferent to whether a 
credit were given because under Moe they are immune from 
any state tax, whether credited or not. Some nonmembers 
of the Tribes living on the reservations would possibly travel 
elsewhere to purchase cigarettes if a state credit were not 
given, and smokeshop business would to this extent be 
decreased as compared to the situation under a credited tax. 
But the Tribes have not shown whether or to what extent 
this would be the case. and we cannot infer on the present 
record that by failing to give a credit Washington imper- · 
missibly taxes reservation value by deterring sales tha.t, if 
credit were given, would occur on the reservation because of 
its location and because of the efforts of the Tribes in import-
ing and marketing the cigarettes. 
A second asserted ground for the invalidity of the state 
taxes is that they somehow conflict with the Tribes' cigarette 
ordinances and thereby are subject to pre-emption or contra-
vene the principle of tribal self-government. This argument 
need not detain us. There is no direct conflict between the 
13tate and. trib~tl schemes, since each government is free to 
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impose its taxes without ousting the other. Although taxes 
can be used for distributive or regulatory purposes, as well as 
for ra.ising revenue, we see no nonrevenue purposes to the 
tribal taxes at issue in these cases, and, as already noted, we 
perceive no intent on the part of Congress to authorize the 
Tribes to pre-empt otherwise valid state taxes. Other provi-
sions of the tribal ordinances do comprehensively regulate the 
marketing of cigarettes by the tribal enterprises; but the State 
does not interfere with the Tribes' power to regulate tribal 
enterpri~.es wheu it simply imposes its tax on sales to nou-
membcrs. Hence, we perceive no conflict between state and 
tribal law warranting invalidation of the State's taxes. 
c 
We recognized in Moe that if a State's tax is valid, the State 
may impose at least minimal burdens on Indian businesses to 
aid in collecting and enforcing that tax. ·The simple collec-
tion burden imposed by Washington's cigarette tax on tribal 
smokeshops is legally indistinguishable from the collection 
burden upheld in Moe, and we therefore hold that the State 
may validly require the tribal smokeshops to affix tax stamps 
purchased from the State to individual packages of cigarettes 
prior to the time of sale to nonmembers of the Tribe. 
The state sales tax scheme requires smokeshop opera.tors to 
keep detailed records of both taxable and nontaxable transac-
tions. The operator must record the number and dollar 
volume of taxable sales to nonmembers of the Tribe. With 
respect to nontaxable sales, the operator must record and 
retain for state inspection the names of all Indian purchasers. 
their tribal affiliations, the Indian reservations within which 
sales are made, and the dollar amount and dates of sales. 
In addition. unless the Indian purchaser is personally known 
to the operator he must present a tribal identification card. 
The District Court struck down all recordkeeping require-
ments with respect to cigarette sales, because it found that no 
cigarette sales were taxable. With respect to sales of items· 
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other than cigarettes, the District Court found no record evi-
dence "as to whether the record keeping requirements, as 
promulgated, are or are not reasonably necessary to ensure 
payment of lawful taxes." 446 F . Supp., at 1373. The Dis-
trict Court upheld the requirements insofar as they pertained 
to taxable sales, but struck them down with respect to non-
taxable sales on the ground that the State had not met its 
burden of showing that the regulation was reasonably neces-
sary to ensure payment of taxes which it had power to impose. 
Contrary to the District Court, we find the State's record-
keeping requirements valid in toto. The Tribes, and not the 
State as the District Court supposed, bear the burden of show-
ing that the recordkeeping requirements which they are chal-
lenging are invalid. The District Court made the factual 
finding, which we accept, that there was no evidence of record 
on this question. Applying the correct burden of proof to the 
District Court's finding, we hold that the Tribes have failed 
to demonstrate that the State's recordkeeping requirements 
for exempt sales are not reasonably necessary as a means of 
preventing fraudulent transactions. 
D 
The State asserts the power to apply its sales and cigarette 
taxes to Indians resident on the reservation but not enrolled 
in the governing Tribe. The issue arose in the Yakima case 
in the wake of the District Court's determination that the 
state retail sales tax could be applied to the purchase by non-
Indians of goods other than cigarettes. It was, of course, 
quite clear after Moe and McClanahan that the sales tax could 
not be applied to similar purchases by tribal members, but the 
State argued that this exemption should not extend to non-
members of the Tribe. Relying in part on the lower court 
opinion in Moe, Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. 
Moe, 392 F . Supp. 1297. 1312 (Mont. 1975) (three-judge 
court) , the District Court rejected the contention. 446 F. 
Supp,, at 1371- 1372. 'rhis Court dicl not reach the question in 
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Moe because Montana failed to raise it on appeal. We d<) 
reach it now, and we reverse. 
Federal statutes, even given the broadest reading to which 
they are reasonably susceptible, cannot be said to pre-empt 
Washington's power to impose its taxes on Indians not mem .. 
bers of the Tribe. We do not so read the Major Crimes Act, 
62 Stat. 758. as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 1153, which at most 
provides for federal-court jurisJiction over crimes committed 
by Iudians on another Tribe's reservation. Cf. United States 
v. Antelope, 430 U. S. 641, 646-647, n. 7 (1977). Similarly, 
the mere fact that nonmembers resident on the reservation 
come within the definition of "Indian" for purposes of the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 988, 25 U. S. C. 
§ 479, does not demonstrate a congressional intent to exempt 
such Indians from state taxation. 
Nor would the imposition of Washington's tax on these pur-
chasers contravene the principle of tribal self-government, fol' 
the simple reason that nonmembers are not constituents of 
the governing Tribe. For most practical purposes those 
Indians stand on the same footing as non-Indians resident on 
the reservation. There is no evidence that nonmembers have 
a say in tribal affairs or significantly share in tribal disburse .. 
ments. We find, therefore, that the State's interest in taxing 
these purchasers outweighs any tribal interest that may exist 
in preventing the State from imposing its taxes. 
E 
Finally, the State contends that it has the power to seize 
unstamped cigarettes as contraband if the Tribes do not coop-
erate in collecting the State's taxes. The State in fact seized 
shipments travelling to the reservations from out-of-State 
wholesalers before being enjoined from doing so by the Dis~ 
trict Court, and it has declared its intention to continue such 
seizures if successful in this litigation. The Tribes contest 
this power, noting that because sales by wholesalers to the 
tribal businesses are concededly exempt from state taxation~ 
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We find that Washington's interest in enforcing its valid 
taxes is sufficient to justify these seizures. Although the 
cigarettes in transit are as yet exempt from state taxation, they 
are not immune from seizure when the Tribes, as here, have 
refused to fulfill collection and remittance obligations which 
the State has validly imposed. It is significant that these 
seizures take place outside the reservation, in locations where 
state power over Indian affairs is considerably more expansive 
than it is within reservation boundaries. Cf. Mescalero 
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973). By seizing 
cigarettes rn route to the reservation, the State polices against 
wholesale evasion of its own valid taxes without unnecessarily 
intruding on core tribal interests. 
Washington further contends that it may enter onto the 
t•eservatiolls. seize stocks of cigarettes which are intended for 
sale to nonmembers, and sell these stocks in order to obtain 
payment of the taxes due. However, this question, which 
obviously is considerably different from the preceding one, is 
not properly before us. The record does not disclose that the 
State has ever entered the reservations to seize cigarettes 
because of the Tribes' failure to collect the taxes due on 
sales to nonmembers, or ever threatened to do so except in 
papers filed in this litigation. Indeed, the State itself con-
cedes that "it may very well be that this Court will find it 
unnecessary to rule on this aspect of the appeal." Brief for 
Appellant 110. We therefore express no opinion on the 
matte. 
v 
The next issue concerns the challenge in the Colville case 
to the Washington motor vehicle and mobile home, camper 
and travel trailer taxes. Although not identical, these taxes 
are quite similar. Each is denominated an excise tax for the 
"privilege" of using the covered vehicle in the State, each is 
assessed annually at a certain percentage of fair market value, 
and each is sought to be imposed upon vehicles owned by 
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the Tribe or its members and used both on and off the 
reserva.tion.20 
Once again, our departure point is Moe. There we held 
that Montana's personal property tax could not validly be 
applied to motor vehicles owned by tribal members who re-
sided on the reservation. 425 U. S., at 480-481. The vehicles 
Montana attempted to tax were apparently used both on and 
off the reservation,ao and the tax was assessed annually at a 
percentage of market value of the vehicles in question. Thus, 
the only difference between the taxes now before us and the one 
struck down in Moe is that these are called excise taxes and 
imposed for the privilege of using the vehicle in the State, 
while the Montana tax was labelled a personal property tax. 
The State asserts that this difference mandates a different 
result. In Moe, it argues, the District Court concluded that 
the taxable event was "the ownership of a motor vehicle as of 
January 1 of each year," at and that event took place on the 
reservation. Accordingly, under McClanahan v. Arizona 
State Tax Comm'n, supra, Montana was without authority 
to impose its tax. In the present case, the State continues, 
the taxable event is the use within the State of the vehicle in 
question. Thus, we are told, the McClanahan principle is 
inapplicable and the ta.x should be upheld under Mescalero 
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973). 
2o In the wake of McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, supra, 
and Moe, the State does not claim that it can impose these taxes upon 
vehicles u. ed wholly within the re2ervation. Brief for Appellant 111, and 
n. 77. 
30 Moe did not focus upon vehicle use at all. The District Court opin-
ion in that case, however, indicates that some of the vehicles to which 
Montana sought to apply its tax were used both on and off the resen·a-
tion . Confedemted Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Montana, 392 F. Supp. 
1325, 1328-1329 (Mont. 1975) (three-judge court) (Smith, J., concurring 
and dissenting) . 
31 /d ., at 1327, citing the l\Iontana statute , Mont. Rev. Codes Ann .. 
§ 84-406 (2) (1974 Supp.). 
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We do not think Moe and McClanahan can be this easily 
circumvented. While Washington may well be free to levy 
a tax on the use outside the reservation of Indian-owned 
vehicles, it may not under that rubric accomplish what Moe 
held was prohibited. Had Washington tailored its tax to the 
amount of actual off-reservation use, or otherwise varied some-
thing more than mere nomencla.ture, this might be a different 
case. But it has not done so, and we decline to treat the 
case as if it had. 
VI 
Finally, we come to the chailenge by the Colville, Lummi, 
and Makah Tribes to the State's assumption of civil and 
criminal jurisdiction over them. The District Court found 
that assumption unlawful as regards the Makah and Lummi 
reservations and lawful as regards the Colville reservation. 
446 F. Supp., at 1366-1367. The State challenges the former 
findings. 
AU parties apparently recognize that this issue is controlled 
by the intervening decision in the State's favor in Washington 
v. Yak·ima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979). There a pat-
tern of jurisdiction identical to those created on the Makah 
and Lummi reservations was upheld, and the holdin~~: of the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on which the District 
Court in the present case relied for its conclusion that such 
patterns are unconstitutional was reversed. We therefore 
uphold the State's assumption of jurisdiction over the Makah 
and Lummi reservations.32 Accordingly, the judgment of the 
District Court is 
Reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
82 We note probable jurisdiction in No. 78-60, Confederated Tribes of 
the Colville lndian Reservation et al. v. Washington et al., which is pend-
ing on a.ppeal. There the Colville Tribe appeals from so much of the Dis-
trict Court's judgment as reflects the holding that Washington's assump-· 
tion of total jurisdiction over that. Tribe's reservation was lawful. See 446 
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grounds (1) tiHlt Washington could not assume jurisdiction without amend. 
ing its constitution and (2) that the assumption of tota.l jurisdiction over 
only selected reservat.ions violates the Equa.l Protection Clause. W ask-
ing ton v. Yakima. Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463 (1979), disposes of the 
first contention, id., at 493, and makes clear that the second must fail 
if the assumption of jurisdiction is rationally related to some valid state 
purpose, id., at 500-502 . Wr find the pattern of juri:sdiction in the 
present case rational: The Colville Tribe consented in 1965 to the State's 
a:s:sumpt.ion of jurisdiction over it, and the State has assumed total juris. 
diction only over Tribes that have so consented. The presence or 
absence of tribal consent. is a rational ba.sis for distinguishing among 
reservations, and there is thus no constitutional infirmity. Accordingly, 
th<' judgment is in this respect affirmed. 
., 
,, 




C H AMBERS OF 
.:§u:pumt Q}omiof flrt ~ .:§ta:tt.&' 
~fringhm. ~- <!}. 20,?~~ 
J U S TIC E B Y R O N R . WHITE June 4, 1980 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes 
For the information of those who 
have written in this case, I plan no 




CHAMBE RS OF 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
.§uprtntt <!Jourl Df t~t 1!lnitd1 .§tail's 
~rudyingtrrn. ~· cq. 2I1~Jl·2 
June 4 , 198 0 
RE : 78-63 0 - Washington v . Confederated Tribes 
Dear Byron : 
I join . 
Regards , 
Mr . Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
June 4, 19 80 
78-630 Washi~oton v. Confederated Tribes 
Dear Byron: 
PlPase ioin me jn your opinion for the Court . 
Sincerely, 
Mr . Justice t•Ih]te 
lfp/ ss 








JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.§u-puuu <qomt (lf fJrt 'J!tniL>lt ~hrl:.l'f 
'Jlffa;Jrittgt(ltt, tfl. <q. 206f>1.;l 
June 5, 1980 
Re: 78-630 - State of Washington v. 
Confederated Tribes 
Dear Byron: 
To brighten your day, if you like, you may 
join me in your proposed lineup. 
Mr. Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
'· 
CHAMBERS OF" 
j\u.prtmt C!Jourt of tltt ~itt~ j\tatu 
'Ulasfrington. ~. a;. 211,?)1.;1 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL June 6, 1980 
Re: No. 78-630 - Washington v. Confederated 
Tribes 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your opinion. 
Sincerely, 
T.M. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
' • 
To: Tho Chief Justice 
Mr. Tustico Brennan 
Mr. iustioe Stewart 
Mr. Justtce Marshall 
Mr. Justi.ce Bl':l.ckmun * · Juu-c tno PtYHell 
lh ·. Ju;;t l.ce R:~hr1quist 
l~r. Jus V:.ce Stevens 





SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78- 630 
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MR .• JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In recent Terms we have more than once addressed the 
intricate problem of state taxation of matters involving 
Indian tribes and their members. Moe v. Salish & Koo-
tenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona 
State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164 (1973); Mescalero Apache 
Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973) . We return to that 
vexing area in the present cases. Although a variety of ques-
tions arc presented, perhaps the most significant is whether an 
Indian tribe ousts a State from any power to tax on-reserva-
tion purchases by nonmembers of the tribe by imposing its 
own tax on the transaction or by otherwise earning revenues 
from the tribal business. A three-judge District Court held 
for the Tribes. We affirm J:n part and reverse in part. 
l[ 
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from declaratory judgments and permanent injunctions en-
tered by the District Court at the close of consolidated pro-
ceedings in two separate cases that raised related issues. 446 
F. Supp. 1339 (ED Wash. 1978) . The first case, Confederated 
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. State of Wash-
ington, Civ. No. 3868, was filed on May 17, 1973, by the Con-
federated Tribes of the Colville Reservation (Colville), 
Makah, and Lummi Tribes. The second, United States of 
Americ•z and Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima 
Indian Reservation v. State of Washington, Civ. No. 3909, 
was commenced on July 18, 1973, by the United States on 
behalf of the Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima 
Indian Nation (Yakima Tribe).1 In each action, the com-
plainants contended that the State's cigarette and tobacco 
products taxes 2 could not lawfully be applied to sales by on-
reservation tobacco outlets. They sought declaratory judg-
ments to that effect, as well as injunctions barring the State 
from taking any measures to enforce the challenged taxes. In 
particular, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the State from seiz-
ing as contraband untaxed cigarettes destined for delivery to 
their reservations.8 In the Colville case, the Tribes also chal-
lenged the State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction 
over their reservations and, by amended pleadings, attacked 
1 On April 24, 1974, the Yakima Tribe intt>rvened as a plaintiff in the 
United States' ca:se. Its complaint appears at App. 149 
2 The state tobacco product~:! tax, which is unposed on cigars and pipe 
tobacco pursuant to Wash. Rev . Code § 82.26 (1976), is not before us. 
The District Court concluded that that tax fell upon the Indian sellers 
and not upon the non-Indian purchasers. 446 F. Supp. 1339, 1355, n. 15 
(ED Wash. 1978) . The State did not appeal from this holding, Brief for 
Appellants 55, n. 40, and all parties agree that in consequence the tobacc(} 
products tax may not be imposed on sales by tribal dealers. 
3 The Tribes also sought damages for interference with their cigarette 
businesses. The damage issues in both cases were remanded by the three-
judge court to a single district judge. 446 F . Supp., at 1367, 1373. 
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the application of the State's vehicle excise taxes to Indian-
owned vehicles. The Yakima case did not present these 
latter issues, but it did make a broad attack on the applica-
tion of the State's general retail sales tax to on-reservation 
transactions. 
From the time of filing, the two cases pursued closely paral-
lel courses. On November 5, 1973, a temporary restraining 
order against the Sta.te's enforcement of the taxing statutes 
was issued in each. App. 13, 147. Thereafter, because the 
complaints sought injunctive relief against the enforcement 
of state statutes, a three-judge District Court was convened 
pursuant to the then-applicable requirement of 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2281 (1970).4 On September 6, 1974, the three-judge court 
issued preliminary injunctions restraining the State from 
enforcing the challenged taxes against the Tribes. App. 15, 
156. There followed extensive discovery,5 after which the 
parties to each case reached agreement on pretrial orders set-
ting forth facts and clarifying the issues. 
Trial was held in both cases on Mar. 28, 1977, and the 
three-judge court entered its consolidated decision on Feb. 22, 
1978. The court concluded (1) that it had jurisdiction as a 
three-judge court to consider the issues presented; (2) that 
the state cigarette tax could not be applied to on-reserva-
tion transactions because it was pre-empted by the tribal tax-
ing ordinances and constituted an impermissible interference 
with tribal self-government; (3) that the state retail sales tax 
could not be applied to tribal cigarette sales, but could be 
4 Although § 2281 was subsequently repealed, Act of Aug. 12, 1976, § 1, 
90 Stat. 1119, it was expressly left in place for cases which , like those 
before us, were pending on the date of repeal. § 7, 90 Stat. 1120. We 
consider issues concerning the applicability of the former § 2281 to these 
cases in Part III, infra. 
11 Proceedings in both cases were stayed for several months, however, 
pending this Court's decisions in Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 42$ 
U . .S. 463 .(1976), aud Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373 (1976). 
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applied to sales of other goods to non-Indians; (4) that the 
State could not impose certain recordkeeping requirements 
in connection with various tax-exempt sales; (5) that the 
State could not impose its vehicle excise taxes upon vehicles 
owned by the Tribes and their members, and (6) that the 
State's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction over the 
Makah and Lummi Tribes was unconstitutionaL The court 
enjoined enforcement of the statutes it had struck down, and 
the State moved unsuccessfully for a new triaL This appeal 
followed, We postponed consideration of certain jurisdic-
tional questions to the merits. - U. S. - (1979). 
We begin by sketching the relevant factual background, 
which is not seriously in dispute.6 Thereafter, we explore 
the jurisdictional questions previously postponed and then 
turn to the merits. 
II 
The State of Washington levies a cigarette excise tax of 
$1.60 per carton/ on the "sale, use, consumption, handling, 
possession or distribution" of cigarettes within the State. 
Wash. Rev. Code § 82.24.020 (1976), The tax is enforced 
with tax stamps; and dealers are required to sell only ciga-
rettes to which such stamps have been affixed. § 82.24.030. 
Indian tribes are permitted to possess unstamped cigarettes 
for purposes of resale to members of the tribe, but are required 
by regulation to collect the tax with respect to sales to non-
members. § 82.24.260; Wash. Admin. Code § 458-20-192 
8 Our statement of the factual background is drawn in large measure 
from lihe opinion of the District Court, 446 F . Supp., at 1345-1349, 1368-
1370. 
7 The cigarette excise tax is imposed pursuanli to Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 82.24.020 (1976) . That provision authorizes a levy of 6.5 mills per 
cigarette. The tax is brought up to its full amount by Wash. Rev. Code 




WASHINGTON v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES 
(1977) .~ The District Court found, on the basis of its exami~ 
nation of state authorities, that the legal incidence of the tax 
is on the purchaser in transactions between an Indian seller 
and a non-Indian buyer.9 
The State has sought to enforce its cigarette tax by seizing 
as contraband unstamped cigarettes bound for various tribal 
reservations. It claims that it is entitled to make such seiz= 
ures whenever the cigarettes are destined to be sold to non~ 
Indians without affixation of stamps or collection of the tax, 
Washington also imposes .a sales tax on sales of personal 
property, including cigarettes. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.08.020 
(1976) . This tax, which was 5% during the relevant period, 
is collected from the purchaser by the retailer. § 82.08.050. 
It does not apply to on-reservation sales to reservation In-
dians. Wash. Admin. Code§ 458--20- 192 (1977) . 
The state motor vehicle excise tax is imposed on "the 
privilege of using in the state any motor vehicle." Wash. 
Rev. Code § 82.44.020 (1976) . The tax is assessed annuallyy 
8 Initially the Sta.te asserted that it could tax all tribal cigarette sales, 
- regafdless of whether the buyer was Indian or non-Indian. Its theory was 
that Pub. L. 280, 67 Stat. 588 {1953), granted it general authority to tax 
reservation Indians. After this theory was reJected in Bryan v. Itasca 
Co·unty, supra, the State abandoned any claim of authority to tax sales 
to tribal members. See 446 F . Supp., at 1346, n. 4. 
9 446 F . Supp., at Ja52-1;355. Es~entially, the Court a.ccepted the 
State's contention that the tax falls upon the first event which may con~ 
stitutionally be subjected to it. In the case of sales by non-Indians to non-
Indians, this means the incidence of the tax is on the seller, or perhaps on 
someone even further up the chain of distribution, because that person is 
the one who first sells, uses, consumes, handles, possesses or distributes the 
products. But where the wholesaler or retailer is an Indian on whom 
the tax cannot be imposed under McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax 
Comrn'n, 411 U. S. 164 (197:3) , the first taxable event is the use, con-
sumption or possession by the non-Indian purchaser. Hence, the District 
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and during the relevant period the amount was two percent of 
the fair market value of the vehicle in question. In addition, 
the State imposes an annual tax in the amount of one percent 
of fair market value on the privilege of using campers and 
trailers in the State. § 82.50.400.10 
Each of the Tribes involved in this litigation is recognized 
by the United States as a sovereign Indiau tribe Each is 
governed by a business or tribal council approved by the Sec-
retary of Interior.11 The Colville Tribe has some 5,800 mem-
bers, of whom about 3,200 live on the Colville Indian Reser-
vation.u Enrolled members of the Tribe constitute just 
under half of the reservation's population. The Lummi Tribe 
has approximately 2,000 members. Roughly 1,250 of them 
live on the reservation.13 The Makah Tribe has about 1,000 
members. Some 900 live on the reservation.14 'The Colville, 
Lummi and Makah reservations are isolated and underde-
veloped. Many members reside in mobile bomes. Most own 
at least one automobile which is used ·both on and off the 
reservatiOn. 
10 The same chapter provided for an excise tax on mobile homes. Ini-
tially, the State sought to apply this tax to Indians as well; 'but after 
Bryan v Itasca County, wpm, and Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, supra, 
it no longer attempts to do so. 446 F . Supp., at 1365. 
11 The Makah Tribe is organized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 lJ. S. C. § 461 et seq. While the Lummi and 
Colville Tribe:> do havE' federally-approved con~titutions, they voted in 
1935 not to come under that Act. 446 F. Supp., at 1345, n. 2. 
12 The Colville Reservation encompasses 1.3 million acres in the north-
eastern section of Washington. It was established by Executive Order on 
July 2, 1872. 1 C. Kappler, Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties 916 (2nd 
ed. 1904). 
18 The Lummi Reservation encompasses 7,319 acres, most of them on a 
peninsula near Bellingham, Wash. It was established by the Treaty of 
Point Elliott in 1855. 12 Stat. 927. 
14 The Makah Reservation encompasses 28,000 acres at the northwest tip 
of the Olympic Peninsula. It too was established by treaty in 1855. 
Treaty with the Maka.h Tnbe, 12 Stat. 939 Roughly 63% of its inhabi-
tants are enrolled members of the Tribe. 
. . 
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The Yakima Tribe has more than 6,000 members, of whom 
about 5,000 live on the reservation.1 & Enrolled members, 
however, constitute less than one fifth of the reservation's 
population. The balance is made up of approximately 1,500 
Indians who are not members of the Tribes and more than 
20,000 non-lndians. 
The Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes have nearly iden-
tical cigarette sales and taxing schemes. Each Tribe has 
enacted ordinances pursuant to which it has authorized one 
or more on-reservation tobacco outlets.16 These ordinances 
have been approved by the Secretary of the Interior; and the 
dealer at each tobacco outlet is a federally licensed Indian 
trader. All three Tribes use federally restricted tribal funds 17 
to purchase cigarettes from out-of-state dealers.18 The Tribes 
distribute the cigarettes to the tobacco outlets and collect 
from the operators of those outlets both the wholesale dis-
tribution price and a tax of 40-to-50 cents per carton. The 
cigarettes remain the property of the Tribe until sale. The 
taxing ordinances specify that the tax is to be passed on to 
the ultimate consumer of the cigarettes. From 1972 through 
1976, the Colville Tribe realized approximately $266,000 from 
its cigarette tax; the Lummi Tribe realized $54,000 and the 
Makah Tribe realized $13,000. 
While the Colville, Lummi, and Makah Tribes function as 
retailers, retaining possession of the cigarettes until their sale 
to consumers, the Yakima Tribe acts as a wholesaler. It pur~ 
1~ The Yakima Indian Reservation was set aside for the Tribe by treaty 
ratified March 8, 1859. Treaty with the Yakimas, 12 Stat. 951. It 
encompasst>s about 1.4 million acres in south-central Washington . 
16 The tribal ordinances regulating the sale, distribution and taxing of 
cigarettes are set forth at App. 104, 118, and 111. 
17 The funds are maintained in individual accounts in the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs agency serving the reservation pursuant to 25 CFR Part 104 
(1978) . App. 32-34. 
18 These out-of-state wholesalers are also federally licensed Indian 
traders. 
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chases cigarettes from out-of-state dealers and then sells them 
to its licensed retailers. The Tribe receives a markup over the 
'wholesale price from those retailers as well as a tax of 22.5 
cents per carton. There is no requirement that this tax be 
added to the selling price. In 1975, the Yakima Tribe derived 
$278,000 from its cigarette business. 
Indian tobacco dealers ma"ke a large majority of their sales 
to non-Indians-residents of nearby communities who journey 
to the reservation especially to take advantage of the claimed 
tribal exemption from the state cigarette and sales taxes. The 
purchaser saves more than a dollar on each carton, and that 
makes the trip worthwhile. All parties agree that if the State 
were able to tax sales by Indian smokeshops and eliminate 
that one-dollar saving the stream of non-Indian bargain 
hunters would dry up. In short, the Indian retailer's busi-
ness is to a substantial degree dependent upon his tax-exempt 
status, and if he losses that status his sales will fall off sharply. 
III 
We first address our jurisdiction to hear the State's appeal. 
'Two attacks are made upon that jurisdiction, one grounded in 
· the intricacies of the now-repealed statute governing three~ 
judge district courts and the other having to do with the timing · 
of the State's appeal. 
Under 28 U. S: C. § 1253, a direct appeal lies to this court 
from an order granting or denying an injunction in a suit 
11required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined ·· 
by a district court· of three judges." At the time the Yakima 
and Colville cases were filed, 28 U. S. C. § 2281 provided that : 
"An interlocutory or permanent injunction restraining 
the enforcement, operation or execution of any State stat~ 
ute by restraining the action of any officer of such State· 
in the enforcement or execution of such statute ... 
shall not be granted by any district court or judge thereof 
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unless the application therefor is heard and determined by 
a district court of three judges . .. . " 19 
After the State filed its jurisdictional statement in this appeal, 
the United States moved to dismiss the Yakima case on the 
ground that it was not one required by § 2281 to be heard by 
a court of three judges and thus did not fall within the grant 
of appellate jurisdiction in § 1253. Although directed only to 
the Yakima case because that is the only one to which the 
government is a party, this challenge is quite clearly germane 
to the Colville case as well. 
Section 2281 does not require a three-judge court where a 
constitutional challenge to a state statute is grounded only in 
the Supremacy Clause. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U. S. 
111, 128-129 (1965) . In addition, § 2281 is not brought into 
play by constitutional claims that are "insubstantial," Goosby 
v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512; 518 (1973). The United States argues 
that the substantive tax claims raised by these cases fall into· 
one or the other category, and thus failed to trigger § 228J.2° 
Further, the Government continues, the attacks on the State's 
seizure of cigarettes, while perhaps raising genuine Commerce 
Clause issues, are not properly characterized as challenges to 
the constitutionality of a state statute. Rather, the Govern-
ment asserts, they go to the constitutionality of the result ob-
tained by the use of the statute. We find neither contention 
persuasive. 
The original complaints in these actions contended that 
the state taxes were unconstitutional under the Indian Com-
merce Clause as well as the Supremacy Clause. Relying 
19 The repeal of this provision in 1976 does not affect its application to 
these cases. See n. 4, supra. 
20 As the Government recognizes, its position in this regard is somewhat 
anomalous since it was the United States which initially requested a three-
judge court in the Yakima case. App. 145. At that time the government 
seemed to have no doubt that it sought to enjoin the enforcement of a 
state statute on grounds of its unconstitutionality within the meaning oi 
§ 2281. 
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primarily upon language in footnote 17 in Moe v. Salish & 
Kootenai Tribes, 425 U. S. 463, 481, n. 17 (1976), the United 
States asserts that the Tribes' Commerce. Cla4se claims were 
insubstantial.21 But Moe was decided. in 1976-long after a 
three-judge court was convened to hear these cases-and it 
is thus apparent that footnote 17 alone cannot be dispositive, 
whatever its precise thrust. ·There is language in that foot-
note, however, which ·suggests that the insubstantiality of 
Commerce Clause claims such as those before us flows from 
M'esoalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973), and 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164 
(1973)-both of which were decided before the present suits 
were filed.22 We think the United States reads too much into 
this language. Goosby v. Osser, supra, made it clear that 
constitutional claims will not 1ightly be found insubstantial for 
purposes of § 2281. Indeed, Goosby explicitly states that 
21 The District Court seems to have found this contention persuasive, 
446 F. Supp., at 1350, although it addressed it only briefly. Presumably 
it saw no need to explore the matter more fully since it was confident 
that the three-judge requirement, had in any event been satisfied by the 
Tribes' challenges to the State's enforcement measures. /d., at 1350-135L 
22 Footnote 17 in its entirety reads as 'follows : 
" It is thus clear that the basis Tor the invalidity of these taxing meas-
ures, whicn we have found to oe inconsistent with existing federal statutes, 
is the Supremacy Clause, U . S. Canst., Art. VI, cl. 2, and not any automatic 
exemptions 'as a matter of constitutional la:w' either under the Com-
merce Clause or the intergovernmental-immunity· doctrine as laid down 
originally in M'Culloch v.'Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819) . · If so, then the 
basis for convening a three-jtidge court in this type of case has effectively 
disappeared, for this Court has expressly held 'that attacks on state statutes 
raising only Supremacy ·clause invalidity do not fall within the scope of 
28 U . S. C.§ 2281. Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965) . · Here, 
however, the District Court properly convened a § 2281 court, because 
at the outset the Tribe's attack asserted unconstitutionality of these statutes 
under the Commerce Clause, a not insubstantial claim since Mescalero-
and McClanahan had not yet been decided. See Goosby v. Osser., 40~ 
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prior decisions are not sufficient to support a conclusion that 
certain claims are insubstantial unless those prior decisions 
"inescapably render the claims frivolous." ld., at 518. We 
cannot say here that the Goosby test has been met. Neither 
Mescalero nor McClanahan "inescapably render [ s] the 
[Tribes' Commerce Clause] claims frivolous" because neither 
holds that that clause is wholly without force in situations 
like the present. And even footnote 17 merely rejects the 
stark and rather unhelpful notion that the Commerce Clause 
provides an "automat,ic exemptio[n] 'as a matter of constitu-
tional law'" in such cases. (Emphasis added.) It does not 
take that clause entirely out of play in the field of state regu-
lation of Indian affairs. 
In addition, it seems quite clear that the Tribes' attack 
on the official seizure of cigarettes bound for the reserva-
tions also triggers the three-judge requirement of § 2281. 
The United States concedes that that attack raised Com-
merce Clause issues, but maintains that the Tribes' target 
was not really the state enforcement statutes themselves, 
but rather the discretionary official conduct undertaken pur-
suant to those statutes. We have no quarrel with the prop-
osition that the mere fact that executives seek shelter under 
various state statutes will not necessarily convert a suit . to 
restrain their lawless behavior into a § 2281 case, Phillips v. 
United States, 312 U.S. 246, 248-253 (1941) . But this is not 
a situation in which the only connection with state statutes 
arises when officials accused of taking various ultra vires ac-
tions seek to trace their conduct back to vague statutes grant-
ing them broad executive discretion. Here the state officials 
involved were attempting to enforce the state tax laws by 
using the tools authorized for such enforcement by the state 
legislature. They manifested an intention to continue to use 
those tools for that purpose. And it is those tools, as applied 
to cigttrettes in Indian commerce, which the Tribes ~hal-
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lenged.23 We hold that this suffices to bring these cases within 
§ 2281. 
The other jurisdictional question postponed last February is 
relevant only to the Colville case. It concerns the timeliness 
under 28 U. S. C. § 2101 (b) of the State's appeal from the 
District Court's resolution of the motor vehicle tax and as~ 
sumption of jurisdiction issues. Basica1ly, the problem is 
this: the Notice of Appeal on these two issues was filed more 
'than 60 days after the District Court's decision, but within 60 
days of the denial of a state motion for partial new trial-a 
motion that was not addressed to the motor vehicle and as-
sumption of jurisdiction issues. The question is whether a 
motion for partial new trial renders nonfinal the District 
Court's holding on all issues between the parties, or merely 
renders nonfinal the disposition of tho~e issues actually raised 
in the new trial motion. If the former, the State's Notice 
of Appeal on the vehicle taxes and assumption of jurisdiction 
issues was timely. If the latter, that Notice was filed out of 
time and to that extent the appeal is jurisdictionally time-
barred.2' 
23 See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 354, n. 10 (1970) . See also 
Department of Employment v. United States, 385 U. S. 355 (1966) ; 
Queru v. United States, 316 U.S. 486, 490 (1942) . 
24 The actual chronology was as follows: On May 10, 1978, the District 
Court entered its final order. On May 22, the State filed a motion for 
partial new trial on the cigarette and sales tax issues. On July 12, while 
that motion was pending, the State filed a Notice of Appeal raising the 
motor vehicle excise tax and assumption of jurisdiction issues. On July 17, 
the motion for partial new trial was denied; and on August 14, the State 
filed a Notice of Appeal on the sales and cigarette tax issues. On Sep· 
tember 8, the State0led an Amended Notice of Appeal raising all rele-
vant issues. The July 12 Notice of Appeal was filed more than 60 days 
after the original District Court order. Accordingly, under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 2101 (b), it was out of time. The ohce of August 14 and the Amended 
Notice of September 8, however, were filed within 60 days of the District 
Court's denial of the motion for partial new trial. It seems clear that 
the filing of that motion rendered nonfinal the disposition of all covered 
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We think tha.t the filing of a motion for partial new trial 
in these circumstances must have rendered nonfinal the dis-
position of all issues between the parties. A contrary conclu-
sion would serve no useful purpose. At best it would make 
little difference save to force future appellants to include in 
what might otherwise have been narrow motions for partial 
new trials a blanket request for reconsideration of all issues. 
And at worst it would be a procedural pitfall, devoid of any 
sound supporting rationale but capable of occasionally tripping 
those who failed to insert a line of boilerplate or file a redun-
dant slip of paper. Accordingly, we hold that the appeal of 
the District Court's vehicle tax and assumption of jurisdiction 
holding is properly before us, and we turn to the merits. 
IV 
A 
In Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), 
we considered a state taxing scheme remarkably similar to the 
cigarette and sales 25 taxes at issue in the present cases. Mon-
tana there sought to impose a cigarette tax on sales by smoke· 
shops operated by tribal members and located on leased trust 
lands \vithin the reservation, and sought to require the smoke· 
shop operators to collect the tax. We upheld the tax, insofar 
issues-if not, one seeking a partial new trial would have to jeopardize 
his right to appe.'ll. Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U. S. 
441, 445-446 (1974); Department of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264, 266 
(1942) . Thus, the only remaining question is whether the motion for 
partial new trial also suspended the finality of the District Court's disposi-
tion of issues not covered by that motion. 
25 We are here generally concerned only with the application of Wash-
ington's retail sales tax to cigarette sales. The District Court upheld 
the sales tax as applied to sales of other goods to non-Indians, and the 
Tribe~ do not contest that holding. We do, however, con~:>ider the ques-
tion of noncigaret.te sales when we discuss (1) whether Washington can 
tax purchases by Indians not members of the governing Tribe, and 
(2) whether Washington's recordkeeping requirements are valid. 
,, 
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as sales to non-Indians were concerned/6 because its le'gal ingi~ 
dence fell on the non-Indian purchaser. .Hence, "the compet-
itive advantage which ''the Indian seller doing business on 
tribal land enjoys over ail other cigarette retailers, within .and 
without the reservation, is ~ependent on the extent to which 
the non-Indian purchaser is willing to flout his legal obligation 
to pay the tax." !d., 11t 482 ' (emphasis in" original) .- We 
upheld the collection requirement, as applied to purchases by 
non-Indians, on the ground that it was a "minirnal burden" 
designed to aid the State in collecting an otherwise wralid tax. 
!d. , at 483. 
Moe establishes several principles relevant to the present. 
cases. The State may sometimes impose a nondiscriminatory 
tax on non-Indian customers of Indian retailers doing business 
on the reservation. Such a tax ma.y be valid even if it s~ri­
ously disadvantages or eliminates the Indian retailer's busi-
ness with non-Indians. 27 And the State may impose at least 
"minimal" burdens on the Indian retailer to aid in enforcing 
and collecting the tax. There .is no automatic bar, therefore, 
to Washington's extending its tax and collection and record-
keeping requirements onto the reservation in'the present cases. 
Although it narrows the issues in the present cases, Moe 
does not definitively resolve several important questions. 
First, unlike in Moe, each of the· Tribes imposes its own tax 
on cigarette sales, arid obtains further revenues by participat-
ing in the cigarette enterprise at the wholesale or reta:il level. 
Second, Washington requires the Indian retailer to keep 
detailed records of exempt and nonexempt sales in addition to 
simply precollecting the tax. Moe expressed no opinion 
26 We struck down the tax as applied to sales to Indians. Moe v. Salish 
& Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463,475-481 (1976) . 
27 The United States reads Moe too parsimoniously in asserting its inap-
plicability to cases, such as the present ones, in which the economic 
impact on tribal retailers is particularly severe. Moe makes clear that 
the Tribes have no vested right to a certain volume of sales to non-1nilians,. 
·or inde(ld to any such sales ~t .all, 
·' 
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regarding the "complicated problems" of enforcement that 
distinctions between exempt and nonexempt purchasers might 
entail. I d., at 468, n. 6. Third, Moe left unresolved the 
question of whether a State can tax purchases by on-reserva-
tion Indians not members of the governing tribe, as Washing. 
ton seeks to do in the present cases. !d., at 480-481, n. 16. 
Finally, unlike in Moe, Washington has seized, and threatens 
to continue seizing, shipments of unstamped cigarettes en 
route to the reservations from wholesalers outside the State, 
We address each of these questions. 
B 
(1) 
At the outset, the State argues that the Colville, Makah, 
and Lummi Tribes have no power to impose their cigarette 
taxes on nontribal purchasers.28 We disagree. The power 
to tax transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly 
involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute 
of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by 
federal law or necessary implication of their dependent status, 
Cf. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313 (1978) . 
The widely held understanding within the Federal Govern~ 
ment has always been that federal law to date has not worked 
a divestiture of Indian taxing power. Executive Branch offi~ 
cials have consistently recognized that Indian tribes possess 
a broad measure of civil jurisdiction over the activities of non-
Indians on Indian reservation lands in which the tribes have 
a significant interest, 17 Op. Atty. Gen. 134 (1881); 7 Op. 
28 The incidence of the Colville, Lummi, and Makah taxes falls on the 
cigarette purchaser, since the tribal ordinances specify that the tax is to be 
passed on to the ultimate consumer. ·The Yakima ordinance, in contrast, 
does not require that the tax be added to the selling price, and the inci-
dence of the Yakima tax therefore does not fall on the purchaser. The 
State's challenge is directed only at the Colville, Lummi, and Makah 
taxes. 
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Atty. Gen. 174 (1855), including jurisdiction to tax, 23 Op, 
Atty. Gen. 214 ( 1900); Powers of India:n Tribes, 55 I. D. 14, 
46 (1934). According to the Solicitor of the Department of 
the Interior: 
"Chief among the powers of sovereignty recognized as 
pertaining to an Indian tribe is · the power of taxation. 
Except where Congress has provided otherwise, this power 
may be exercised over members of the tribe and over non-
members, so far as such nonmembers may accept privi-
leges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes may be 
attached as conditions." 'Ibid. (emphasis added). 
Federal courts also have acknowledged tribal power to tax 
non-Indians entering the reservation to engage in economic 
activity. Buster v. ·Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (CA8 1905), 
appeal dismissed,· 203 U. S. ·599 (1906); Iron Crow v. Oglala 
Sioux Tribe, 231 F. 2d 89 (CA8 1956); cf. Morris v. Hitch-
cock, 194 U. S. 384, 393 (1904). No federal statute cited to 
us shows any congressional departure from this view. To 
the contrary, authority to tax the activities or property of 
non-Indians taking place or situated on Indian lands, in cases 
. where the tribe has a significant interest in the subject matter, 
was very probably one of the tribal powers under "existing 
law" confirmed by § 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934, 48 Stat. 987, 25 U. S. C. § 476. In these respects the 
present cases differ sharply from Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), in which we stressed the 
shared assumptions of the Executive, Judicial and Legislative 
Departments that Indian tribes could not exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians. 
Tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the 
· Tribes' dependent status. This Court has found such a dives-
titure in cases where the exercise of tribal sovereignty would 
be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National 
Government, as when the Tribes seek to engage in foreign 












WASHINGTON v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES 17 
consent, or prosecute non-Indians in tribal courts which do 
not accord the full protections of the Bill of Rights. See id., 
at 208- 210; United States v. Wheeler, supra, at 326. In the 
present case, we can see no overriding federal interest that 
would necessarily be frustrated by tribal taxation. And even 
if the State's interests were implicated by the tribal taxes, a 
question we need not decide, it must be remembered that 
tribal sovereignty is dependent on and subordinate to only 
the Federal Government, not the States. 
(2) 
The Tribes contend that their involvement in the operation 
and taxation of cigarette marketing on the reservation ousts 
the State from any power to exact its sales and cigarette taxes 
from nonmembers purchasing cigarettes at tribal smokeshops. 
The primary argument is economic. It is asserted that 
smokeshop cigarette sales generate substantial revenues for 
the Tribes which they expend for essential governmental serv-
ices, including programs to combat severe poverty and under-
development at the reservations. Most cigarette purchasers 
are outsiders attracted on to the reservations by the bargain 
prices the smokeshops charge by virtue of their claimed 
exemption from state taxation. If the Sta.te is permitted to 
impose its taxes, the 'Tribes will no longer enjoy any competi-
tive advantage vis-a-vis businesses in surrounding areas. 
Indeed, because the Tribes themselves impose a tax on the 
transaction, if the state tax is also collected the price charged 
will necessarily be higher and the Tribes will be placed at a 
competitive disadvantage as compared to businesses elsewhere. 
Tribal ~mokeshops will lose a large percentage of their ciga-
rette sales and the Tribes will forfeit substantial revenues. 
Because of this economic impact, it is a.rgued, the state taxes 
are (1) pre-empted by federal statutes regulating Indian 
affairs; (2) inconsistent with the principle of tribal self-
government; and (3) invalid under "negative implications•' 
of the IndUl.n Commerce Clause. 
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It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the 
srnokeshops to persons corning from outside is not generated 
on the reservations by activities in which the Tribes have a 
significant interest. Cf. Moe v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 
supra, at 475-481; McClanahan v. Arizona State Ta:r 
Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164 (1973) . What the srnokeshops offer 
these customers, and what is not available elsewhere, is solely 
an exemption from state taxation. The Tribes assert the 
power to create such exemptions by imposing their own taxes 
or otherwise earning revenues by participa.ting in the reserva~ 
tion enterprises. If this assertion were accepted, the Tribes 
could impose a nominal tax and open chains of discount stores 
at reservation borders, selling goods of all descriptions at deep 
discounts and drawing custom from surrounding areas. We 
do not believe that princip1es of federal Indian law, whether 
stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal self-government, or 
otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemp~ 
tion from state taxation to persons who would norma:lly do 
their business elsewhere. 
The federal statutes cited to us, even when given the 
broadest reading to which they are fairly susceptible, cannot 
be said to pre-empt Washington:'s sales and cigarette taxes. 
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 
U. S. C. § 461 et seq., the Indian Financing Act of 1974, 88 
Stat. 77, 25 U. S. C. § 1451 et seq., and the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 88 Stat. 
2203, 25 U. S. C. § 450 et seq., evidence to varying degr~es a 
congressional concern with fostering tribal self-government 
and economic development, but none goes so far as to grant 
triba.I enterprises selling goods to nonmembers an artificial 
competitive advantage over all other businesses in a State. 
The Indian traders statutes, 25 U. S. C. § 261 et seq., incor-
porate a congressional desire comprehensively to regulate 
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exchauge, see Warren Trading Post v. 'Pax Cormn'n, 380 U. S. 
685 (1965) , but no similar intent is evident with respect to 
sale by Indians to nonmembers of the Tribe. The Washing-
ton Enabling Act, 25 Stat. 676, reflects an intent that the 
State not tax reservation lands or income derived therefrom, 
but the present taxes are assessed against nonmembers of the 
Tribes and concern transactions in personalty with no substan-
tial connection to reservation lands. The relevant treaties, 
Treaty of Point Elliott, 12 Stat. 927 (Lummi Tribe); Treaty 
with the Makah Tribe, 12 Stat. 939; Treaty with the Y akimas, 
12 Stat. 951, can be read to recognize inherent tribal power to 
exclude non-Indians or impose conditions on those permitted 
to enter ; but purchasers entering the reservation are not the 
State's agents and any agreements which they might make 
cannot bind it. Finally, although the Tribes themselves could 
perhaps pre-empt state taxation through the exercise of 
properly delegated federal power to do so, cf. Fisher v. District 
Court, 424 U. S. 382, 390 (1976) (per curiam); United States 
v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544 (1975), we do not infer from the 
mere fact of federal approval of the Indian taxing ordinances, 
or from the fact that the Tribes exercise congressionally 
sanctioned powers of self-government, that Congress has dele-
gated the far-reaching authority to pre-empt valid state sales 
and cigarette taxes otherwise collectible from nonmembers of 
the Tribe. 
Washington does not infringe the right of reservation 
Indians tci "make their own laws and be ruled by them," 
Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220 (1959), merely because 
the result of imposing its taxes will be to deprive the Tribes 
of revenues which they currently are receiving. The principle 
of tribal self-government, grounded in notions of inherent sov-
ereignty and in congressional policies, seeks an accommoda-
tion between the interests of the Tribes and the Federal 
Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the 
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other. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S, 
164, 179 ( 1973) . While the Tribes do have an interest in rais-
ing revenues for essential governmental programs, that interest 
is strongest when , the revenues are derived from value gen-
erated on the reservation ,by ·activities involving the Tribes 
and when the taxpayer is the recipient of tribal services: - The 
State also has a legitimate governmental' interest in raising 
revenues, and that interest is likewise strongest when the tax 
is directed at off-reservation value and when the taxpayer is 
the recipient of state services. As we have already noted, 
Washington's taxes are reasonably designed to prevent the 
Tribes from marketing their tax exemption to nonmembers 
who do not receive significant tribal services and who would 
otherwise purchase their cigarettes outside the reservations. 
It can no longer be seriously argued that the Indian Com .. 
merce Clause, of -its own force, automatically bars all state 
taxation of matters significantly touching the political and 
economic interests of the ·Tribes. See Moe v. Salish & Koo-
tenai T·ribes, supra, at 481, n. 17. That clause may have a 
more limited role to play in preventing undue discrimination 
against, or burdens on, Indian commerce. But Washington's 
taxes are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner to· aU trans-
actions within the Sta.te. And although the result of these 
taxes will be to lessen or eliminate tribal commerce with non-
members, that market existed in tlie firsl place only because of 
a claimed exemption from these very ta.xes: The taxes under 
consideration do not 'burden commerce that would exist on the 
reservations without respect to the tax exemption. 
We cannot fault the State for not giving credit on the 
amount of tribal taxes paid. It is argued that if a credit is 
not given, the tribal retailers· will actually be placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage, as compared to retailers elsewhere, due 
to the overlapping impact of tribal and state taxation. While 
this argument is not without force, we find that the ·Tribes 
· h~v~ f~iled tQ demonstratE;) that b1,1sines~ at the smokeshopa 
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would be significantly reduced by a state tax without a credit 
as compared to a state tax with a credit. With a credit, prices 
at the smokeshops would presumably be roughly the same as 
those off the reservation, assuming that the Indian enter-
prises are operated at an efficiency similar to that of businesses 
'elsewhere; without a credit, prices at smokeshops would exceed 
those off the reservation by the amount of the tribal taxes, 
'about 40-to-50 cents per carton for the Lummi, Makah, and 
Colville Tribes, and 22.5 cents per carton for the Yakima 
Tribe. It is evident that even if credit were given, the bulk 
of the smokeshops' present business would still be eliminated, 
-eince nonresidents of the reservation could purchase ciga-
rettes at the same price and with greater convenience nearer 
their homes and would have no incentive to travel to the 
smokeshops for bargain purchases as they do now. Members 
of the Tribes, of course, would be indifferent to whether a 
credit were given because under Moe they are immune from 
any state tax, whether credited or not. Some nonmembers 
of the Tribes living on the reservations would possibly travel 
elsewhere to purchase cigarettes if a state credit were not 
given, and smokeshop business would to this extent be 
decreased as compared to the situation under a credited tax. 
But the Tribes have not shown whether or to what extent 
this would be the case, and we cannot infer on the present 
record that by failing to give a credit Washington imper-
missibly taxes reservation value by deterring sales that, if 
credit were given, would occur on the reservation because of 
its location and because of the efforts of the Tribes in import-
ing and marketing the cigarettes. 
A second asserted ground for the invalidity of the state 
taxes is that they somehow conflict with the Tribes' cigarette 
t>rdinances and thereby are subject to pre-emption or contra-
vene the principle of tribal self-government. This argument 
need not detain us. There is no d1rect conflict between the 
1tate and tribal schemes, since each government is free to 
'· 
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impose its taxes without ousting the other. Although taxes 
can be used for distributive or regulatory purposes, as well as 
for raising revenue, we see no nonrevenue purposes to the 
tribal taxes at issue in these cases, .and, as already noted, we 
perceive no intent on the part of Congress to authorize the 
Tribes to pre-empt otherwise valid state taxes. Other provi-
sions of the tribal ordinances do comprehensively regulate the 
ma.rketing of cigarettes by the tribal enterprises; but the State 
does not interfere with the Tribes' power to regulate tribal 
enterprises when it simply imposes its tax on sales to non-
members. Hence, we perceive no conflict between state and 
tribal law warranting invalidation of the State's taxes. 
c 
We recognized in Moe that if a State's tax is valid, the State 
tnay impose at least minimal burdens on Indian businesses to 
aid in <'Ollecting and enforcing that tax. The simple ·Collec-
tion burden imposed by Washington's cigarette tax on tribal 
smokeshops is legally indistinguishable from the collection 
burden upheld in Moe, and we therefore hold tha.t the State 
ma.y validly require the tribal smokeshops to affix tax stamps 
purchased from the State to individual packages of cigarettes 
prior to the time of sale to nonmembers of the Tribe. 
The state sales tax scheme requires smokeshop operators to 
keep detailed records of both taxable and nontaxable transac-
tions. The operator must record the number and dollar 
volume of taxable sales to nonmembers of the Tribe. With 
respect to nontaxable sales, the operator must record and 
retain for state inspection the names of all Indian purchasers, 
their tribal affiliations, the Indian reservations within which 
sales are made, and the dollar amount and dates of sales. 
In addition, unless the Indian purchaser is personally known 
to the operator he must present a tribal identification card. 
The District Court struck down all recordkeeping require-· 
ments with respect to cigarette sales, because it found that no 
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tlther than cigarettes, the District Court found no record evi-
dence "as to whether the record keeping requirements, as 
promulgated, are or are not reasonably necessary to ensure 
payment of lawful taxes." 446 F. Supp., at 1373. The Dis-
trict Court upheld the requirements insofar as they pertained 
to taxable sales, but struck them down with respect to non-
taxable sales on the ground that the State had not met its 
burden of showing that the regulation was reasonably neces-
s~ry to ensure payment of taxes which it had power to impose. 
Contrary to the District Court, we find the State's record-
keeping requirements valid in toto. The Tribes, and not the 
State as the District Court supposed, bear the burden of show-
ing that the recordkeeping requirements which they are chal-
lenging are invalid. The District Court made the factual 
finding, which we accept, that there was no evidence of record 
on this question. Applying the correct burden of proof to the 
District Court's finding, we hold that the Tribes have failed 
to demonstrate tha.t the State's recordkeeping requirements 
for exempt sales are not reasonably necessary as a means of 
preventing fraudulent transactions. 
D 
The St.ate asserts the power to apply its sales and cigarette 
taxes to Indians resident on the reserva.tion but not enrolled 
in the governing Tribe. The issue arose in the Yakima case 
in the wake of the District Court's determination that the 
state reta.il sales tax could be applied to the purchase by non-
Indians of goods other than cigarettes. It was, of course, 
quite clear after Moe and McClanahan tha.t the sales tax could 
not be applied to similar purchases by tribal members, but the 
State argued that this exemption should not extend to non-
members of the Tribe. Relying in part on the lower court 
opinion in Moe, Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. 
Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1312 (Mont. 1975·) (three-judge 
court), the District Court rejected the contention. 446 F. 
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Moe because Montana failed to raise it on appeal. We do 
reach it now, and we reverse. 
Federal statutes, even given the broadest reading to which 
they are reasonably susceptible, cannot be said to pre-empt 
Washington's power to impose its taxes on Indians not mem-
bers of the Tribe. We do not so· read the Major Crimes Act, 
62 Stat. 758, as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 1153, which at most 
provides for federal-court jurisdiction over crimes committed 
Ly Indians on another Tribe's reservation. Cf. United States 
v. Antelope, 430 U. S. 641 , 646- 647, n. 7 (1977) . Similarly, 
the mere fact that nonmembers resident on the reservation 
come within the definition of "Indian" for purposes of the 
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 988, 25 U. S. C. 
§ 479, does not demonstrate a congressional intent to exempt 
such Indians from state taxation. 
Nor would the imposition of Washington's tax on these pur-
chasers contravene the principle of tribal self-government, for 
the simple reason that nonmembers are not constituents of 
the governing Tribe. For most practical purposes those 
Indians stand on the same footing as non-Indians resident on 
the reservation. There is no evidence that nonmembers have 
a say in tribal affairs or significantly share in tribal disburse-
ments. We find, therefore, that the State's interest in taxing 
these purchasers outweighs any tribal interest that may exist 
in preventing the State from imposing its taxes. 
E 
Finally, the State contends that it has the power to seize 
unstamped cigarettes as contraband if the Tribes do not coop· 
erate in collecting the State's taxes. The State in fact seized 
shipments travelling to the reservations from out-of-State 
wholesalers before being enjoined from doing so by the Dis-
trict Court, and it has declared its intention to continue such 
seizures if successful in this litigation. The Tribes contest 
this power, noting that because sales by wholesalers to the 
tribal businesses are concededly exempt from state taxation, 
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We find that Washington's interest in enforcing its valid 
taxes is sufficient to justify these seizures. Although the 
cigarettes in transit are as yet exempt from state taxation, they 
l,U"e not immune from seizure when the Tribes, as here, have 
refused to fulfill collection and remittance obligations which 
the State has validly imposed. It is significant that these 
seizures take place outside the reservation, in locations where 
state power over Indian affairs is considerably more expansive 
than it is within reservation boundaries. Cf. M esoalero 
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U. S. 145 (1973). By seizing 
cigarettes en route to the reservation, the Sta.te polices against 
wholesale evasion of its own valid taxes without unnecessarily 
intruding on core tribal interests. 
Washington further contends that it may enter onto the 
reservations, seize stocks of ciga.rettes which are intended for 
sale to nonmembers, and sell' these stocks in order to obtain 
payment of the taxes due. However, this question, which 
obviously is considerably different from the preceding one, is 
not properly before us. The record does not disclose that the 
State has ever entered the reservations to seize cigarettes 
because of the Tribes' failure to collect the taxes due on 
sales to nonmembers, or ever threatened to do so except in 
papers filed in this litigation. Indeed, the State itself con-
cedes that "it may very well be that this Court will find it 
unnecessary to rule on this aspect of the appeal." Brief for 
Appellant 110. We therefore express no opinion on the 
matter. 
v 
The next issue concerns the challenge in the Colville case 
to the Washington motor vehicle and mobile home, camper 
and travel trailer taxes. Although not identical, these taxes 
are quite similar. Each is denominated an excise tax for the 
"privilege" of using the covered vehicle in the Sta.te, each is 
assessed annually at a certain percentage of fair market value, 
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the Tribe or its members and used both on and off the 
reservation. 29 
Once again, our departure point is Moe. 'There we held 
that Montana's pei_'sonal property tax could not ·validly be 
applied to motor vehicles, owned by tribal members who re-
sided on the reservation. 425 U.S., at 480-481. The vehicles 
Montana attempted to tax were apparently used both on and 
off the reservation,30 and the tax was assessed annually at a 
percentage of market value of the vehicles in question. Thus, 
the only differenqe between the taxes now before us and the one 
struck down in Moe is that these are called excise taxes and 
imposed for the privilege of using the vehicle in the State, 
while the Montana tax was labelled a personal property tax. 
The State asserts that this difference ·mandates a different 
result. In Moe, it argues, the District Court concluded that 
the taxable event was "the ownership of a motor vehicle as of 
January 1 of each year," 31 and that event took place on the 
reservation. Accordingly, under McClanahan v. Arizona 
State Tax Comm'n, supra, Montana was without authority 
to impose its tax. In the present case, the State continues, 
the taxable event is the use within the State of the vehicle in 
question. Thus, we are told, the McClanahan principle is 
inapplicable and the tax should be upheld under Mescalero 
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U . S. 145 (1973). 
29 In the wake of McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, supra, 
and Moe, the State does not claim that it can impose these taxes upon 
vehicles used wholly within the reservation. Brief for Appellant 111, and 
n. 77. 
30 Moe did not focus upon vehicle use at all. The District Court opin-
ion in that case, however, indicates that some of the vehicles to which 
Montana sought to apply its tax were used both on and off the reserva-
tion. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Montana, 392 F. Supp. 
1325, 1328-1329 (Mont. 1975) (three-judge court) (Smith, J., concurring 
and dissenting) . 
31 ld., at 1327, citing the Montana statute, Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. 
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We do not think Moe and McClanahan can be this easily 
circumvented. While Washington may well be free to levy 
a tax on the use outside the reservation of Indian-owned 
vehicles, it may not under that rubric accomplish what Moe 
held was prohibited. Had Washington tailored its tax to the 
amount of actual off-reservation use, or otherwise varied some-
thing more than mere nomenclature, this might be a different 
case. But it has not done so, and we decline to treat the 
case as if it had. 
VI 
Finally, we come to the challenge by the Colville, Lummi, 
and Makah Tribes to the State's assumption of civil and 
criminal jurisdiction over them. The District Court found 
that assumption unlawful as regards the Makah and Lummi 
reservations and lawful as regards the Colville reservation . 
446 F. Supp., at 1366-1367. The State challenges the former 
findings. 
All parties apparently recognize that this issue is controlled 
by the intervening decision in the State's favor in Washington 
v. Yak·ima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979). There a pat-
tern of jurisdiction identical to those created on the Makah 
and Lummi reservations was upheld, and the holdinp; of the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on which the District 
Court in the present case relied for its conclusion that such 
patterns are unconstitutional was reversed. We therefore 
uphold the State's assumption of jurisdiction over the Makah 
and Lummi reservations.82 Accordingly, the judgment of the 
District Court is 
Reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
82 We :aste pmbable jttfiscliction 1n No. 78-60, Confederated Tribes of 
the Colville Indian Reservation et al. v. Washington et al., which is pend-
ing on appeal
2 
~ the Colville Tribe appeals from so much of the Dis-
trict Court's JUdgment as reflects the holding that Washington's assump-
tion of total jurisdictjou over that Tribe '::; reservation was lawful. See 446 
F. Supp., at 1366- 1367. The Colville Tribe challenges that holding on 
'7 6~m-OPINJON 
28 WASHINGTON v. CONFEDERATED TRIBES 
grounds (1) that Washington could not assume jurisdiction without amend~ 
ing itl:! constitution and (2) that the assumption of total jurisdiction over 
only selected reservations viola.tes the Equal Protection Clause. Wash-
ington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463 (1979), disposes of the 
first contention, id., at 493, and makes clear that the second must fail 
if the assumption of jurisdiction is rationally related to some valid state 
purpo~e, id., at 500-502. We find the pattern of jurisdiction in the 
present case rational : The Colville Tribe consented in 1965 to the State's 
·assumption of jurisdiction over it, and the !Sta.te has assumed total juris-
diction only over Tribes that have so consented. The presence or 
absence of tribal consent is a rational basis for distinguishing among 
reservations, and there is thus no constitutional infirmity. Accordin~y~ 
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